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 This study joins a nascent body of scholarship that seeks to enrich and 
complicate understanding of 1950s political culture. While this newer scholarship 
acknowledges conservative dominance, it has also uncovered considerable evidence 
that the period was far more politically diverse and contested. This study 
demonstrates that there was no single, unitary conservative Americanism or 
patriotism in the fifties decade. Instead, the American Veterans Committee, despite 
suffering heavy membership losses after purging the Communist Party from its ranks 
in the late 1940s, survived, regrouped and persistently challenged the hegemonic 
conservative American Legion, (the nation‘s largest veterans‘ organization) 
throughout the 1950s. Using a liberal version of what I term Cold War Americanism, 
the AVC attempted to defend and advance the New Deal legacy. The Legion, 
however, using a conservative version of anti-Communist discourse, joined with its 
counterparts in the postwar Right to oppose the interventionist liberal state. I explore 
the role of these contending languages in shaping 1950s political culture by analyzing 
how these two groups used Cold War Americanism to advance their respective 
interest concerning two of the period‘s most important domestic issues: the restriction 
on civil liberties, and the developing struggle for African-American civil rights. This 
study demonstrates that within the community of organized veterans, the American 
Legion was not the only voice heard in the 1950s. Any account of this period that 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Speaking to the Chicago Accident and Health Association on May 17, 1950, 
American Legion national commander George N. Craig leveled a blistering attack on 
the State Department, declaring that it ―reeks with deceit, depravity and double talk.‖ 
The next day, as the New York Times reported, Michael Straight, national chairman of 
the American Veterans Committee (AVC) publicly denounced the speech as a 
―defense‖ of Sen. Joseph McCarthy. As Straight charged, ―the Legion has used the 
same pack of lies and malicious gossip as is contained in McCarthy‘s original charges 
against the State Department.‖ Further, Straight declared, ―AVC is shocked that an 
organization which claims to be patriotic is joining this un-American attempt to 
undermine the faith of the American people in their government. At this critical time 
in the struggle against Soviet communism the bipartisan foreign policy as expressed 
by the State Department should be vigorously supported by all patriotic 
organizations.‖ As Straight concluded, the speech constituted ―another boost for Joe 
Stalin.‖ Undeterred by the AVC, the Legion continued its attacks on the State 
Department. At their October 1950 national convention Legionnaires passed a 
resolution that denounced Secretary of State Dean Acheson and ―the presence in the 
Department of State itself of men well known to possess Communist leanings and 
tendencies or perhaps even Communist party membership… [for] the failure of the 
State Department to deal adequately with the grim and bloody advance of 
communism throughout the world.‖
1
  
                                                 
1
 New York Times, May 18, 1950, 13; AVC Bulletin, May, 1950, 2. For the Legion‘s 1950 convention 




Far more than a disagreement over charges of Communist influence in the 
State Department informed the actions of these two organizations. As this study 
argues, the use of anti-Communist rhetoric in this episode reflected two distinct and 
competing political agendas concerning the legitimacy of the postwar New Deal. 
Founded in 1919 during the height of the WWI Red Scare to lobby for federal aid to 
veterans and to combat domestic ―Bolshevism,‖ the Legion emerged in the interwar 
decades as one of the nation‘s premier anti-Communist organizations.
2
 Yet beginning 
in the late 1940s, and continuing throughout the 1950s, the Legion played a 
significant role in the efforts of the postwar Right to halt the postwar New Deal. As 
did other conservative individuals and organizations,
3
 the Legion sought to discredit 
liberal reform by associating its vast enlargement of centralized federal authority over 
domestic affairs with Soviet Communism. From its conservative perspective, the 
Legion viewed the postwar liberal welfare state as an unwarranted encroachment 
upon individual liberty, the system of unregulated free enterprise, and state‘s rights. 
These elements informed a conservative Americanism critical of the New Deal as 
                                                                                                                                           
passed similar resolutions against the State Department. The 1951 national convention called for ―the 
immediate removal of the present corps of [State Department] leaders‖ for their ―incompetence, 
indecision and defeatism,‖ and, ―the removal from office in that department, and all other government 
departments, of any and all persons who are not in full sympathy with our opposition to communism.‖ 
As convention delegates declared, ―They must be replaced and the State Department reconstituted with 
men of unquestioned loyalty.‖ Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, in Proceedings of the 
31
st
 National Convention of the American Legion, Miami, FL, October 15-18, 1951, published as 




 Session  84-85, 88. The 1952 Legion convention 
condemned State Department leaders for their ―outright refusal to act‖ effectively against ―the dangers 
of communism.‖ It also called for the administration to remove Acheson from his position. New York 
Times, August 28, 1952, 1. 
2
 William Pencak, For God & Country: The American Legion, 1919-1941 (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1989), xii, 14. 
3
 On the conservative anti-New Deal backlash, see Robert Griffith, The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. 




―communistic‖ since the late 1930s
4
, and as the Cold War intensified, they were 
reasserted in a resurgent postwar nationalist and anti-Communist discourse I term 
Cold War Americanism. Throughout the 1950s, the Legion regularly drew upon this 
political language to depict the New Deal domestic reform agenda as detrimental to 
American national security interests. In these representations, the Legion depicted 
liberal reform and its allies as ―alien,‖ ―un-American,‖ ―disloyal,‖ and 
―communistic.‖ Conversely, the group represented the values and practices of self-
reliant individualism, laissez-faire free enterprise and state supremacy over local 
affairs as the embodiments of ―true‖ Americanism that were indispensable to United 
States success in the Cold War.  
The AVC on the other hand primarily used anti-Communist rhetoric as a 
language of reform to counter conservative opposition to the New Deal. Formed in 
1944 by reform-minded WWII veterans as an alternative to the Legion, the AVC 
advanced a liberal version of Cold War Americanism discourse that embraced the 
power of the interventionist state as a positive development, and promoted its 
expansion to ensure that the nation lived up to its core ideals of democracy and 
equality of opportunity for all Americans. This liberal Americanism had been forged 
between the New Deal state and the millions of citizens it had protected from 
powerful economic interests at home and authoritarian dictatorships abroad.
5
  
                                                 
4
 Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), 159.  
5
 Gerstle, American Crucible, Chapter 4, esp., 133-139, 140-141,185-186, and, Chapter 5; John 
Bodnar, ed. Bonds of Affection: Americans Define Their Patriotism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 9-10, 11-12. As Gary Gerstle has noted the strong liberal nationalism 
generated by the New Deal ensured that many Americans conceived of their support for its programs 





Anti-Communism played a central role in shaping the AVC. During the 
tumultuous late 1940s disintegration of the Popular Front liberal-left alliance, the 
AVC, like many other postwar liberal organizations, purged the Communists from its 
ranks and permanently barred them from membership
6
 But the AVC‘s postwar 
agenda focused on strengthening the bonds of liberal nationalism and the social and 
economic policies that sustained them, not the Communist menace. Even at the height 
of the Red Scare, the AVC, unlike the American Legion, did not make anti-
Communism a ―cause.‖ While the Cold War, as Mary Dudziak observes, ―created a 
constraining environment for domestic politics,‖ and narrowed ―acceptable [political] 
discourse,‖ Cold War Americanism discourse nevertheless provided the AVC and 
other liberals with a rhetoric to press their case for reform.
7
  
The AVC used this language to portray conservative opposition to liberal 
reform as detrimental to national commitments to improve democracy and equal 
opportunity at home and abroad, that is, as an attack on the same set of ideals federal 
officials used to advance U.S. leadership of the free world against international 
Communism. Thus, the AVC‘s Cold War lexicon represented anti-reform efforts as 
the work of ―false patriots‖ and ―subversives.‖ By depicting anti-New Deal policies 
as ―disloyal,‖ and ―un-patriotic‖ threats to national security, the AVC simultaneously 
implied that its own proposals were unambiguously ―patriotic,‖ and thoroughly 
                                                 
6
 Robert L. Tyler, ―The American Veterans Committee: Out of a Hot War and Into the Cold,‖ 
American Quarterly 18 (Autumn, 1966): 431-433. 
7
 Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, 








Although Cold War Americanism rhetoric was widely used by other reformers 
and conservatives, this study does not maintain that it was the only means organized 
veterans used to promote their agendas. But the evidence reveals that this discourse 
permeated the public statements of both the Legion and the AVC, and that both 
groups considered it to be of primary tactical value. Several key themes emerge from 
this study. First, despite the conservative climate engendered by the Cold War, the 
1950s did not produce a unitary, fixed understanding of what constituted patriotism or 
Americanism. Second, while both groups claimed they represented a singular ―true‖ 
Americanism, the distinctly different and contending meanings they ascribed to the 
concept reveals both its fluidity and the fact that it reflected fundamental 
disagreement, not consensus, among many organized veterans over the shape of the 
postwar political and social order. Third, the example of the AVC exposes the limits 
of Cold War rhetoric as a language of reform in the 1950s. Despite the efforts of the 
AVC to link the need for liberal change to the goals of the Cold War, its successes in 
this period were rare and, at most, marginal. The overwhelmingly conservative and 
repressive nature of Cold War political culture severely constrained the ability of 
liberal veterans to effectively challenge the Legion on anything approaching equal 
                                                 
8
 My understanding of anti-Communist rhetoric as a liberal language of reform relies heavily upon the 
recent work of Joanne Meyerowitz, and Mary Dudziak: Joanne Meyerowitz, ―Sex, Gender and the 
Cold War Language of Reform,‖ Chapter 5 in Rethinking Cold War Culture, eds. Peter J. Kuznick and 
James Gilbert (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 106-123; Mary L. Dudziak, 
Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000.) As Meyerowitz observes, ―[A]s a political discourse adopted by a wide range 
of conservative, liberals, and even radicals, Cold War language had different meanings and different 
uses in different political contexts. For certain reformers, the Cold War offered a new vocabulary for 
extending democratic ideals and demanding individual freedom.‖ Meyerowitz, ―Sex, Gender and the 




terms. Also, even when used as a reform language, liberal anti-Communist rhetoric 
undoubtedly helped reinforce dominant Cold War meanings supporting the 
conservative forces it opposed.
9
  
This study then advances two main arguments. First, although the Cold War 
did provide a basis for promoting liberalism, the example of the AVC in this period 
highlights the ineffectiveness of Cold War language in advancing reform. Second, 
while this study is primarily a story of conservative hegemony within the organized 
veterans‘ community, the AVC‘s persistence in challenging the Legion disrupts the 
notion that an untrammeled conservative consensus defined the political culture of the 
1950s. Indeed, as this study argues, the existence of conflicting understandings of 
both Americanism and the Cold War‘s purpose among organized veterans sheds 
additional light that deepens and complicates understanding of the political culture in 
these years.  
I explore these arguments by analyzing how these groups used Cold War 
discourse to advance their interests concerning two of the most important domestic 
issues that shaped the decade‘s political culture: the restriction of civil liberties, and 
the emerging struggle for African American civil rights.
10
 In developing these 
                                                 
9
 As Meyerowitz observes in her study of women and sexual rights reformers, ―In using Cold War 
language…[t]hey reinscribed the ideology of the Cold War as they attempted to carve out respectable 
oppositional niches on gender and sexuality.‖ Meyerowitz, ―Sex, Gender and the Cold War Language 
of Reform,‖ 117. For a discussion of the fluid nature of Americanism, see Michael Kazin and Joseph 
McCartin, eds. Americanism: New Perspectives on the History of An Ideal (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006). 
10
 Throughout this study, the terms civil liberties and civil rights are defined differently. By civil 
liberties I refer to those individual rights and freedoms, such as the right to free speech, expression and 
assembly that are guaranteed by the Constitution and federal law from infringement by the 
government. Civil rights, on the other hand, are understood to be those legal rights that protect 
individuals from discrimination or unequal treatment based upon such factors as their race, gender or 
national origin. See entry, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, by John E. Semonche, in Kermit L. Hall 
and others, eds., The Oxford Companion to American Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 




arguments, I rely upon and contribute to recent historiography in several main ways. 
First, in uncovering how the AVC used Cold War rhetoric to promote liberalism, this 
study contributes to a nascent revisionist literature emphasizing the Cold War‘s 
positive influence on domestic reform. As these studies contend, while the Cold War 
fostered political and cultural conservatism, it simultaneously created political space 
for advancing liberal change. Susan Hartman and Joanne Meyerowitz, for instance, 
found that while the Cold War reinforced traditional domestic roles for women, 
middle class women used Cold War rhetoric to promote their claims for equal access 
to professional occupations reserved for men by arguing that national security 
demanded the full mobilization of all human resources. While these arguments 
softened attitudes against employing middle class women, they also helped convince 
federal authorities to provide funding for educating women in the sciences.
11
 
Similarly, while scholars have shown how Cold War red-baiting undermined racial 
reform,
12
 Mary Dudziak has shown that black leaders successfully pressured 
government officials to make improvements in civil rights by arguing that racial 
inequality at home undermined U.S. efforts to sell democracy abroad to win the Cold 
War. Yet despite these successes, as Steve Lawson observes, Dudziak inadequately 
addressed the limits of this strategy to generate reform.
13
 In highlighting the failure of 
                                                 
11
 Susan M. Hartmann, ―Women‘s Employment and the Domestic Ideal in the Early Cold War Years,‖ 
Chapter 5 in Joanne Meyerowitz, ed. Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 
1945-1960 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 86; 90; 97-98; Meyerowitz, ―Sex, Gender 
and the Cold War Language of Reform,‖ 112. 
12
 Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University 
of  North Carolina Press, 1996). 
13
 Mary Duziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2000); See Steve Lawson‘s review of Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, in 
American Historical Review 107 (February, 2002):  246-247. As Lawson notes, ―the Cold War 
supplied leverage African Americans could exploit, but it was not sufficient to force the State 




the AVC‘s Cold War arguments to advance civil rights and civil liberties this study 
helps fill this scholarly gap, and demonstrates the extremely limited role of the Cold 
War as a force for liberal change. 
In emphasizing the ideological and political conflicts between the Legion and 
the AVC, this study also contributes to recent scholarship that has challenged and 
complicated the notion of a postwar consensus. As recent studies reveal, an analytical 
lens focused solely on elements of the period‘s acknowledged conformity and 
moderate conservatism misses a far more dynamic and complex historical reality. 
Indeed, as Thomas Sugrue contends, ―the 1940 and 1950s was a period of intense 
cultural contestation, not of homogeneity or consensus,‖ resulting in ―a series of 
battles—political, economic, and cultural—to define American society.‖ As Sugrue 
has shown, racial discord and resistance to civil rights, often violent, was not confined 
to the segregated South; rather it pervaded postwar Northern society generally, and 
was rife even among liberalism‘s seemingly most devout unionized white constituents 
in Detroit.
14
 As this study reveals the national American Legion, the largest postwar 
veterans‘ organization, was a major force for segregation in the 1950s. The sharply 
conflicting positions of the Legion and the AVC on civil rights reform uncovered in 
this study further underscore the lack of consensus in postwar race relations. Also, the 
                                                 
14
 Thomas Sugrue, ―Reassessing the History of Post War America,‖ in Prospects: An Annual of 
American Cultural Studies 20 (1995): 494-495; and, Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: 
Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); and Thomas 
Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: 
Random House, 2008). Meyerowitz also challenges the postwar consensus paradigm in a recent 
collection of essays documenting women‘s postwar reform activism that defies the notion that all 
women conformed to prescribed consensus norms of domesticity. Joanne Meyerowitz, ed. Not June 
Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1994). Similarly, in his path breaking examination of masculinity in the 1950s, James B. Gilbert 
discovered no ―single, prevailing agreed-upon norm of masculinity,‖ but instead, ―not only variety, but 
the contending shapes of gender that began to look like the diversity expressed so famously in the next 
decades.‖ James B. Gilbert, Men in the Middle: Searching for Masculinity in the 1950s (Chicago: 




existence of two contending versions of Americanism among these groups also 
accords with the findings of recent scholars challenging the consensus interpretation. 
As historian Stuart Little argues, while federal officials and corporations created the 
late 1940s Freedom Train program to both showcase and foster Cold War consensus 
ideology, it nevertheless mirrored ―the conflicting forces and languages within the 
political culture that were attempting to define American citizenship and 
Americanism.‖
15
 Furthermore, in demonstrating that organized veterans used anti-
Communism to advance opposite political agendas, this study sheds additional light 
on Joanne Meyerowitz‘s contention that the meanings of anti-Communism were not 
fixed or stable, but instead malleable and contested, and therefore capable of 
supporting the needs of various political interests.
16
  
In making this argument I depart from recent scholarship on postwar veterans, 
in particular the work of Robert Saxe, who maintains that the AVC‘s purge of the 
Communists in late 1940s, ensured its hitherto dissenting voice was ―subsumed in a 
cold war consensus.‖
17
 However, as this study argues, the AVC‘s anti-Communist 
rhetoric did not signal its unequivocal acceptance of the postwar anti-Communist 
consensus. Rather, its adoption of anti-Communism in the 1950s was primarily 
tactical, a rhetorical strategy to advance liberal reforms despite conservative 
hegemony. Indeed, because Saxe confines his analysis of the AVC to the late 1940s 
                                                 
15
 Stuart Little, ―The Freedom Train: Citizenship and Postwar Political Culture, 1946-1949,‖ American 
Studies 34 (Spring 1993): 38. 
16
 Meyerowitz, ―Sex, Gender and the Cold War Language of Reform,‖  107, 117. Philip Jenkins, for 
example, has also revealed how, after the 1946 elections, liberal Pennsylvania Democrats successfully 
used anti-Communist rhetoric to repel GOP red-baiting attacks and retain their large ethnic voting 
base. Philip Jenkins, Cold War at Home: The Red Scare in Pennsylvania, 1945-1960 (Chapel Hill: 
University of  North Carolina Press), Chapter 3, esp.  62-68. 
17
 Robert F. Saxe, Settling Down: World War Two Veterans’ Challenge to the Postwar Consensus 




and does not analyze the content of its anti-Communist language, he misses the story 
I tell in this study. As a result, he takes the civil rights activism of black ex-soldiers as 
evidence that they alone among veterans refused to conform to the dictates of a 
presumed postwar consensus. ―African American veterans offered a sustained and 
powerful critique of racial inequality in the United States.‖ Furthermore, he notes, ―In 
calling attention to racial divisions in America, black veterans were undermining the 
image of national unity that lay at the heart of the growing consensus culture.‖
18
 As 
will be seen, by this measure it is clear that the AVC, a vocal and persistent advocate 
of black civil rights and racial equality throughout the 1950s, did not succumb to an 
alleged postwar consensus.  
This account enriches historical scholarship on veterans in other ways. The 
relatively few extant studies of organized veterans in postwar politics focus on the 
late 1940s, leaving the 1950s uncharted territory. Aside from a few very brief 
examinations of the AVC in the late 1940s, no scholar has produced a full study of 
the Legion in the 1950s, or examined the history the AVC in the decade.
19
 This study 
then helps to fill some of these important scholarly gaps, in part by moving the 
chronology forward. Its focus on the Legion‘s ill liberalism, particularly in 
perpetuating racial segregation, serves as a counterweight to studies concerning the 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., 156. 
19
 The two extant essay length examinations of the AVC in the 1940s focus on its purge of the 
Communists: Robert L. Tyler, ―The American Veterans Committee: Out of a Hot war and Into the 
Cold,‖ American Quarterly 18 (Autumn 1966): 419-436; and, Saxe, Settling Down, Chapter 4.; for 
some additional mention of AVC in the 1940s, see Richard Severo and Lewis Milford, The Wages of 
War: When Soldiers Came Home, From Valley Forge to Vietnam  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1989), 309-314; and Jennifer Brooks, Defining the Peace: World War Two Veterans, Race and the 
Remaking of the Southern Political Tradition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 
45, 46, 49, 53, 54, 62, 63, 77. The only work that very briefly discusses some key AVC activities in the 
1950s is: Rodney G. Minott, Peerless Patriots: Organized Veterans and the Spirit of Americanism 




positive effects of the 1944 Servicemen‘s Readjustment Act, or G.I. Bill, on veterans 
and postwar society. Keith Olson‘s pioneering study found that the mass influx of 
G.I. Bill beneficiaries into universities made higher education more democratic and 
academically rigorous. Also, while acknowledging racial segregation within the 
Legion, Suzanne Mettler demonstrates the G.I. Bill produced a generation ―intensely 
involved in public life,‖ who made postwar society much more democratic.
20
 Yet this 
study reveals, the Legion‘s postwar policies regarding race suggest the need to 
reconsider veterans‘ roles as positive agents of postwar democracy.  
Existing studies also highlight the central role of veterans‘ organizations in 
shaping late 1940s domestic politics and fostering conservative dominance. Jennifer 
Brooks has shown that white moderate reform-minded and conservative WWII 
veterans in Georgia coalesced to help usher in a new southern order based upon white 
rule and economic modernization (without labor unions), defeating the reform efforts 
of their African American and liberal white counterparts.
21
 I build on this scholarship 
by showing that Southern Legionnaires actively resisted racial reform in decade that 
followed. Although Michael Kazin and Philip Jenkins briefly discuss the Legion‘s 
role as an important source of conservative anti-Communism in the postwar years, 




                                                 
20
 Keith W. Olson, The G.I. Bill, the Veterans, and the Colleges (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1974).  As Mettler observes, ―Beneficiaries became more intensely involved in public life, 
in activities long considered to be critical to self-governance and therefore the lifeblood of American 
democracy.‖ Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest 
Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 10, also see esp., 9, 133-134. 
21
 Jennifer Brooks, Defining the Peace: World War Two Veterans, Race and the Remaking of the 
Southern Political Tradition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
22
 Kazin discusses the Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars as important allies of the postwar 




One measure of the effects of conservative dominance over the political 
culture of the 1950s is the AVC‘s size. In 1956, the Legion had some 2,800,000 
members, and throughout the decade it commanded superior resources as the nation‘s 
largest organization of veterans.
23
 By the end of 1955, by contrast, the AVC had 
slightly over 30,000 members.
24
 Yet despite conservative hegemony, an editorial in 
1955 by then AVC national chairman Mickey Levine captures the significance of the 
AVC‘s presence in this exceedingly conservative era: ―[In] these troubled times—
Goliaths overrun the land but the Davids are few. If the AVC did not challenge 
Goliath, I mean the Legion, then the Legion would have been the ONLY 
VETERANS‘ voice heard.‖
25
 Indeed, while fully cognizant of the enormous power of 
conservative forces it confronted, the AVC nevertheless decided to press ahead in its 
role as an alternative voice to the Legion in the fifties. The AVC was not successful 
in obtaining its agenda, but despite Cold War pressures to otherwise conform to 
reigning conservative viewpoints it persisted through the period as a resilient 
advocate for liberal change. Throughout the decade, the group attracted leading 
liberal politicians into its membership ranks, and it worked in alliance with prominent 
liberal organizations in shaping the postwar reform agenda. While this study, then, 
underscores the theme of conservative dominance among veterans organizations, as 
exemplified by the American Legion, it also reveals that any full examination of the 
political culture of in these years that failed to take account of the AVC would be 
                                                                                                                                           
The Populist Persuasion: An American Story (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 178-183. Kazin, 
however, incorrectly assumes that the AVC essentially ceased to function in 1949, ibid, 178-179; 
Philip Jenkins, Cold War at Home, esp. 55-57, and passim, 94, 115-116, 118-119, 140. 
23
 Los Angeles Times, September 3, 1956, 4. 
24
 The AVC was ranked the fourth in size (respectively) behind the Legion, the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars and the American Veterans of World War Two (Amvets). New York Times, November 13, 1955, 
51. 
25




incomplete and inaccurate. While these two groups are the principal concern of this 
study, when appropriate, other veterans‘ organizations, specifically the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, the Catholic War Veterans, Jewish War Veterans, and the American 
Veterans of World War Two (Amvets), enter the story.  
Of these other groups, a study of the VFW‘s role in shaping Cold War culture 
would undoubtedly be interesting and shed further light on the topic of this study. It 
remained the second largest veterans‘ organization in the 1950s; and its anti-
Communist activities also paralleled those of the Legion.
26
 In 1955 the VFW had 1.6 
million members organized into 8,682 local posts in 1955.
27
 However, unlike the 
American Legion and the AVC, the VFW lacks a central archive of its records. This 
unfortunate fact dictated my research strategy from the beginning of this study. But 
since the Legion and the VFW shared the same conservative anti-Communist 
discourse, the VFW‘s inclusion in this study would not substantively alter the story I 
tell. 
One surprising finding of this study is that despite the AVC‘s constant 
criticisms of the Legion‘s actions, the Legion did not in turn attack the AVC. The 
Legion‘s decision not to retaliate reflected the fact that its overwhelming power made 
it largely impervious to such attacks. If the AVC annoyed the Legion at times, the 
Legion nonetheless remained unwilling to engage in direct debate.  
In the chapters that follow, I attempt to provide a more complete history of the 
role the Legion and the AVC in shaping the political culture of the 1950s. The first 
                                                 
26
 Kazin, The Populist Persuasion, 179-180.  
27
 For 1955 VFW membership, see Report of the Quartermaster General, 298, Proceedings of the 56
th
 
Encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Boston, MA, August 28-September 




 Session, 298.  For the number of 




two chapters focus on the issue of civil liberties to show how each group attempted to 
promote their larger political agendas. Chapter 1 argues that although the Legion‘s 
campaign against domestic subversion was in keeping with its historical role as a 
leading anti-radical organization, its main purpose in the 1950s was to stop the 
advance of the postwar New Deal. I begin the chapter with a brief overview the 
Legion‘s anti-subversive activities in the interwar years, and provide evidence that its 
anti-New Deal stance initially emerged in the late 1930s. I then examine how the 
Legion‘s post-WWII anti-Communist campaign, or Americanism program, primarily 
served as a vehicle to carry out its anti-New Deal agenda. I uncover this agenda by 
examining representations of the New Deal welfare state that appear in the American 
Legion Magazine, the activities of local Legion chapters, or posts, and in the Legion‘s 
work with important postwar conservative individuals and organizations. In these 
venues, the Legion used Cold War Americanism discourse to depict the New 
Deal/Fair Deal as unpatriotic, un-American and ―communistic.‖ 
This discussion sets the stage for a longer examination of the Legion‘s 
activities to control subversion, primarily in government, education, and the 
entertainment industry. As in the interwar decades, the postwar Legion 
indiscriminately lumped non-Communist liberals and Communists into the same 
category. But, as this chapter argues, the Legion‘s anti-subversive efforts in the 1950s 
were not primarily concerned with curtailing the Communists. Instead, as this chapter 





 Chapter 2 examines how the AVC attempted to counter these efforts and the 
extent to which it succeeded. While this chapter acknowledges the late 1940s purge of 
the Communist Party from the AVC, it argues that it primarily used a liberal version 
of Cold War Americanism discourse to promote the New Deal agenda. After 
establishing the AVC‘s pro-New Deal credentials, the chapter shifts the focus to 
examine how the group represented conservative encroachments on civil liberties in 
attempting to disassociate liberalism from radicalism. In these representations, 
conservative attempts to curb subversion became acts that facilitated the objectives of 
the Communists to weaken American democratic ideals and practices, in ways that 
undermined national security. These representations are first explored by examining 
the AVC‘s campaign against the foremost symbol of postwar conservative opposition 
to the postwar New Deal—Senator Joseph McCarthy. I subsequently analyze 
representations the group generated in its opposition to anti-subversive legislation and 
its defense of the civil liberties of a range of individuals and prominent liberal 
organizations. But as this chapter reveals, the AVC‘s attempts to reverse dominant 
conservative meanings of subversion rarely succeeded. As this chapter demonstrates, 
the AVC‘s failure to persuade national veterans‘ organizations to stem particularly 
excessive anti-subversive initiatives of their affiliates, as exemplified by the VFW in 
Norwalk, Connecticut, is emblematic of its inability to effectively challenge 
conservative hegemony in this period. 
The final fours chapters address the issue of civil rights. Chapter 3 focuses on 
the AVC‘s efforts to use anti-Communist language to promote civil rights policies. It 




in employment, housing, the armed forces, and G.I. Bill benefits for African –
American veterans. The remaining chapters focus on the racial policies and practices 
of the American Legion. Together they demonstrate how the Legion solidified into a 
major force for segregation in the 1950s. Chapter 4 sets the broader context for 
developing this theme by establishing that, throughout the decade, national Legion 
officials upheld the organization‘s long-standing interwar policy that permitted their 
state and local affiliates to segregate their memberships by race. Although the AVC, a 
few white and black liberal Legionnaires and black civil rights organizations used 
anti-Communist discourse to protest the Legion‘s racial policies, they proved unable 
to obtain reform. The chapter also examines how Supreme Court rulings establishing 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over the enforcement of sedition laws and increasing 
federal authority over civil rights strengthened pro-segregation forces within the 
Legion and stifled the possibility of reform.  
In Chapter 5, I examine the involvement of Legionnaires in the ―massive 
resistance‖ that erupted throughout the South against the emerging civil rights 
movement I focus this narrative on two main events. First I examine the efforts of the 
Mississippi State Legion to suppress the civil rights activism of its all-black unit, 
Jackson, Mississippi Post 214. Second, I examine the Legion‘s role in the crisis over 
efforts to desegregate Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. Once again, 
using Cold War discourse, liberal critics, including black Legionnaires, the AVC and 
the black press, protested the Legion‘s actions in these events. In attempting to 
advance reform, liberals depicted conservative efforts to suppress the freedom 




violating national commitments to freedom and equality for all citizens, 
segregationists directly aided the Soviets by providing them with a propaganda 
weapon to use against the United States in the Cold War. I also show how the Legion 
and the AVC promoted their agendas regarding segregation using their competing 
notions of Americanism to represent events in Little Rock. Yet despite efforts by 
liberals to discredit massive resistance as un-American, in the absence of a broader 
movement for reform, I demonstrate that the Legion‘s version of conservative 
Americanism remained dominant.  
As Chapter 6 shows, however, the 1950s saw some progress towards racial 
reform within the Legion. In late 1959, the Legion expelled its elite unit, the Society 
of the 40 & 8, from the national body, over its refusal to abolish its whites only 
membership rule. As the civil rights movement advanced the mid-1950s, the 40 & 8‘s 
racial restriction became a matter of national controversy. Opposition to the 
restriction intensified among black Legionnaires, some white Legionnaires, the AVC, 
black civil rights leaders, major newspapers and the black press. Despite ousting the 
40 & 8, the Legion upheld racial segregation within its own ranks. Furthermore, 
liberal Cold War arguments failed to advance reform. Rather, despite some interest 
within the Legion for racial progress, considerations of organizational self-interest 
primarily forced change. Although racial segregation remained intact, the expulsion 
of the 40 & 8 is nonetheless significant since it further illustrates that even within the 
Legion, conservative dominance in the 1950s was disrupted and challenged. In the 




Chapter 2: The Legion and Civil Liberties 
  
In late August 1947, the American Legion publicly announced its ― 
‗multimillion dollar‘ campaign for 1948 to fight Communist propaganda in the 
United States.‖ As the New York Times reported, the Legion proclaimed ―at least 
10,000,000 American homes will receive a booklet each month telling them about 
some fundamental advantages of American life.‖
28
 The following week, at their 
national convention, Legionnaires approved numerous Americanism Committee 
resolutions to expand their anti-Communist crusade. One from the New York 
delegation demanded, ―that the Communist Party be outlawed in the United States,‖ 
and that Communist Party membership ―or adherence to Communist 
doctrines…render any person ineligible for office or employment in any Federal 
office or agency.‖ Another resolution, introduced by the Wisconsin delegation, called 
for an amendment to the Bill of Rights denying its protections in federal and state 
court proceedings to ―subversive citizens‖ charged with ―promoting the overthrow of 
the Government of the United States by force.‖ Another called for the national 
headquarters to establish an anti-subversives training school ―without delay.‖ 
Underlying these actions, as the Mississippi delegation declared, was the belief that: 
―Communists and other subversive groups are actively endeavoring to substitute alien 
ideologies for the American way of life, and to overthrow our Constitution and 
Government.‖
29
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While these initiatives marked the onset of a wide-ranging Americanism 
program the Legion conducted in the 1950s, they also reflected strong continuity with 
its interwar history as one of the country‘s foremost anti-Communist organizations. 
As historian William Pencak has noted, ―Throughout much of the 1920s and 1930s, 
the Legion‘s was almost the only respectable voice crying that internal radical 
subversion seriously threatened the nation.‖
30
 As in the WWI years, the Legion‘s 
efforts to control subversives in the 1950s Red Scare contributed substantially to the 
overall retrenchment of civil liberties
31
 These infringements were, of course, very 
much in keeping with established American practices of denying Constitutional rights 
guarantees to Communists and other radicals, particularly during Red Scares when 
the public demanded intensified government suppression of dissenters.
32
 Further, as 
in the interwar period, many Legionnaires in the post-WWII years continued to 
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Yet, as this chapter contends, the primary target the Legion‘s effort to define 
and control subversion in the 1950s was not the Communists and their supposed 
sympathizers, but rather, New Deal liberalism itself. Throughout the 1950s, the 
American Legion joined in the broader movement of other conservative organizations 
and individuals to halt the advance of liberal reform. In keeping with the postwar 
conservative backlash against liberalism, the Legion attacked the New Deal state as a 
force that fundamentally threatened the survival of individual freedom, private 
enterprise and state‘s rights. These elements informed a 1930s conservative 
Americanism that attempted to discredit the New Deal by associating it with 
Communism.
34
 After the war, the Right reasserted them in a political language of 
revived nationalism and anti-Communism, which I term conservative Cold War 
Americanism. In attempting to cast the New Deal into disrepute, the Legion drew 
heavily upon this discourse, depicting liberal reform and its allies as ―subversive,‖ 
―alien,‖ and ―un-American‖—in short, as a threat to national security. As will be 
seen, at both the national and local levels, the Legion‘s efforts to promote anti-
liberalism in this period proved largely successful. 
The American Legion was formed in Paris, France in February 1919 by an 
energetic group of young Army officers, including Theodore Roosevelt Jr., former 
Missouri Congressman Bennett Champ Clark, and William ―Wild Bill‖ Donovan, 
later head of the Office of Strategic Services in WWII.
35
 During the height of the Red 
                                                                                                                                           
General Federation of Women‘s Clubs and the Women‘s International League for Peace and Freedom 
to the presumed world-wide Communist conspiracy. ― Pencak, For God & Country, 8-9.   
34
Griffith, The Politics of Fear,  vii, 31-32; Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the 
Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 157-159. 
35
 Pencak, For God & Country, 49, 52, 53.  Pencak also notes, the interwar Legion tended to attract 




Scare, the Legion quickly assumed a leading role in campaigns to combat domestic 
radicalism and to expand federal aid to wounded veterans. For example, Legion 
lobbying resulted in the creation of the federal Veterans‘ Bureau in 1921, forerunner 
of the Veterans‘ Administration.
36
 Along with other patriotic nationalist organizations 
like the American Protective League, the Legion engaged in vigilantism to purge 
communities of subversives, often by using violence. However, starting in the early 
1920s, largely to dampen public criticism, the group shifted tactics to emphasize legal 
methods of dealing with subversion. At times, however, particularly as a major 
strikebreaking organization in the 1930s, the Legion continued to employ physical 
force against those it saw as threatening the social order.
37
 But these episodes aside, 
the Legion mainly worked within the law to foster its conservative 100% 
Americanism. It lobbied for anti-Communist legislation at the state level, and it also 
aided local and federal law enforcement officials, including the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI)), to police radicalism by providing them with information on 
suspected subversives. The Legion centered its intelligence gathering operations in its 
National Americanism Commission (NAC), which, beginning in the 1920s ―became a 
nationwide clearinghouse for reports on left-wing groups with suspected subversive 
connections.‖
38
 Legionnaires also often prevented liberals and radicals from 
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The Legion also attempted to thwart the dissemination of liberal and radical 
views in the interwar years by monitoring the school system, including higher 
education, which it saw as a major source of subversive thought.
40
 One the hand the 
Legion attempted to prevent subversive ideas from influencing young minds through 
campaigns to ban liberal textbooks from high schools. On the other hand, it sought to 
instill its values among high school students by sponsoring writing contests for 
college scholarships focused on Americanism topics, such as the democratic way of 
life versus Communism.
41
 At times, Legionnaires also successfully prodded 
administrators to dismiss teachers and professors they found politically 
objectionable.
42
 The Legion frequently charged that higher education was under the 
influence of radicals. In early 1935, NAC director Homer Chaillaux distributed some 
2,000 copies of a radio address by Congressman Hamilton Fish to local Legion 
Americanism officers across the country that attacked nine major universities ―as 
‗honeycombed with Socialist, near Communist and Communists.‘‖
43
 After 
Northwestern University professor, and Legionnaire, William Gellerman, in June 
1938, charged (in his dissertation) that the Legion ―was reactionary and 
unpatriotic…and… led by men representing the ‗banking, business and military 
classes,‘‖ Legion national commander Dan Doherty denounced the claims as Red 
propaganda. As Doherty declared, it ―was well known that that many of our 
institutions of higher learning are hotbeds of communism for the dissemination of 
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theories and philosophies which are entirely alien to the American concept and 
American principles under which we have prospered.‖ New York State Legion 
commander Jeremiah Cross also pointed out that Gellerman‘s thesis director was 
George S. Counts of Columbia University Teachers College. Convinced that the 
Depression rendered individualistic laissez-faire capitalism obsolete, Counts wanted 
the schools to become a leading force in transforming the nation into a collectivist 
society. Counts thus served to further link Gellerman and higher education generally 
to the Red conspiracy. As Cross declared, Gellerman‘s ideas ―would find a responsive 
appreciation of his desire for a communal state in Professor Counts, whose 
contribution and visits to the Soviet Union are too well known.‖
44
  
The national Legion increasingly linked radicalism to the New Deal in the late 
1930s as it voiced its concerns over the concentration of power in the liberal state. In 
February 1938, the Legion used the 129
th
 anniversary of Abraham Lincoln‘s birth to 
warn Americans about increasing federal power. Speaking from Lincoln‘s gravesite 
in Springfield, Illinois national commander Daniel Doherty declared, ―that ‗tidal 
waves un-American beliefs and doctrines‘ were endangering the balance between 
governmental authority and individual liberty in America.‖ Furthermore, he declared, 
―We need a return of Lincoln‘s spirit in the breast of every American, far more than 
we need a return of so-called prosperity. Economic revivals will surely come in the 
course of events, if we cleave to the principles of our founders.‖
45
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The Legion also took a leading role in lobbying for the establishment of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), created in 1938 by anti-New 
Deal conservatives.  HUAC Chairman Texas Democrat Martin Dies rewarded the 
Legion by inviting NAC director Homer Chaillaux to appear as one of the 
committee‘s initial witnesses. Chaillaux provided Dies with ―reams of material on 
subversives‖ from the Legion‘s files.
46
 But it was during the committee‘s hearings in 
late October 1938 hearings when two California Legion officials, its attorney Ray 
Nimmo and Harper Knowles, chairman of its Radical Research Committee, directly 
attacked the New Deal. Their main target was Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins, 
whom they charged with ―coddling‖ Communists for delaying deportation 
proceedings against alleged Communist and West Coast Longshoremen‘s union 
president Harry Bridges. Knowles also testified that Maritime Labor Board member 
Dr. Louis Bloch ―was formerly a Communist party member,‖ and that his own 
evidence ―proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the Communist party, through its 




The Legion associated the New Deal with radicalism on other occasions in the 
late interwar years. In early 1940, for example, NAC director Homer Chaillaux along 
with Catholic Youth Organization director (and former heavy-weight champion 
boxer) Gene Tunney, Theodore Roosevelt Memorial director David Hinshaw, and 
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Boy Scouts directors John Schiff and Victor Ridder issued a public statement 
denouncing the American Youth Congress (AYC) as ―the junior front of the 
Communist Trojan-horse movement which permits Communists and their fellow-
travelers ‗to bore from within‘.‖ While they identified the AYC as ―a menace to our 
free institutions,‖ they also highlighted the fact that President Roosevelt, Attorney 
General Jackson, and CIO president John L. Lewis were scheduled to speak at its 
upcoming national conference, and that Eleanor Roosevelt had continued to support 
and defend the group Furthermore, in calling for the AYC‘s supporters ―to repudiate‖ 
the organization, they proclaimed, ―This the youth movement whose communistic 
leaders are hiding behind the skirts of their influential protectors, while attempting to 
pose as the representative of 4,650,000 American youth.‖
48
  
After WWII, however, Legion opposition to the New Deal intensified as the 
group stepped up its efforts to conflate liberal reform with subversion. In late August 
1947, the national convention voted 2,796-722 to oppose the Taft-Ellender-Wagner 
public housing bill, which aimed to make millions of urban residences available to 
veterans and other low and moderate-income citizens. In January 1948, the American 
Legion Magazine declared the convention vote, ―In essence…was between two 
different philosophies of government—those who believe in public housing and those 
who don‘t.‖ The Legion‘s Housing Committee which urged delegates to oppose the 
bill, the article noted, ―contended that the political doctrine set forth by the measure 
was one of Federal paternalism…a philosophy…opposed to the principles on which 
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this nation was founded…[that] could lead to cancerous bureaucracy and socialism.‖ 
Indeed, as the article concluded, rather than making ―Uncle Sam …the big boss of the 
housing industry,‖ the convention adopted a housing policy ―that will help veterans to 
obtain housing through the normal operations of the free enterprise system aided, 
when necessary by state and local agencies.‖
49
  
To avoid establishing a permanent federal public housing program, the Legion 
subsequently sponsored the Veterans‘ Homestead Act of 1948. The act provided 
permitted 5 or more veterans with loans (financed by tax-exempt Veterans‘ 
Administration bonds) to set up non-profit housing associations to construct homes 
themselves. As the Legion noted, ―No government gift, the deal would be self-
liquidating, and the VA would be supplied with funds to loan the capital.‖
50
  
The Legion also opposed public housing at the local level. For instance, in 
April 1952, Legionnaire J. Bradley became veterans‘ chairman of the Committee 
Against Socialist Housing, an organization funded by private homebuilders and 
headed by conservative Democrat Frederick C. Dockweiler to defeat a proposed 
$110,000,000 (federally supported) low-income public housing program for Los 
Angeles. To aid the campaign, Bradley brought in representatives from the Veterans 
of Foreign Wars (VFW), Disabled American Veterans (DAV), American Veterans of 
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World War Two (Amvets) and Jewish War Veterans (JWV). As Bradley declared, 
―Veterans have a tremendous stake in defeating Proposition B because the 
multimillion-dollar housing program it would restore is Socialistic; it would impose 
new and inflationary taxes on our economy; it would not clear slums; and it would be 
an added burden on the hundreds of thousands of veterans who have built their own 
homes.‖ Despite the Legion‘s opposition to federal public housing, President Truman 
signed the 1949 Housing Act into law in July 1949.
51
  
Legion national commanders also increasingly used their positions to express 
the group‘s antipathies towards the New Deal/Fair Deal. As George N. Craig, the first 
WWII veteran elected as national commander, told the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) national convention in October 1949: ―The American Legion wishes in this 
country a state of welfare…but not a Welfare State!…Economic policy-making in the 
United States must remain in free, private hands and those are the hands of labor and 
the hands of industry!‖ The problem, Craig told the delegates, was that the New Deal 
state had opened the door to ―evil philosophies imported from the bankrupt countries 
of Europe‖ that were progressively eroding the core foundations of political freedom 
in America: free enterprise and self-reliant individualism. As Craig declared, ―There 
is a growing disposition on the part of more and more of our people to surrender their 
rights and freedoms, bit by bit, in return for government security.‖ Since the Legion 
had led the effort to secure the Servicemen‘s Readjustment Act of 1944, or G.I Bill, 
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the most far-reaching piece of social legislation the New Deal produced, Craig‘s 
comments may have initially perplexed some delegates. But Craig was careful to 
delineate the rationale justifying social provisions for veterans. As Craig informed the 
delegates, ―We do not believe that social security should be primarily and exclusively 
a government responsibility! We believe the government should supplement such a 
movement only for that segment of our population which cannot do the job for itself. 
War widows and disabled veterans are an example of that segment. They have earned 
government protection through their costly sacrifices in defense of our freedoms, 
sacrifices which have placed them under everlasting economic handicaps.‖
52
 This 
restricted view of the legitimate scope of federal social welfare policy had in fact 
guided the Legion in articulating the parameters of the G.I. Bill. It understood its 
generous social rights to be exclusively veterans‘ entitlements earned in battle, not 
benefits that should be extended to all Americans.
53
   
In keeping with its conservative approach to social welfare policy, the Legion 
also joined the American Medical Association in opposing President Truman‘s 
national health insurance legislation. In early December 1949 the AMA announced its 
approval of an ―unprecedented‖ annual assessment of $25 per member to amass a war 
chest of $3 million dollars ―to fight‖ the Truman plan.  As the Washington Post also 
reported ―The AMA was assured of the Legion‘s strong support in its anti-
administration battle.‖ That same day, national commander George N. Craig told 
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White House officials: ―We have just begun to fight.‖ Speaking to the national 
Legion convention in October 1955, AMA representative David B. Allman praised 
the group for its ongoing assistance in helping to defeat ―creeping socialism.‖ As 
Allman reminded the delegates, ―the American Legion was one of American 
medicine‘s first and staunchest allies in the campaign against national compulsory 
health insurance. That is why the American Medical Association has contributed 




Indeed, as the largest veterans‘ organization in the postwar years, the national 
Legion wielded considerable power in Congress, and therefore it could provide 
kindred groups such as the AMA additional clout. The Legion‘s veteran membership 
swelled from 840,000 in 1920
55
 to 2.8 million in 1956, organized into 17,000 local 
posts. The Legion drew additional strength from its national American Legion 
Auxiliary, which in 1952 composed nearly a million women active in some 14, 000 
local units.
56
 In 1956, by its annual expenditures, the Legion held rank as one of the 
top ten lobbies in the nation.
57
 The high proportion of veterans in Congress in the 
1950s undoubtedly enhanced its influence over legislation. As Suzanne Mettler has 
noted, ―By 1960, veterans accounted for about 60 percent of the membership of the 
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 In the late 1940s, the Legion also had 195 members in 
the House and 44 in the Senate, and so it is likely that even more were Legionnaires 
in the fifties decade.
59
 Indeed, a New York Times profile of the ―average member of 
the Eighty-Fourth Congress‖ in January 1955 noted, ―He is married and has two 
children, is a war veteran, belongs to the American Legion, and is a Mason and 
Lion.‖
60
 The powerful Legion spearheaded federal lobbying efforts that greatly 




The Legion‘s large membership ensured that it had ample resources to 
advance its conservative agenda. Its nationally distributed American Legion Magazine 
kept members informed about pending legislation, and served as a major outlet for the 
dissemination of anti-liberalism throughout the 1950s. The magazine typically 
featured articles that depicted New Deal/Fair Deal liberalism as an alien, un-
American and radical force that threatened to destroy American freedom by tossing 
aside Constitutional principles of limited government and laissez-faire free enterprise. 
As William LaVarre told readers in September 1952, ―For 20 years now they have 
been patiently planning us into Socialism and out of our Constitutional Republic. The 
genesis of their socialist blue prints… originates out of Marx and Lenin and radical 
Europe by way of Laski, Webb and Keynes of radical London, and is entirely foreign 
to America and American doctrines. From its inception in the diseased mind of 
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fanatically property-less Marx it has been a pagan ideology against private enterprise 
[and] private property.‖ Other writers voiced similar conclusions. According to Ruth 
Alexander, in a November 1953 article, by exceeding their constitutionally prescribed 
authority, liberals in Congress were in effect functioning as subversives, radically 
transforming the country in ways the Communists desired. Under the Constitution, 
Alexander told readers, ―These representatives were commissioned to deal primarily, 
if not exclusively, with political affairs. In recent years they have increasingly 
encroached on economic affairs and our form of government has increasingly 
approached that of our ideological enemies. A bloodless revolution has taken place 
and we have already made certain qualitative changes in our society that threaten to 
achieve the goal of our enemies, i.e. to destroy capitalism, the source of all of our 
freedoms.‖ Through the fifties, ALM regularly published articles authored by key 
figures in the emerging postwar conservative movement, including William F. 




Also, many Legion affiliates served as forums for the articulation of 
conservative ideas, thus further reflecting the depth of antipathies towards postwar 
liberalism within the organization. The Los Angeles American Legion regularly 
invited conservatives to address its Luncheon Club meetings. For example, in early 
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November 1951, W.C. Mullendore, president of Southern California Edison 
Company warned Club attendees of: ―The danger to freedom of the individual citizen 
arising from invasion by our own government of the rights essential to liberty.‖ In 
continuing to increase federal spending on domestic projects, including programs ―to 
build more and more houses on government credit,‖ he explained, ―this nation 
is…‗practically reducing ourselves to the level of European totalitarianism.‘‖ 
Addressing the California Legion convention in late June 1956, Frank N. Belgrano 
Jr., chairman of Transamerica Corporation, declared, ―It is fashionable today to 
condemn the Communist, Fascist and Socialist, and properly so. But in our 
condemnation of them we neglect the many societies and innumerable other 
organizations of different names spreading alien doctrines dangerous to this country. 
They carry deceptive banners difficult to recognize.‖ Nevertheless, Belgrano ―labeled 
as ‗most dangerous‘ the groups known as ‗economic planners, social planners and 
welfare planners.‘‖
63
 As the Americanism chairman of Legion Post 152, Martin B. 
McNeally, (later Legion national commander, 1959-1960) instituted a forum ―under 
post sponsorship‖ that brought in leading conservatives ―to give public talks.‖ 




Clarence Manion, as Rick Perlstein has recently shown, played a central role 
in the rise of the postwar conservative movement primarily as the chief architect, 
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beginning in the late 1950s, of Barry Goldwater‘s campaigns for the presidency.
65
 But 
less known is Manion‘s work with the American Legion. Author of the The Key to 
Peace: A formula for the perpetuation of real Americanism in 1951, Manion, also a 
Legionnaire, assumed a major role in the Legion‘s postwar Americanism program. In 
The Key to Peace, an anti-New Deal tract that climbed to 15 on the New York Times 
best selling list in March 1951,
66
 Manion excoriated the liberal welfare state. 
―Proposed alternatives to private enterprise all add up to a super-state which will 
sterilize the natural incentive impulse of human beings with a system of complete 
endowed ‗security.‘ Just as the nub of private enterprise is freedom, so is slavery the 
inevitable alternative. For an unidentified benefit deceptively termed ‗freedom from 
fear‘ we are asked to surrender freedom itself.‖
67
 In early January 1951, national 
commander Erle Cocke wrote Manion‘s publisher, Arthur L. Conrad, president of the 
Heritage Foundation, stating that the Legion ―would accept quantities of this book as 
gifts…for the purpose of placing them in the hands of all American Legion Posts and 
in the libraries of secondary schools, colleges and universities throughout the United 
States.‖ Its call to restore the pre-New Deal economic order was precisely what the 
Legion hoped its anti-Communist campaign would accomplish. As Cocke informed 
Conrad, ―The Key to Peace is in full accord with the Americanism program of the 
American Legion.‖ In late-April 1951, the Legion‘s National Americanism 
Commission (NAC) director reported that all state commanders, adjutants and 
Americanism officers and all post commanders in five states had received the book; 
                                                 
65
 Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the UnMaking of the American Consensus 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2002), 15. 
66
 New York Times, March 18, 1951,  BR5. 
67
 Clarence Manion, The Key to Peace: A formula for the perpetuation of real Americanism (Chicago: 




and in June, it was shipped to post commanders ―in the remaining‖ nineteen states. 
Major corporations, in particular General Motors and Inland Steel, also participated in 
the distribution plan. By early June 1951, General Motors purchased 3, 275 copies of 
The Key to Peace, which the Legion subsequently sent to the Michigan Board of 
Education ―for use in the Legion Boys‘ State program,‖ and to post commanders in 
six states, and the District of Columbia. In acknowledging this ―gift‖ NAC director 
Allen Willand informed Steve Dubrul of General Motors, ―We want to express to you 
our very deep appreciation for this evidence of your interest in this unusually 
effective method of reselling Americans on America and your co-operation in 
achieving our objectives.‖
68
 Indeed, these firms as Elizabeth Fones-Wolf has shown, 
were also participants in a massive campaign launched by ―important segments of the 
business community‖ after WWII to persuade the public of the need to roll back New 
Deal liberalism.
69
 In short, their contributions to the Legion were another important 
part of this larger effort.   
Local posts praised the book,
70
 and Manion frequently spoke at Legion state 
conventions. Shortly after convening in July 1951, the chairman of the Alabama 
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Legion state convention informed the national office that ―We used as our theme ‗The 
Key to Peace,‘ and had as our principle speaker…Clarence Manion.‖ In July 1952, 
Manion also addressed 5,000 Legionnaires at their New York State convention.
71
 By 
mid-year 1952, the Legion appointed Manion as special advisor to the NAC.
72
 The 
Legion continued to work with Manion through the 1950s. In 1955, Manion provided 
idea for a series of Legion-sponsored billboards ―selling basic American ideals‖ 
which proclaimed: ―Communism is Godlessness‖ and ―Protect the Constitution.‖ 
Also in April 1959, national commander Preston Moore appeared on Manion‘s radio 
program, the Manion Forum.
73
   
With Manion at their side, Legionnaires entered the battle against the liberal 
state in all its subversive manifestations. The revival of anti-communism leading to 
the period‘s Red Scare brought fresh opportunities for the Legion to confront the 
nation‘s alleged fifth columnists. Communist victory in China and Russia‘s atomic 
bomb detonation in 1949, followed by the Soviet espionage cases, the Communist 
invasion of the South Korea in 1950, all heightened public anxiety over a widespread 
Communist conspiracy.
74
 Officials at all levels of the Legion proclaimed a full 
mobilization to counter the threat of internal subversion. In July 1950, as the country 
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mobilized for war in Korea, Justice Matthew J. Troy, the newly elected commander 
of the Kings County, NY Legion ―pledged redoubled efforts‖ by his unit ―to stamp 
out every vestige of communism in our community life, in our schools, in our 
churches, in political and civic groups and everywhere the menace of Moscow has 
raised its ugly head.‖ Similarly, in October, 1950, Don R. Wilson, national chairman 
of the group‘s Foreign Relations Commission, declared, ―We must encourage an 
individual, activated Americanism. It is up to us to light the torch for this crusade of 
Americanism and it is time for each individual in America to be asked ‗Are you for 
the United States or against it.‘‖ Likewise, in January 1951, the Legion‘s national 
Auxiliary president, Mrs. Willis (Hope) Reed, sounded the alarm. ―Only an America 
united in patriotic determination can hope to hold the line for freedom against the 
hordes now advancing under the Red flag…Against the fanatical zeal of Communism 
we must array the strength of an enthusiastic, determined Americanism.‖
75
 
As in the interwar years, the Legion carried out much of its anti-subversive 
offensive through its National Americanism Commission (NAC). But in 1948, the 
NAC added an Un-American Activities Office in Washington D.C., under the 
direction of Karl Baarslag, previously a counter-subversives officer with U. S. Naval 
Intelligence. The office functioned as a ―clearinghouse for information on subversive 
and counter-subversive activity‖ and maintained ―card files on some 500,000 people 
identified with Communists or suspected communist movements.‖ Headquarters also 
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made information concerning anti-subversive activities available to Legion affiliates, 
and other subscribers, through its bi-monthly newsletter, The Firing Line. As Ellen 
Schrecker has noted, the Washington D.C. office did not operate in isolation, rather it 
functioned within a national ―anti-communist network,‖ composed of various groups 
and individuals with whom it also shared information. The Legion also maintained 
close ties to the nation‘s leading counter-subversives agency, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). FBI agent Lee R. Pennington served as the Bureau‘s liaison to 
the NAC from 1948-1952. When Pennington left the FBI in late 1953, Legion 
officials immediately appointed him as the NAC ‗s director; and in 1955, he became 
head of the group‘s Un-American Activities Office.
76
   
State and local units also conducted anti-subversive activities, involving both 
training and intelligence gathering functions. The Illinois State Legion‘s Anti-
Subversive Commission, for example, held yearly seminars to train affiliates in 
fighting the communist menace, ―inviting to Chicago the nation‘s outstanding 
authorities on the subject.‖ Indianapolis, Indiana Post 312 began holding annual anti-
subversive seminars in early 1955, which featured well-known anti-communists 
experts such as Senator McCarthy‘s chief counsel, Roy M. Cohn. Affiliates 
apparently enthusiastically embraced counter-subversive training guidelines provided 
by national headquarters. As the national commander reported in 1955, ―There is 
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every indication that the training program outlined in the manual is being put into 
operation in all parts of the country.‖ In New England, the Massachusetts Legion 
served as the central repository for ―files of index cards and mimeographed dossiers,‖ 
concerning some 412 ―suspected subversives‖ in the state, ―and about fifty names 
from each of the other New England states.‖ As the New York Times reported, ―the 
material had been gathered by the security officers of Legion posts throughout New 
England.‖ National headquarters staff sifted through this information as well. ―Those 
[security] officers, officially known as chairmen of anti-subversive activities, send 
their material to the National Committee in Indianapolis for correlation.‖ These units 
also used their resources to aid the anti-subversive work of their state governments. In 
January 1954, for example, the Massachusetts Legion provided its files on 




The national Legion also sponsored a host of anti-subversive laws. The group 
strongly supported passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (or McCarran Act,) 
requiring Communist party members, and their front groups, to register with the 
Attorney General. In his September 1950 message to Congress vetoing the bill, 
President Truman, whose own loyalty-security programs had done much to advance 
the era‘s repressive legal climate, voiced serious concerns over the measure‘s 
potential to undermine civil liberties. The president‘s main objection to the bill was 
that its definition of ―communist fronts‖ could allow virtually any non-subversive 
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group to be classed as a front, merely for supporting any part of a goal or position 
advanced by the Communist Party. In Truman‘s view, these provisions represented, 
―the greatest danger to freedom of speech, press, and assembly, since the Alien and 
Sedition Laws of 1798.‖ The Legion‘s national commander, George Craig, harbored 
no such misgivings, and declared the Senate‘s vote over turning the president‘s veto, 
―[the] most encouraging news from Washington since VJ-Day.‖ In recognition of the 
group‘s vigorous support of the bill, Senator Karl Mundt, one of its main sponsors, 
asked Truman to appoint a Legion-designated citizen-member to the Subversive 
Activities Control Board, the Act‘s administrative arm. In November 1950, frustrated 
by the Communist Party‘s legal appeals delaying implementation of the McCarran 
Act‘s registrations requirements, the Legion established the National Committee on 
Un-American Activities. The group, consisting of 139 attorneys and law enforcement 
officials belonging to the Legion, focused on helping federal authorities enforce the 
new law. In addition to cooperating with the FBI ―to combat Communism,‖ the 
Committee also provided legal assistance, ―to those patriotic Americans who find 
themselves sued for libel after exposing Communists and others [my emphasis] who 
would subvert our way of life.‖ Also, in June 1954, the Legion lobbied Congress ―to 
outlaw the Communist party and all [of its] affiliated or subordinate organizations.‖ 
78
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State units also lobbied for anti-subversive legislation. In early 1951, the New 
York Legion pushed for stricter loyalty-security program requirements among state 
employees, and extension of the Feinberg Law, which subjected teachers in public 
schools and colleges to discharge on the grounds of membership in ―subversive‖ 
organizations listed by the Board of Regents, to ―all public employees.‖ The Indiana, 
New York, California and Pennsylvania units all pushed for state laws outlawing the 
Communist party. The Pennsylvania Legion‘s legislative chairman initiated the 1951 
Pechan Act, which imposed loyalty-oaths in the state‘s higher education system. The 
Montana Legion sponsored the 1951 bill that established the state legislature‘s un-
American activities investigations committee.
79
 
The Legion also sought measures intended to deny those charged with 
subversion of their constitutional guarantees to legal representation. Given the 
predominance of left-wing attorneys among those few even willing to represent such 
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 Legionnaires sought imposition of various national and state bar 
association sanctions on lawyers who defended accused subversives. In 1950, 
national convention delegates authorized all Legion units to lobby the American Bar 
Association ― to file disbarment proceedings against those members in the National 
Lawyers Guild who follow the communist line.‖ At their 1955 convention, 
Legionnaires directed the National Legislative Commission to pursue measures 
requiring all attorneys practicing before federal courts, agencies and Congressional 
committees to file non-communist affidavits, with provisions for ―criminal penalties 
and disbarment‖ for any ―false‖ or ―fraudulent‖ statements. The same convention 
mandate requested legislation to disbar lawyers who invoked the Fifth Amendment, 
―when questioned in any legal proceeding relative to any communist activity on his 
part.‖ Similarly, in March 1955, the California State Legion testified in favor of a 
proposed law put forth by a committee of the state bar association that would allow 
the disbarment of attorneys for, among other causes, invoking their Fifth Amendment 
privileges when questioned ―about membership in subversive organizations, and the 
showing of disrespect to Congressional or other investigating committees.‖
81
  In 
short, the dual intent of such measures was to severely restrict the rights of both the 
accused and their attorneys.  
As the U.S. Supreme Court rulings concerning the civil liberties of 
Communists took a more liberal direction under Chief Justice Earl Warren from 1955 
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onwards, the Legion joined with those seeking to neutralize the Court‘s authority. In 
February 1959, national commander Preston Moore announced the Legion‘s ―full 
support‖ for the American Bar Association‘s resolution calling ―for tightening 
subversion laws,‖ passed in opposition to the Supreme Court‘s more liberal direction. 
The Legion also supported the State Department curbs on the right to travel, and its 
policy of refusing to issue passports on the basis of an applicant‘s political views. 
When the Supreme Court upheld these restrictions in April 1958, the Legion backed 
the early 1959 legislative initiatives of Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland to 
restore the withholding of passports from ―Communist suspects.‖
82
  
The notion that Communists and their sympathizers sought to subvert the 
minds of youth by infiltrating the educational system was of intense concern to the 
American Legion in the 1950s, ensuring that the schools became a major focal point 
of its Americanism program. As Eve Ashton, Americanism Committee chair of the 
National Auxiliary, observed in 1951, ―Gaining control of our schools and colleges is 
another Communist goal. If they can control and color the education of our children, 
the future of America is indeed dark. We must see to it that our teachers and 
textbooks are soundly American, teaching our children to be free Americans, not 
preparing them to be puppets of a foreign dictator.‖ Some of this work involved 
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making sure students had access to patriotic reading materials in their school libraries. 
In early 1950, for example, 13 posts participated in the Orange County (CA) Legion 
Council‘s ―book project,‖ which placed texts celebrating ―the stirring growth of the 
United States and its ideals,‖ in area junior high schools. According to the project‘s 
organizing committee, the books were needed ―to combat the Red-leanings of many 
of our educators… and…the flood of Socialist and Communistic literature which has 
found its way into our school libraries.‖ The Americanism work of local Legion 
auxiliaries also included ―donating anti-communist books to libraries and schools.‖
83
 
To make the public schools ―soundly American‖ as Ashton put it, the Legion 
also conducted campaigns to censor textbooks. In Peoria, Illinois, for example, the 
local post succeeded in 1952 in forcing the school board to remove Frank Abbott 
Magruder‘s American Government from the high schools, a textbook banned by many 
school boards across the country in the 1950s in response to widespread attacks by 
various conservative groups who labeled it ―subversive.‖ The school board responded 
to the Legion‘s attacks by setting up ―a specially created teachers committee,‖ which 
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recommended its retention, the post ignored this report, and aggressively pushed its 
campaign forward. As the New Republic characterized these efforts, ―the American 
Legion is vigilant, intolerant and energetic in applying pressure against all who 
challenge its views.‖  After ―a few weeks,‖ the school board capitulated, and 
―officially retired‖ the book from the curriculum. The Legion‘s role in censoring 
textbooks continued well into the late 1950s. In September 1959, for example, the 
Mississippi Legion established a Textbook Study Committee to investigate the 
content of some 44 titles used in the state‘s public school system after the Daughters 
of the American Revolution found them to be ―unsatisfactory‖ for supporting the 
United Nations, labor unions and desegregation.
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Legionnaires also organized actions to remove teachers from the classroom 
whom they perceived as deviating from Americanism. In June 1958, for example, 
Hanover, (NJ) Legionnaires, along with local VFW units, publicly protested the 
continued employment of a high school teacher who had asked her students to 
critically examine the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan.  Students had 
explored the issue by writing essays on that fateful event based on their reading of 
John Hershey‘s Hiroshima. While the student papers took positions both for and 
against the bombing, the teacher permitted the school‘s newspaper to publish three of 
the essays that opposed the decision. One student wrote, ―I feel ashamed to call 
myself an American when I think this country of mine could do such damage to the 
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humble Japanese.‖ The veterans‘ units charged that the published essays were proof 
of the teacher‘s un-American ideas, and that she had imposed her own views on the 
students. As the veterans publicly declared, the essays were ―disrespectful to every 
loyal American.‖ The local Legion Auxiliary president also charged, as New York 
Times stated it, ―that Miss Goodman was not fit to teach.‖ Although the school board 
subsequently cleared the teacher of ―spreading un-Americanism,‖ and asked her ―to 
withdraw her resignation,‖ she took a job at another school.
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Legionnaires also supported school board policies that removed ―subversive‖ 
teachers for invoking their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination during 
official probes into their political associations. In 1953, for example, two Philadelphia 
Legion posts, and the VFW, demanded that city school board officials summarily 
suspend or fire teachers who refused to give testimony to loyalty investigators. 
Similarly, in early February, 1955, the Kings County (NY) Legion backed a proposed 
city Board of Education rule to force teachers ―called for questioning about 
Communist affiliations to name their former party associates,‖ under the threat of  
―dismissal after trial for insubordination.‖
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 As in the interwar years, efforts by Legionnaires to deprive educators of 
employment for holding ―subversive‖ ideas also extended to higher education. for 
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example, starting in late 1951, the Westchester County (NY) Legion maintained a 
seven-year campaign against Sarah Lawrence College, demanding that officials 
answer its charges of Communist associations among certain faculty, and specifically 
that it dismiss three professors. The Legionnaires also issued calls for outside groups 
to boycott speaking engagements by the college‘s president, and demanded that 
HUAC investigate the institution. Additionally, the New York Legion succeeded in 
having two Republican legislators introduce its bill to extend the state‘s Feinberg Law 
provisions, authorizing discharge of public school faculty belonging to ―subversive‖ 
organizations, to private institutions. Professors who defended civil liberties on 
campus also faced harassment. In August 1952, the Queens County, (NY) Legion, 
joined by Catholic War Veterans, hurled public condemnations at Queens College‘s 
Professor Harold Lenz, for simply voicing his opposition to a resolution placed before 




 The efforts of Legionnaires to bar ―subversives‖ from appearances on college 
campuses also resulted in numerous assaults on free speech. In early 1956, the Illinois 
State Legion sought to block Nobel prize-winning scientist Linus Pauling from 
lecturing at the University of Illinois, by bringing his previous appearance before a 
Senate loyalty hearing to the attention of campus officials. The effort failed when the 
university, acting on the Legion‘s request to ―more carefully‖ examine Pauling‘s past, 
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released its report stating he was ―loyal to America.‖ When Baltimore College invited 
Asia expert Owen Lattimore to speak in early 1951, falsely identified as a Soviet 
agent by McCarthy a year earlier, the Legion successfully pressured the Baltimore 
City Council to ask the school board prevent his appearance. The board, however, 
halted the Legion‘s campaign when it refused to implement the Council‘s request. In 
1952, Legion Post 16 in Huntington, West Virginia temporarily succeeded in having 
Marshall College cancel guest lectures by Professors Max Lerner and Paul Engle, on 
the basis that HUAC had cited them ―as…supporters of Communist fronts.‖ While 
Marshall officials later rescinded their decision, their initial response (like the 
Baltimore City Council decision) revealed the Legion‘s power to exert its influence in 
such cases. The New Jersey Legion also opposed the speaking engagement of Alger 
Hiss at Princeton in April 1956.
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Beyond the realm of education, the Legion also regularly attacked the speech 
and assembly rights of a range of liberal and left individuals and groups. In April 
1952, the Los Angeles County Legion opposed giving a permit for a public meeting 
in a high school that included the presence of two Communist speakers. In a school 
board hearing to decide the issue, local Legionnaires insisted that the permit should 
be revoked, ―in the interest of Americanism,‖ and let it be known that, ―we intend to 
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have a picket line out there.‖ Despite free speech arguments presented by the 
Metropolitan League and the area‘s American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), school 
board officials cancelled the event when the county attorney warned of its potential 
disruptive effects at the school, including property damage. Similarly, in October 
1951, local hotel officials reneged on  the rental of their ballroom by the Westchester 
(NY) Human Rights Committee‘s when confronted by protests from the local Legion, 
which denounced the group as ―pro-Communists.‖ The Legionnaires also targeted the 
group‘s scheduled speaker, Carey McWilliams, associate editor of Nation magazine. 
Westchester County officials and ―several organizations,‖ also refused to grant rental 
space to the group Liberal church groups were also targeted. In September 1951, 
Evanston, Illinois Legionnaires, and the Cook County Legion Council, demanded that 
First Methodist Church officials refuse to allow the Methodist Federation for Social 
Action to meet in their building, basing their protest on a HUAC report, which 
claimed the group ―had exerted influence ‗on behalf of Communist causes and the 
Communist line.‘‖ (The church eventually rebuffed the Legion).
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As the country‘s leading defender of the rights of radicals and other dissenters 
since the WWI-era Red Scare, the ACLU sustained some of the Legion‘s heaviest 
assaults on liberal organizations in the 1950s. Since the interwar period, both 
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organizations clashed over the definition of Americanism, and the Legion regarded 
the ACLU‘s defense of Communists and other radicals as evidence that it functioned 
as their front group Even though in early 1953, the ACLU officially adopted an anti-
Communist stance to shield itself against McCarthyism, this action, along with its 
retreat from defending the rights of Communists, did nothing to halt the Legion‘s 
onslaughts. Beginning in 1952, and in successive national conventions, the Legion 
called upon federal authorities to ―investigate (and expose) the questionable record of 
subversive activities of the ACLU [my abbrev.]…and its personnel.‖  In May 1957, 
Clark Foreman, Director of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, (formed six 
years earlier by activists wanting a more aggressive defense of civil liberties than the 
ACLU was providing), reported that, ―in recent weeks,‖ New York City hotels 
―owing to pressure from the American Legion‖ had canceled meeting rooms to his 
group and the ACLU.
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In November 1953, the Indiana Legion initiated a major attack on the ACLU 
that drew national attention when it successfully blocked the Indiana Civil Liberties 
chapter, (ICLU) from holding an organizing meeting in the Indiana War Memorial 
auditorium (IWM) in downtown Indianapolis. Despite being a public institution, the 
IWM‘s board denied the ICLU use of the facility, citing a rule against meetings of ―a 
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political or controversial nature,‖ after it received protests from the Indiana Legion, 
and the far-right Minute Women, claiming the ACLU was a ―Communists front,‖ 
with a ―long history of unbroken and undeviating defense of Communist and 
Communist causes.‖ The ensuing debate over the civil liberties issues raised by the 
ban reached a national television audience on November 24, 1953, when Edward R. 
Murrow featured the affair on his CBS program See It Now, which had recently 




As both sides publicly contested use of the war memorial, they mobilized their 
conflicting understandings of Americanism, patriotism and the Cold War. Indiana 
Legionnaires used their participation in Murrow‘s program to bolster their charges 
that the ACLU was a subversive organization. They characterized the ACLU‘s 
defense of left-wing union leader Harry Bridges against government deportation for 
his political views, as a betrayal of the nation‘s Cold War struggle against 
communism. As one Legionnaire, noted, ―An organization which gives aid and 
comfort to anyone such as Bridges does not belong in Indiana.‖ Legionnaires 
contrasted the patriotic meanings they ascribed to the war memorial to the ACLU‘s 
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supposed un-American defense of the civil liberties of Communists. As Indiana 
Legion commander Roy Amos told viewers, ―The American Legion can never agree 
that the Indiana War Memorial is a fitting place for a meeting of the ACLU [my 
abbrev.] The Memorial is hallowed ground. It is a shrine sacred to the memory of 
thousands of Hoosier patriots, many of whom died in Korea fighting Communism. As 
such, it must never be used as a sounding board for the advocacy of any policy of 
pampering Communists to the virtual exclusion of all others.‖
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The national ACLU sought to defend its claim to use the war memorial by 
directly rebutting the Legion‘s Communist front charges. It did so, in part, by 
claiming the mantle of anticommunism. ―The Legion should know that since 1940 the 
ACLU has faithfully practiced its resolution barring Communists and other 
totalitarians from its staff and governing councils.‖ Also, using liberal Cold War 
Americanism discourse to criticize the IWM board‘s rationale for denying access, the 
group represented its desire to meet in the memorial as consistent with American 
democratic ideals, while it depicted the Legion‘s position as promoting values that the 
nation‘s Cold War enemies found compatible. ―Controversial discussion is as 
American as the Fourth of July. It is the heart of our democracy. The freedom to 
discuss all issues, controversial or not, is one of the main things that makes us 
different from—and better than—totalitarian Communism. It is unfortunate that the 
local branch of the American Legion does not realize this.‖
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Prior to the Murrow broadcast, the New York Times defended the ACLU by 
reminding the IWM board, Legionnaires and the Minute Women that ―They ought to 
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know that a proposed ACLU meeting on civil liberties…is an expression of 
Americanism, the antithesis of communism.‖ Further, it conflated the ACLU‘s fight 
to enter the memorial with the sacrifices the structure commemorated. ―They ought to 
know that the American boys who have died in the three great wars of this generation 
died for liberty and for freedom. To bar the War Memorial to defenders of freedom is 
not far short of sacrilege toward the dead.‖ The IWM board remained unmoved by 
such arguments. In May 1954, it blocked the ICLU from convening in the memorial 
with its guest speaker Studebaker Corporation chairman Paul Hoffman, who was to 
speak on the topic of ―Free Enterprise and How to Preserve It.‖ The board held to its 
decision, even though it took no action the previous June to halt the appearance of a 
speaker in the memorial, ―who talked in defense of the Rosenbergs.‖ In August 1957, 
the IWM board once again refused to permit the ICLU to hold its Bill of Rights Day 
celebration in the facility, citing a HUAC report stipulating that its parent body was 
―a defender of Communists.‖ Despite years of ongoing efforts to end the board‘s ban, 
the ICLU finally gained access to the memorial following a favorable ruling from the 
Indiana Supreme Court in 1973.
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The Legion also played a major role in curtailing civil liberties in the 
Hollywood film industry. Its influence was initially felt after HUAC completed its 
first postwar investigations of communism in the industry in late 1947. Concerned 
that the negative publicity and growing anti-Communist agitation surrounding the 
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hearings could harm box office revenues, the major studios immediately issued their 
pledge, or ―the Waldorf Statement,‖ to blacklist Communists from employment. Both 
the Legion and the Hearst newspapers led these initial calls for action against 
communism in the industry.  In urging industry executives to adopt the blacklist, 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Eric Johnston warned 
them of the Legion‘s threat to organize boycotts against film companies employing 
Communists.
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The Legion assumed a more direct role in advancing the anti-Communist 
campaign in Hollywood at the end of 1951, as HUAC concluded the first year of its 
new round of investigations of communism in the film industry. In February 1952, 
HUAC released its finding that Hollywood, despite its Waldorf Statement, had failed 
to rid itself fully of Communist influence. In December 1951, acting on its recent 
national convention mandate to use the American Legion Magazine to ―condemn, 
expose and combat‖ entertainers with connections to Communist front groups, the 
Legion published an article by the leading anti-Communist J.B. Matthews, which 
supplemented HUAC‘s charges. The article claimed that the film industry remained 
riddled with screenwriters, actors and other employees having affiliations to 
Communist fronts. It listed these employees‘ names, their alleged front group ties and 
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activities, and the studios and current films that employed them. Following the 
article‘s release, the film industry found itself the target of protests by Legionnaires, 
who setup picket lines at movie theaters showing the listed films. Initially, the 
MPAA‘s Eric Johnston rebuffed HUAC‘s February report, including its charge that 
Communists were attempting to influence film content. ―As there is no un-
Americanism in our pictures,‖ Johnston declared, ―the Committee should do the 
fair…thing and stop this accusation.‖ The industry‘s defiant stance, however, soon 
crumpled as it considered the potential threat to box office sales posed by the 
Legion‘s publicity attacks and its potential to expand boycott and picketing activity 
by its nearly 3 million members, especially in light of already sagging revenues and 
increased competition from television. As the New Republic’s Phil Kerby reported, 
Johnston‘s response to HUAC revealed, ―responsible film industry leaders do not 
consider Communism a present threat in Hollywood. But they are afraid, mortally so, 
of the harm that can come to the industry by the manipulation of the fear of 
communism.‖ In an effort to contain the Legion, the eight major studios, led by Eric 
Johnston, reversed course and convened a late March 1952 meeting with national 
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Under the terms of the plan worked out with Wilson on March 31, 1952, the 
Legion supplied the film executives with the names of 300 film industry personnel (to 
be used by the studios to screen employees for their loyalty) composing its so-called 
graylist, meaning liberals and fellow travelers that it had identified as having, at some 
time, membership or association in a Communist front group The studios‘ 
administration of the Legion‘s graylist paralleled procedures used in the ―clearing,‖ or 
rehabilitation, of blacklisted individuals (persons who had defied HUAC by invoking 
the Fifth Amendment or not appearing to testify). To justify retaining their jobs, the 
studios required graylisted personnel to submit letters of contrition for their alleged 
front group affiliations, with sufficient explanations to persuade their employers that 
they were loyal Americans. Such employees subsequently endured additional 
degrading stages of review by so-called ―clearing agents.‖ These included officials of 
the conservative Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals and 
the Legion‘s publications director James F. O‘Neil, who scrutinized the documents to 
determine whether an individual‘s rehabilitation warranted final approval. That the 
Legion‘s intervention helped to undercut the rights of graylisted personnel to hold a 
job, irrespective of their individual beliefs and opinions, was not lost on its critics. As 
the New Republic observed, ―No sooner had the lists reached the inner sanctums of 
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the sprawling movie lots than the studios began a widespread ‗loyalty‘ screening 
process.‖
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The power of the Legion to compel the Hollywood film industry to cooperate 
with its anti-subversion efforts was further demonstrated by the success of its 
aggressive boycott campaign against the distribution of Charlie Chaplin‘s film 
Limelight. Following the Attorney General‘s statement in late September 1952, 
declaring that he would block any reentry of Chaplin (a British citizen) to the U.S. 
pending an Immigration Service investigation of both his moral character and alleged 
ties to the Communist Party, the Legion demanded a boycott of his films until he 
cleared himself of the government‘s charges. The National Executive Committee‘s 
(NEC) October 1952 resolution authorizing the boycott urged all film distributors to 
―withhold‖ Limelight, and emphasized the Legionnaires displeasure over Chaplin‘s 
―views of personal morality,‖ and what they viewed as his un-Americanism. On the 
latter point, the resolution specifically targeted his failure to become a U. S. citizen 
and his, ―contemptuous attitude toward American patriotism.‖ Local Legionnaires 
picketing theaters showing Limelight in Los Angeles attacked Chaplin‘s Americanism 
by drawing attention to his alleged support of Communist front organizations, his 
problems with the Attorney General, and his failure to join other Hollywood actors in 
Korea to entertain the troops. Increasingly pressured by Legion picketing and threats 
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of such actions, the big theater chains around the country began to halt their 
distribution of the film.
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Appalled by the negative implications of the Legion‘s attack on Chaplin for 
civil liberties, some individuals attempted to undercut the boycott by invoking liberal 
Americanism and Cold War rhetoric. In early February, Commonweal cited a 
disregard for due process when it derided movie houses for aiding the boycott by 
canceling Limelight in advance of Chaplin‘s reentry hearing. ―The theaters, it would 
seem, have…subscribed to an assumption increasingly evident behind a type of neo-
patriotism for which the Legion has become a leading spokesman, …that a man on 
whom suspicion of disloyalty has fallen is guilty until he is proved innocent.‖ A 
number of letters to the editor focused on the Legion‘s actions as undemocratic and 
authoritarian. One Washington Post reader, for example, depicted protesting 
Legionnaires as ―self-appointed vigilantes.‖ A New York Times reader asked ―What 
right does this group have to limit through coercion the freedom of their fellow-
citizens?‖ ―The American Legion,‖ Mrs. Robert Ross informed the Washington Post, 
―is taking the same stand as the Nazi storm troopers…If the American public lets the 
Legion, in the guise of American patriotism, get away with it, we can expect to see 
troops of Legionnaires march into our libraries, schools and colleges, confiscate the 
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books they object to, and burn them in the public squares of our towns.‖ The 
Washington Post, in late January 1953, held that the Legion‘s application of a 
political test to Chaplin‘s ―artistic achievements is to embrace one of the ugliest 
aspects of communism. Behind the Iron Curtain, artists are judged exclusively on the 
basis of their political orthodoxy; and no one may write or act or paint or play music 
unless he satisfies some official censor. But happily this has not been, at least until 
lately, the American way.‖ Also in late January, the New York Times concluded, ―If 
this whole business of prejudgment, pressures and, what is worse, knuckling under to 




As these critics implied, the Legion‘s campaign resulted not only in an un-
American destruction of civil liberties, but in mimicking tactics used by the Nazis and 
its Iron Curtain enemies, the Legion was weakening American ideals defended in 
both the last war, and in the present Cold War. It was the Legion‘s actions, not 
Chaplin‘s, that were undermining America‘s position vis-à-vis its Cold War 
opponents.  
 In defending their picketing of two Washington, D.C. theaters showing 
Limelight in late February 1953, local Legionnaires, aggressively denounced their 
critics‘ charges. They argued that it was not their protests, but Chaplin‘s Communist 
front activities, funded by his film profits, that threatened freedom. By picketing his 
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films, they claimed they were defending American liberty against Communist 
subversion by disrupting the flow of cash to the front groups. As the D.C. 
Department‘s ―open letter‖ to Chaplin declared, ―you have given aid and comfort to 
11 organizations which have been officially cited as fronts for and sympathizers with 
as malevolent a creed as ever threatened freedom and decency in the whole history of 
mankind.‖ The Legionnaires also maintained that by opposing the purpose of their 
picketing and defending Chaplin‘s freedom of expression, their critics were also 
complicit in aiding America‘s Cold War adversaries. As the unit‘s Americanism 
chairman told the Washington Post, ―We feel that an informed public will refuse…to 
support his Commie-front prestige and bank roll any longer. Your condonement [sic] 
of the accrual of wealth to Chaplin in the United States is tantamount to advocacy of 
trading with the enemy.‖ Further, the unit implied that concern for Chaplin‘s right not 
to have his film work judged on political grounds, as the Washington Post 
maintained, betrayed the troops at the front, and therefore subverted the war effort. 
―To approach Chaplin and Limelight from an artistic viewpoint is to denounce 
America‘s responsibility to her sons in arms.‖ Despite the protestations of its critics, 
the Legion‘s national campaign against Chaplin proved highly successful. 
Widespread capitulations to the Legion by film distributors and theaters, as Stephen 
Whitfield has noted, ensured that ―Limelight was shown in relatively few cities.‖
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The Legion‘s efforts to pressure Hollywood studios to maintain employment 
sanctions against alleged subversives persisted into the late 1950s. In June 1959, the 
California State Legion convention went on the attack with a resolution that declared, 
―the American public is witnessing the re-infiltration of the motion-picture industry 
by communist and their fellow travelers.‖ The convention also denounced the 
decision of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, earlier in the year, to 
end its ban on awarding Oscars to Communists. By early July, the California unit 
began work on a list of subversives to back up its charges. In September, the national 
convention passed two resolutions pertaining to filmmakers; one lauded those major 
studios that continued to enforce the Waldorf Statement, while the other attacked 
independent producers ―who have [employed] communist and communist 
sympathizers.‖ It was this latter group that became the Legion‘s primary focus.
101
    
Following the convention, the national organization wasted no time in 
targeting the independent producers. As national commander Martin B. McKneally 
declared in early February 1960, the Legion ―was opening a ‗war of information,‘ to 
combat ‗a renewed invasion of American filmdom by Soviet-indoctrinated artists.‘‖ 
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The Legion directed its campaign primarily against independent filmmakers Sidney 
Kramer, Kirk Douglas and Otto Preminger, who openly employed blacklisted 
screenwriters. For his part, Kramer refused to accede to the national Legion‘s 
demand, in early February 1960, that he fire screenwriter Nedrick Young, who, in 
1953, had declined to answer a HUAC inquiry as to whether he was a Communist. In 
defying the Legion, Kramer drew heavily upon the liberal anti-Communist discourse, 
drawing attention to the undemocratic and anti-civil libertarian nature of the 
organization‘s practices. ―The American Legion,‖ he stated, ― is weighing a 
procedure in which, literally, the ends justify the means. This is totally un-American 
as anything I can imagine.‖ The Legion responded by casting its methods as open and 
democratic, while implying that Kramer‘s approach to hiring Young was in keeping 
with Communist tactics. As McKneally declared, ―the American Legion will not 
cooperate with Mr. Kramer or anyone else in a conspiracy of silence, nor accept it as 
good Americanism to deceive the public and conceal facts from the people. We 
cannot see on what basis Mr. Kramer finds it ‗reprehensible‘ for us to tell the 
American people what appears in Congressional documents concerning Nedrick 
Young.‖ During a televised debate with Kramer in mid-February, McKneally also 
insisted that ―the movie industry should not employ a communist or anyone who has 
sought refuge behind the Fifth Amendment when questioned about subversive 
associations, unless he recants.‖ Kramer responded, in part, with an unequivocal 
defense of Fifth Amendment rights for all persons, regardless of their individual 
political beliefs. He also countered McKneally‘s emphasis on Young‘s subversive 




act, both democratic and according to the tenets of free enterprise. ―I am in an art 
form. I think the artist must have a freedom of expression. Beyond that, as an 




While Kramer continued to defy the Legion, the group, along with the Hearst 
papers, conducted a successful campaign to pressure Frank Sinatra to fire the 
blacklisted Hollywood Ten screenwriter Albert Maltz, whom he had hired for his 
independent film production, The Execution of Private Slovik. Initially, Sinatra 
resisted the Legion‘s demands. In a late March 1960 statement published in Daily 
Variety, he defended Maltz. ―Under our Bill of Rights I was taught that no one may 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, religion, or other matters.‖ Yet about a 
week later, he reversed course and fired Maltz from the film project. In explaining his 
decision, Sinatra made it appear to be a democratic response on his part. ―I had 
thought that the major consideration was whether or not the resulting script would be 
in the best interests of the United States… But the American public has indicated it 
feels the morality of hiring Albert Maltz is the more crucial matter and I will accept 
this majority opinion.‖ Well into 1960, California Legionnaires continued their 
campaign against employing blacklisted writers. In December 1960, Legionnaires 
from ten Los Angeles posts picketed the Hollywood premier of Otto Preminger‘s 
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Legionnaires launched similar actions of intimidation against theatrical stage 
and other performers aimed at denying them the opportunity to earn a living. 
Syracuse, NY‘s Astor Theater closed its planned season of stage productions in 
November 1953, when its lead actor quit after producers received a letter from the 
Onondaga County Legion identifying him as subversive. Pennsylvania State 
University officials cancelled an appearance by dancer Paul Draper in July 1955, after 
―a meeting with state Legion officials who submitted information allegedly linking 
Mr. Draper with Communists fronts.‖ In late 1953, Las Vegas‘s Sands Hotel likewise 
cancelled Larry Adler‘s harmonica act based upon ―public opinion,‖ and receipt of a 
telegram from the Illinois Legion‘s Anti-Subversive Commission stating that he, ―has 
never made satisfactory answer to Red charges.‖  Adler attempted to defend himself 
by pointing out that in 1951, he was, ―‗cleared for troop entertainment in Korea‘,‖ but 
to no avail. Draper again faced trouble from the Legion when scheduled to perform 
for the Long Island, (NY) Freeport Community Concert Association in May 1959. He 
promptly withdrew from the event following the Board of Education‘s receipt of 
letters from the local Legion post, and 25 unnamed individuals protesting his alleged 
―pro-Communist sympathies.‖  Outraged by the affair, the concert association‘s board 
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To be sure, there were Legionnaires who rejected the assault on civil liberties 
undertaken by so many of their counterparts in this period. For example, Gordon 
Campbell, post commander in Monterey, (CA) denounced the California Bar 
Association‘s March 1955 proposal to disbar attorneys for invoking the Fifth 
Amendment as advancing ―government by confession, a typical Iron Curtain country 
procedure,‖ which ―assumes guilt rather than innocence.‖ In January 1953, the 
Oregon Legion together with the other affiliates of the Oregon Veterans Legislative 
Committee announced that they would not support new ―negative type loyalty oaths 
for the state‘s educational system, requiring teachers to declare they were not 
subversive. Instead, the group endorsed ―the existing affirmative loyalty oaths—
similar to those taken by national and state government officials.‖  Presented by the 
Legion‘s state commander, the committee‘s statement concluded, ―school officials 
themselves should ‗have the opportunity, if it is necessary, to clean their own house 
without being harassed by outside organizations.‘‖ Also, as the New York Times 
reported, the Westchester County (NY) Legion censured the Scarsdale post in June 
1956, after it ―accused [the unit‘s] Un-American Activities Committee of making 
distorted and unwarranted charges of Communist taint against the Scarsdale District 1 
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School Board.‖ In July 1958, the Minnesota Legion‘s Subversives Activities 
Subcommittee also expressed its opposition to the tactics of McCarthyism used by 
such units elsewhere. As its annual report declared, ―Your committee refused to be a 
part of unsupported attacks on individuals or organizations. We feel that such 
practices are unfair, undemocratic, and contrary to America‘s fundamental precept of 
innocent until guilt has been proved under due process of law.‖ Further, it observed, 
―The American Legion, nationally, and in the State of Minnesota, has sacrificed some 
of its prestige and esteem by its zeal in declaring things to be un-American. All too 
often we have adopted the techniques of the dictators when the machinery of 
democracy would have better served the cause.‖ Such criticisms from within the 
Legion, however, proved to be the exception. In the 1950s, the American Veterans 
Committee stood out as the only national veterans‘ organization that consistently 
challenged the Legion on civil liberties.
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Chapter 3: ―We do not need vigilante tactics that violate the 
spirit of true Americanism:‖ The American Veterans Committee 
and the Fight for Civil Liberties. 
 
In the summer of 1951, with the war raging in Korea, President Truman 
proposed revisions to the Defense Production Act of 1950 that would grant his 
administration direct and far-reaching authority to control wages, prices and 
production, ―in short, …a wartime command economy.‖ The bill provoked 
widespread opposition from Congressional conservatives and numerous economic 
interest groups, including the National Association of Manufacturers, resistant to 
increased federal authority over private enterprise. In a radio address to the nation, 
Truman attempted to rally public support for his bill. The President asked all 
Americans to put the good of the nation and the soldiers fighting in Korea before 
personal economic interests, declaring that his proposals would prevent a disastrous 
inflation harmful to the war effort.
106
  
In mid-July 1951, the American Veterans Committee, representing the 
interests of liberal veterans, urged Congress to provide its full bi-partisan support for 
the administration‘s proposals. The AVC‘s public statements reinforced Truman‘s 
call for patriotic sacrifice, and charged that ongoing Congressional opposition to the 
measures undermined the war effort, betrayed the troops in Korea and aided the 
Communists. The AVC Bulletin characterized Congressional opposition to the bill as 
―a headlong appeasement of special pressure groups at the expense of national 
preparedness and consumers.‖ The AVC‘s National Administrative Committee 
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(NAC) sent a petition to Vice-President Alben Barkley and Speaker Sam Rayburn 
that accused Congress of undermining the stability of the home front for which the 
soldiers sacrificed in battle. ―While Congress fiddles, the housewife‘s budget burns—
and by housewives we mean especially the wives and mothers of Americans now 
fighting in Korea. When the servicemen return, they will find higher rents, food costs 
multiplied and they and their families caught in a flood of inflation unleashed by a 
Congress that could listen only to the voices of selfish interests.‖  AVC national 
chairman Michael Straight also charged that Congressional opposition to the bill 
aided the Communists. ―Truce talks in Korea do not signal the end of communist 
aggression. If inflation envelops America, Stalin will have won a victory far more 
decisive than any military decision in Korea. The 82
nd
 Congress will be the most 
effective fifth column Stalin ever had—unless they come to their senses.‖
107
  
As this example reveals, the meanings of Cold War discourse, like any 
political language, were never static or fixed, but instead fluid, and therefore always 
open for reinterpretation. Like their conservative counterparts, liberals readily 
adapted anti-Communist rhetoric to advance their own particular political objectives. 
For liberals, no less than conservatives, anti-Communism had multiple purposes 
beyond expressing genuine anti-Communist sentiment, particularly as a political 
weapon to discredit opponents.
108
 In the AVC‘s liberal Cold War lexicon, the 
expansion of state authority to restrain and regulate free enterprise became true 
Americanism. By foregrounding images of sacrificing soldiers, families in economic 
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disarray, and grieving war widows, the AVC attempted to portray conservative anti-
regulatory policies as unpatriotic and un-American. These representations 
simultaneously depicted the New Deal/Fair Deal state as the legitimate protector of 
domestic stability and the national welfare.  
The AVC extended this rhetorical strategy to its advocacy of civil liberties. 
Inasmuch as the efforts of conservatives to define and control subversion aimed to 
discredit liberal reform, the AVC attempted to counter their initiatives by depicting 
them as strengthening the Communists at the expense of democracy and national 
security. Therefore, when the AVC charged conservatives with resorting to anti-
subversive methods akin to those of Communist police states, it was not simply 
voicing its concern over restrictions on civil liberties; rather, as this chapter argues, it 
was primarily attempting to advance New Deal liberalism. In the 1950s, the AVC 
defined its Americanism program as ―opposition to all efforts to curtail basic 
American freedoms,‖
109
 and in challenging the conservative reaction to the New 
Deal, it came to the defense of a broad range of ordinary and prominent Americans, 
including educators, filmmakers, and also liberal organizations, such as the ACLU. 
But, as this chapter reveals, the AVC‘s attempts to capture the meaning of Cold War 
Americanism for liberal reform did not succeed. The AVC‘s failure, to some extent at 
least, can be attributed to its lack of resources. Despite its early success in recruiting 
members, the AVC became a casualty of early Cold War politics, and subsequently, it 
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never developed the large membership and lobbying clout of the American Legion. 
Most significantly, however, the overwhelmingly conservative political culture of the 
1950s ensured the political hegemony of the Legion and its allies.  
Indeed, the example of the Defense Production Act of 1951 is emblematic of 
the AVC‘s political ineffectiveness in the 1950s. Congressional conservatives labeled 
the economic controls liberals demanded as ―socialistic,‖ and eliminated them from 
the final bill the President Truman ―reluctantly‖ signed, in late July 1951.
110
 This 
outcome exposes the limits of Cold War discourse as a language of reform in these 
years. Nevertheless, the AVC‘s presence serves to further disrupt and complicate the 
notion of a single, unitary conservative Americanism in this period.
111
  
In part, the AVC‘s anti-Communist rhetoric reflected its embrace of the post-
WWII new liberalism that rejected the Popular Front liberal-left alliance with the 
Communists.
112
 Founded in July 1944 by younger, liberal-minded WWII veterans, 
the AVC saw itself ―as an alternative to the more conservative Legion and VFW.‖
113
 
In keeping with the new liberalism, the AVC opposed the Communists and Fascists 
equally as undemocratic ―totalitarians.‖
114
 The AVC‘s anti-Communist stance 
became increasingly apparent after the Communist Party (CP) targeted the AVC for 
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infiltration in early 1946, causing a two-year long internal factional struggle for 
control of the organization. At AVC‘s first national convention in June 1946, the CP-
led Left faction lost its bid to open membership to Spanish Civil War veterans and to 
gain proportional representation on the National Planning Committee (the governing 
executive committee), but it still won six (of sixteen total) seats on that body. After 
the convention, the AVC‘s liberal majority increasingly asserted its desire to purge 
the Communists. In November 1946, the NPC passed a resolution opposing the 
efforts of members of the Communist Party to gain ―entrance into our ranks‖ and ―to 
use AVC as a sounding board for their perverse philosophy.‖ At the second national 
convention, in June1947, liberal anti-Communist candidates won both the national 
chairmanship and all NPC seats.
115
  
Factional turmoil continued through 1948, especially as debate concerning the 
Progressive Party presidential campaign of Henry Wallace escalated; but the AVC 
took decisive steps that defeated the Communists by the end of the year. After a 
highly publicized trial in the summer, the National Administrative Committee (NAC) 
expelled Communist Daily Worker editor John Gates from the AVC in September, 
charging that his use of his membership to advance the Communist Party violated the 
constitutional rule on partisan political activity. In November, the AVC national 
office revoked the charter of the New York Area Council ―a stronghold of the Left.‖ 
That same month, the third national convention passed a resolution that condemned 
the ―totalitarian principles and destructive practices of the American Communist 
Party,‖ and ruled Communists ―ineligible for membership in the AVC.‖ The 
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resolution also directed the national office ―to clean out and keep out members of the 
Communist Party from our ranks.‖
116
 In February 1950 the AVC Bulletin announced, 
―The last refuge of the [Communist faction] ‗east wing,‘ the Los Angeles Area 
Council, has surrendered without a fight.‖ As the Bulletin explained, ―five of the 
major east wing chapters…have disbanded…finally recognizing they have no chance 
of controlling AVC now or in the distant future‖ they ―are being recruited into an 




While the AVC‘s internal policies helped to nurture the new anti-Communist 
liberalism also emerging among other liberal organizations in the postwar years,
118
  it 
had particularly close ties with the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). 
Founded in early 1947 by as an exclusively non-Communist liberal organization 
mainly to perpetuate the New Deal, the ADA regarded American Communists as 
instruments of Soviet dictatorship, and from its inception it officially barred them 
from membership
119
 The fact that many of its key leaders and members also 
participated actively in the ADA further solidified AVC‘s role in building the new 
liberalism. Among ADA‘s founding members were: Charles Bolt and Gilbert 
Harrison, respectively AVC national chairman in 1946-1947 and 1948-1949, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Jr., AVC national housing director in 1947, and AVC‘er and civil 
liberties attorney Joe Rauh, Jr.
120
 Michael Straight, AVC national chairman from 
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1949-1952 (also publisher of the New Republic, 1946-1956), joined the ADA‘s New 
York State Board in August 1948. Also, Mickey Levine, who helped found the AVC 
(and national chairman from 1955-1960), also chaired the ADA‘s Manhattan West 
Side branch in the late 1940s.
121
 
But other factors, besides its ideological affinities with the new liberalism, 
more fundamentally animated the AVC‘s anti-Communist rhetoric in the 1950s. Its 
reputation as liberal–left organization opened the AVC to accusations of being a 
communist front. Conservative veterans‘ organizations publicly red-baited the AVC 
through the late 1940s.
122
 On one level then, Cold War discourse provided the AVC 
with a political weapon to counter these attacks. In April 1949, for example, when 
local units of the Legion, VFW and Catholic War Veterans (CWV) in Queens (NY) 
learned that the Jewish War Veterans had invited the AVC to participate in Memorial 
Day ceremonies with all veterans‘ organizations, they publicly attacked the AVC for 
its ―communistic tendencies‖ and boycotted the events.  In response, local AVC 
leader Charles Belous pointed to AVC‘s anti-Communist record.  ―Certainly, since 
our last national convention,‖ he declared, ―there should be no doubt about the anti-
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Communist position of our organization.‖ Furthermore, he proclaimed, ―to label the 
AVC as communistic was ‗nothing short of cheap politics that plays right into the 




Dramatic membership losses following the purge of the Communists, 
combined with the increasingly conservative Cold War atmosphere in the early 
1950s, also heightened the AVC‘s need to publicly exhibit its anti-Communist 
credentials. Nation-wide membership plunged from a peak of nearly 100,000 in 
1947
124
 to around 35,000 by May 1950.
125
 For the remainder of the 1950s, it hovered 
around 30,000.
126
 The loss of the Communists and their political allies obviously 
accounted for some portion of this decline. But as the Cold War climate intensified, 
many non-Communist liberal AVC‘ers undoubtedly followed former Democratic 
Congressman and AVC founder Will Rogers, Jr., who left the California AVC in 
1948. In his widely publicized letter of resignation, Rogers declared the unit was 
―nothing but a Communist front.‖ He also urged other branch members ―to resign and 
get out.‖ ―We lost a battle here in California…To remain in the State organization is 
to give assistance to America‘s enemies,‖ he warned.
127
 Members who feared being 
labeled a Communist sympathizer (as perhaps Rogers did) had good reason to leave 
the AVC.  
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Indeed, the Cold War shattered the AVC‘s initial plans of becoming a mass 
movement. Throughout the 1950s, therefore, the AVC primarily remained an 
organization of well-educated, solidly middle class, and overwhelmingly white liberal 
veterans. A 1954 Columbia University survey of 70 percent of all AVC members 
reported that over half earned annual incomes ―of $7,000 and higher,‖ well above 
1955 average U.S. per capita income of $2,000. Furthermore, some ―76 percent who 
filled out questionnaires,‖ completed ―four years of college or more.‖ Also, the 
survey reported, while Reader’s Digest, Life, McCall’s and Ladies Home Journal 
garnered the country‘s largest readership, AVC members identified The New Yorker, 
Time, Life and New Republic as their ―favorite‖ magazines. Respondents also gave 
FDR and Adlai Stevenson their highest approval, while 79 percent disapproved of 
Eisenhower‘s presidential record.
128
 As the socio-economic status of most members 
suggests, virtually all AVC chapters active in the 1950s were located in large cities.
129
 
But despite the organization‘s strong commitment to black civil rights (examined in 
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the next chapter), delegates to the 1957 AVC national convention, as the Afro-
American reported, ―were nearly ninety percent white.‖
130
  
Yet aside from its need to use Cold War language to defend itself from 
conservative red-baiting, the AVC primarily adopted anti-Communist rhetoric to 
promote its core postwar political objective—the advancement of the New Deal 
order. This had been on the agenda of the organization since its inception. The 
preamble to its constitution, adopted at the first national convention in 1946, asserted 
that one of its main purposes was: ―to maintain full production and full employment 
in our country under a system of free enterprise in which business, labor, agriculture 
and government cooperate.‖
131
 The AVC attracted a number of individuals into its 
staff and leadership ranks who worked in important positions to advance the New 
Deal both before and after 1945. After completing his undergraduate studies at 
Cambridge University with John Maynard Keynes in 1937, Michael Straight joined 
the New Deal as a State Department economist and wrote speeches for President and 
Mrs. Roosevelt.
132
 His efforts to defend the New Deal against its detractors began as 
early as WWII. When New Republic (owned by his family) sponsored a dinner in 
early 1942 ―to celebrate...the tenth year of the Roosevelt administration and arouse in 
the New Deal a spirit for fighting back at its critics,‖ Straight, then the magazine‘s 
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Washington correspondent, served as toastmaster.
133
 Following his discharge from 
the Army, Hubert Will attended University of Chicago Law School, and subsequently 
served as ―a special secretary to New York Senator Robert Wagner.‖ He was elected 
to the NPC in 1954.
134
 Numerous other AVC‘ers held less prestigious, but 
nonetheless important positions. For instance, Dave Garwin, named director of 
organization for the Washington DC chapter in early 1951, previously ―served for 
sometime‖ as a Committee for the Nation‘s Health field representative ―organizing 
support for President Truman‘s national health program.‖
135
 
Indeed, as conservatives accelerated their postwar roll back of liberalism, the 
AVC endeavored to defend and expand the New Deal/Fair Deal agenda. In 
September 1947, the AVC publicly denounced the national American Legion 
convention for its ―refusal to endorse the [Taft-Ellender-Wagner] housing bill.‖ 
Delegates to the 1948 AVC national convention pledged themselves to work for 
―complete repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act‖ and ―an extended social security 
program.‖
136
 Throughout the 1950s the AVC also lent its support to the labor 
movement. In February 1951, it publicly supported the efforts of railroad workers to 
regain their collective bargaining rights following President Truman‘s seizure of the 
industry that suspended their strike the previous year. The AVC also assisted federal 
employee unions by lobbying Congress on their behalf, and it worked cooperatively 
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The AVC also maintained ties 
with the AFL-CIO. In 1959, the Bulletin reported that Julie Bernstein, a 
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Massachusetts AFL-CIO official, also served on AVC‘s National Board.
137
 
 One of the AVC‘s earliest efforts to defend liberalism in the 1950s was its 
public campaign against the man who most outwardly personified the anti-New Deal 
backlash—Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.
138
 An AVC Bulletin editorial in March 1950, 
for instance, employing Cold War Americanism, responded to the Senator‘s ―false‖ 
charges of Communist infiltration of the State Department by stating that they 
undermined America‘s strength in the world. ―If these charges were true, neither 
Americans nor their allies could have confidence in our government and all that it is 
trying to do.‖ McCarthy‘s accusations, declared the AVC, also served to ―weaken 
America‖ by potentially causing much needed national security staff to quit their jobs 
―at a time when ability in government is vital to democracy and peace.‖ The AVC‘s 
attacks clearly rattled McCarthy. On March 14, 1950, two days before the AVC‘s 
national chairman Michael Straight was to address the group‘s Harvard University 
chapter on the Senator‘s accusations of Communist subversion in the State 
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 Undeterred by McCarthy‘s allegation, the AVC continued its offensive. In 
mid-April 1950, Andrew Rice, AVC‘s Washington DC chapter chairman, publicly 
excoriated the Senator for the harm his methods inflicted on the nation. In Rice‘s 
formulation, McCarthy was a traitor out to undermine American freedoms. ―[B]y the 
venom of his denunciations he has given aid and comfort to the enemies of 
democracy who seek to sow seeds of hate and distrust….by the violence of his 
accusations he has…put a heavy strain on the fabric of our democratic pattern of free 
discussion. This nation can ill afford any Joe McCarthy‘s.‖ In early June 1950, the 
AVC‘s National Planning Committee (NPC) publicly called for McCarthy‘s 
impeachment ―for high crimes and misdemeanors.‖ Its ―articles of impeachment‖ 
reinforced the notion that his actions were simultaneously eroding the nation‘s 
democratic institutions and their ability to meet the demands of the Cold War. As the 
NPC charged, McCarthy ―has traduced, subverted, and degraded the Senate…thereby 
impairing, if not destroying…[its] effectiveness in the critical arena of world 
affairs….He has done more than any other un-American force to bring world scorn, 
domestic obloquy, and general disgrace upon the Senate.‖ In using Hitler‘s ―‗Big Lie‘ 
technique‖ along with ―his own invention of the ‗Multiple Untruth,‘‖ the NPC 
maintained, McCarthy was ―introducing into the America way of life the seeds of our 
own destruction and the road to totalitarianism.‖ The group gave further support to its 
contention that McCarthy‘s methods undermined the country‘s strategic position in 
the world, in late September 1951, when it opposed his efforts to derail Philip 
Jessup‘s nomination as a United Nations delegate. In opposing McCarthy‘s charge 
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that Jessup ―had an affinity for Communist causes,‖ based on his alleged Communist 
front memberships, the AVC stated that Jessup‘s role at the U.N. was ―vital,‖ since he 
had ―proved his capacity to meet and master Soviet spokesmen.‖ Furthermore, the 
AVC‘s national board of directors declared, ―Mr. Jessup‘s record stands unstained 
despite the insinuations, false accusations and distortions of McCarthy…In seeking to 




 The AVC‘s vigorous campaign against McCarthy contrasted sharply with the 
temerity displayed by most liberals who abhorred his methods, but failed to offer any 
sustained opposition to stop to him. For the AVC, providing its support to the handful 
of Congressional leaders who opposed McCarthy, and the individuals he targeted, 
became occasions for mobilizing public opposition to the damage being done to civil 
liberties. For example, in late December 1950, McCarthy attempted to silence 
columnist Drew Pearson, one of his chief outspoken critics, by claiming that 
Pearson‘s sponsor, the Adam Hat Stores, Inc., ―is unknowingly contributing at least 
something to the cause of international communism by keeping this Communist 
spokesman on the air.‖ After the company dropped its sponsorship of Pearson, the 
AVC termed the incident, as the Washington Post noted, ―a threat to American 
freedom of expression,‖ and reissued its call to the newly seated Congress to impeach 
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McCarthy. Similarly, in May 1953, the group labeled McCarthy‘s investigation of the 
anti-McCarthy New York Post and its editor James Wechsler for alleged Communist 
links, as ―really an attack on the freedom of the press,‖ directed against a newspaper 
that ―has been in the forefront of the fight against the communist threat.‖ As the AVC 
implied, by lodging false charges against his critics in the press, such as Wechsler, 
McCarthy simultaneously undermined the First Amendment and their efforts to 
combat subversion. While Democratic Senator William Benton‘s liberal Senate 
colleagues failed to back his persistent opposition to McCarthy, the AVC steadfastly 
supported him. For example, in March 1952, when Benton relinquished his immunity 
and openly challenged McCarthy to refute the charges he issued for his expulsion, 
including making false accusations and other violations, the AVC rallied to his 
support, and declared, ―we are encouraged that Senator Benton has stood up bravely 
against the most dangerous man in the United States, a man who endangers the very 
foundation of American liberty—the Bill of Rights.‖
141
  
 The AVC‘s campaign against McCarthy persisted up through the Senator‘s 
eventual demise in the wake of the army-McCarthy hearings. In late January 1953, 
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the group called for President Eisenhower to order a Justice Department investigation 
of McCarthy‘s finances, after a Senate subcommittee report revealed that his periodic 
bank deposits far exceeded what his Senatorial pay alone could sustain. Building on 
themes developed earlier, the AVC‘s representations of McCarthy focused on his role 
in subverting the nation by corroding the foundations of civil liberties and smearing 
the reputations of its key leaders and institutions in the Cold War. In April, 1954 the 
Bulletin reported on an address by New Jersey Governor Robert Meyner at its recent 
NPC meeting, where he denounced McCarthy ―as ‗a modern ‗Robespierre‘‖ for 
having ―set out to create a reign of terror in America.‖ As Meyner noted, ―The terror 
corrupts political life…it extends to all parts of the nation, stifling the natural genius 
of freedom and democracy.‖ Failure to stop it meant ―we are inviting an American 
Gestapo…the techniques of the totalitarians, whose philosophies we despise and 
whose methods we deplore.‖
142
  
The AVC followed a similar strategy in dealing with McCarthy‘s attack on 
Brigadier General Ralph W. Zwicker, in late February 1954, when he appeared before 
the Senator‘s Investigations Subcommittee examining the Army‘s non-punitive 
discharge of suspected subversive Irving Peress, who McCarthy wanted court-
martialed after he invoked the Fifth Amendment in previous testimony before the 
same committee. After Zwicker refused McCarthy‘s request for the names of those 
responsible for the action, he lashed out at the general, declaring he was ―not fit to 
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wear that uniform‖ and that he ―lacked the brains of a five year old.‖ The AVC 
Bulletin immediately denounced McCarthy‘s attack for ―sabotaging the morale of 
America‘s armed forces.‖ A cartoon by the group‘s national chairman Bill Mauldin 
accompanying the story, featured a machine gun wielding WWII German soldier 
standing guard over a long line of O.W.‘s consisting of the Army‘s top officers led by 
Eisenhower, all of whom, including the president, marched by with their hands 
clasped behind their heads. The German soldier image, as the story revealed, linked 
Zwicker‘s presence at the Battle of the Bulge to McCarthy‘s 1948 role in defending 
the Nazi officers responsible for the mass killing of American O.W.‘s at Baugnez 
Crossroads, Belgium, subsequently termed the Malmedy Massacre.
143
 In a telegram 
to President Eisenhower, the AVC asked, ―Is it coincidental that his latest Army 
target [is] Brig. Gen. Ralph W. Zwicker…[of] the U.S. 2
nd
 Division which fought 
brilliantly…against units of the same S.S. troops responsible for the cold blooded 
murder of American prisoners?‖ Just as he had undermined the Army in the Malmedy 
investigation, by charging the high command with gross incompetence, if not 
subversion, for failing to court martial Peress, who‘s only offense was use of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege; McCarthy was once again aiding the enemy‘s cause. In late 
July 1954, the AVC again reinforced the image of McCarthy as a saboteur 
undermining U.S. interests when it sought Senate leadership support for the Flanders 
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resolution, calling for McCarthy‘s censure, by drawing attention to ―the terrible 
damage inflicted both at home and abroad by the junior Senator from Wisconsin.‖
144
 
The AVC received a barrage of protest letters denouncing its calls for 
McCarthy‘s impeachment. Using the discourse of Cold War conservative 
Americanism, these writers attempted to counter AVC‘s impeachment case against 
McCarthy, by depicting both the group and its anti-McCarthy campaign as unpatriotic 
and subversive. One writer, identifying himself as ―a good American‖ told AVC in 
June 1950, ―More power to the American from Wisconsin…No Pink organization can 
frighten him.‖ Others pointed to what they regarded as McCarthy‘s patriotic WWII 
military service and AVC‘s wrongheaded support of McCarthy‘s targets. For 
example, in February 1951, Thomas Marro of New York City wrote, ―Your defense 
of ‗Trojan Horse‘ Pearson and attack on our ex-Marine, Senator Joe McCarthy proves 
you are mis-named. More fitting is Un-American Veterans Committee.‖ Likewise 
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disgruntled over the AVC‘s defense of Pearson, Thomas Hilton of Ruston, Louisiana 
declared, ―Joe Stalin has more than fifty thousand of his stooges within our 
borders…the kind of people Drew Pearson has his arm around while he goes his way 
preaching ‗how to make democracy live.‘‖ As Hilton concluded, ―Sen. McCarthy will 
go down in history as making the greatest single-handed fight against Communism.‖ 
Elizabeth Baker of Coatesville, Pennsylvania asked the AVC, ―Did you protest about 
Hiss too?…Cannot understand why you Veterans are on wrong side against USA.‖ 
Similarly, a New York City Gold Star Mother wrote, ―I am surprised at a Veterans‘ 
organization taking such Un-American steps. McCarthy so far has not been proved 
guilty of anything. Truman is the one to be impeached.‖ 
145
 
Veterans backing McCarthy voiced similar protests against AVC‘s 
impeachment campaign. A member of the Legion‘s 40 & 8 Society told the AVC in 
late December 1950,  ―we need more men like McCarthy‖ and, ―when the word 
‗Impeachment‘ is used there is only one place for it…for the biggest Socialist in 
office today in our once free country. As for your organization, you are the ones the 
American Legion and Vets of Foreign Wars wouldn‘t let in. We may run McCarthy 
vs. Truman.‖ Also, New York City resident Stanley Rys wrote the group, ―As a 
combat Infantry veteran of World War Two, I am deeply ashamed that a veterans‘ 
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organization would stoop so low and condemn a fighting Marine who is trying to 
weed out this fifth column in [the] U.S.A. I suggest that your organization follow this 
modern Billy Mitchell and assist him in every manner possible.‖ In June 1950, an 
anonymous American Legion member emphatically declared, ―being a veteran do not 
include me in the AVC for I have more respect for the honorable Senator than to 
disrespect him even for the best man in the USA when he is fighting Communists.‖ In 
an extended anti-Semitic rant against ―the damned Jew traitors of our country,‖ a 
former World War II Chaplain, Rev. Philip Separovic of Milwaukee, Wisconsin told 
the AVC in December, 1950, ―Instead of helping Senator McCarthy to combat these 
damned traitors you attack him…That is what you call Americanism…nothing but 
helping…the traitors, who are selling for the Judas‘s pennies our country.‖
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The AVC‘s campaign against McCarthy also angered at least some of its own 
members. In early June, 1950, Peter Cutler, of Garrison, NY, who joined when 
discharged from the Navy in 1945, returned his membership card in protest of the 
group‘s impeachment call, and declared, ―Your organization is the one subverting 
Democracy & [sic] keeping the facts of Communism, Socialism & Subversion from 
the American people and playing right into to the hands of Joe Stalin.‖ As Cutler, 
noted, ―McCarthy was 100% right in the Amerasia Case which betrayed our country 
and most [of] all our veterans and those who gave their lives in battle for the greatest 
Nation in World history!‖ Likewise, in late 1953, Waylan Minot, a disabled veteran 
and AVC ―life member‖ defended McCarthy‘s anti-communist record and questioned 
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the AVC‘s loyalty for having attacked him. As Minot informed the group, ―When I 
read that the AVC proposes to ‗get‘ McCarthy and to condemn ‗McCarthyism‘ I 
boil.‖ Thank God for McCarthy‘s guts and ability to stand abuse from those who 
should be on his side—those who have faced death to uphold our Constitution.‖ 
Given its stance on McCarthy, he felt that at its upcoming national convention, the 




 In short, to the AVC‘s critics, its defense of the civil liberties of accused 
Communists amounted to another form of subversion, hindering the work of the 
country‘s real Cold War patriot, Joe McCarthy. Many veterans idealized McCarthy as 
the ―fighting Marine,‖ carrying out the good patriotic defense of the nation against 
dictatorship they had undertaken in WWII, only this time against America‘s newest 
enemy—Soviet Communism. In their minds, by having ―the guts‖ to take on this new 
battle against the Communists, McCarthy remained true to the sacrifices they made 
during the war. By attacking McCarthy, who, like Billy Mitchell before him, was 
engaged in a ―single-handed‖ crusade to keep the country strong, the AVC not only 
failed to uphold veterans‘ patriotic mission to aid that effort, it actually betrayed it 
through its defense of men like Drew Pearson, who, by embracing the Kremlin‘s 
―stooges,‖ simply gave America‘s enemies the cover they needed to carry out Stalin‘s 
work.   
The AVC also defended civil liberties by opposing the array of anti-
subversion legislation. While Senate liberals, acting on their anticommunist 
                                                 
147
 Peter S. Cutler, Post Road Farm, Garrison NY to Mr. Pakiser, June 9, 1950, AVC Records, 
Subjects, Ser.1, Subser.1, box 10, folder 5: McCarthy—Impeachment, 1950-1951; for Minot‘s 




commitments, supported the McCarran Internal Security Act, the AVC‘s anti-
Communism did not compromise its efforts to protect civil liberties. The group 
lobbied against the legislation, testifying before its sponsoring committees and 
working in coalition with some 21 pro-civil liberties organizations among its liberal 
allies. In testimony before HUAC, in late March, 1950, the AVC ‗s Michael Straight 
argued that existing laws were already sufficient, but if need be, they ―should be 
strengthened,‖ to avert ―legislation that would promulgate a very dangerous principle 
of guilt by association.‖ To do otherwise, Straight told HUAC, would undercut 
America‘s Cold War strategy: ―We think the critical front is in Berlin, Southeast 
Asia, India and Rome. We think it is an illusion to believe Americans can gain 
security by attempting to drive underground or destroy a little band of shabby 
[Communist Party] men on Fourteenth Street whom we think we can lick by 
constitutional measures…We think to the extent we create that illusion, …[it] is a 
point in favor of Joseph Stalin.‖ Despite these objections, Congress, with the support 
of a majority of Senate liberals, passed the bill over President Truman‘s veto.
148
  
Also, in late 1950, Los Angeles AVC member and city councilman Ed Roybal 
opposed three separate ―communist registration ordinances‖ placed before by the city 
council. Using liberal Cold War Americanism rhetoric, the NPC praised Roybal‘s 
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vote as, ―an inspiration to those who believe freedom is more important than 
conformity,‖ and noted, ―We feel as…you do, that the control of communists and 
other subversive elements in our midst is properly the function of those agencies 
qualified by experience and training to deal with such problems.‖ But since Roybal 
cast ―the one dissenting vote on each measure‖ his action proved fruitless.
149
   
 The AVC also opposed anti-subversive measures at the state level, but 
without success. In early 1952, for example, the AVC‘s Ben Franklin chapter in 
Philadelphia, jointly with the local ACLU, lobbied Pennsylvania legislators to defeat 
the state‘s public employee loyalty oath bill, or Pechan Act. Despite these efforts, the 
powerful state veterans‘ lobby, including the American Legion, the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars (VFW) and Amvets, assured that an overwhelming majority of the state 
assembly passed the bill in December.
150
  
The AVC opposed a range of other governmental measures abridging civil 
liberties. In early July 1954, it supported the enactment of fair rules of procedure for 
those brought before Congressional committees investigating subversion, and 
presented its interest in the legislation as a matter of domestic and international 
significance. As the AVC‘s executive director Andrew Rice told the Senate 
Subcommittee on Rules, ―in the cold war between communism and 
democracy…what America does to live up to the democratic ideal speaks louder than 
what any Voice of America may say. Veterans who have served overseas in the post-
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World War II years are particularly aware of this.‖ Similarly, in April 1957, the AVC 
denounced as ―a dagger in the back of one of our basic freedoms—a free press,‖ the 
State Department‘s continued denial of a passport to journalist William Worthy, 
which it revoked in 1956 following his return from reporting on events in China. 
Absent a policy reversal, the group noted, ―the Department must stand guilty of 
denying information to the American people, rivaling the same kind of restrictions 
which we so justly speak out against behind the Iron Curtain.‖ The group continued 
to oppose passport curbs on alleged subversives, being pushed especially hard by 
anti-communist conservatives in the late 1950s, as contravening Americans‘ basic 
―right to travel.‖ In July 1959, for example, it told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that, ―A citizen should be free to leave this country without an ‗exit 
permit‘ which the passport has in recent years in large part become.‖
151
 
 Yet these arguments failed to persuade either the State Department or the 
judiciary to end restrictions on the right to travel. Despite the Supreme Court‘s April 
1958 ruling in Kent v. Dulles that the State Department lacked Congressional 
authority to deny passports based on individuals ―beliefs and associations,‖ the State 
Department basically ignored the Court, and continued to deny passports on political 
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 In July 1959, the United States Court of Appeals ruled unanimously 
against William Worthy and Waldo Frank, who invoked Kent and claimed 
discrimination since the State Department had approved 40 journalists for travel to 
China. In his concurring opinion, Justice Warren E. Berger stated the Court‘s belief 
that the authority of the Secretary of State to determine travel policy ―is political in 
the highest sense and is not reviewable on any basis in any circumstance by any 
court.‖
153
 His opinion also demonstrated the double-edged nature of Cold War 
arguments. As the New York Times reported, Berger maintained that limiting the 
number of passports granted to journalists ― was ‗a calculated risk‘ undertaken on the 
presumption that it would help the ultimate objectives of world peace and stability, 
reduce tensions and strengthen resistance to communism.‖ Since the Supreme Court 
―declined to review these decisions,‖ the travel restrictions remained intact.
154
  
To protect the civil liberties of federal employees, the AVC also strongly 
advocated for reform of the government‘s personnel loyalty-security programs. The 
group‘s opposition in early 1955 to the Defense Facilities Protection Act, or Butler 
bill, aimed at extending the program expanded by Eisenhower‘s Executive Order 
10450 to the nation‘s defense plants, reflected its chief concerns about the entire 
edifice of federal loyalty-security measures. The group roundly criticized the Butler 
bill before the Senate Subcommittee on Government Employee Security Programs for 
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its broad inclusion of non-security related jobs, and lack of proper standards and 
unfair procedures, including guilt by association and ―suspensions without pay,‖ that 
resulted in ―the indiscriminate bringing of half-baked charges on flimsy or no 
evidence.‖ In this, and in virtually all such presentations before Congress, the AVC 
proclaimed its anticommunist record and status ―as an organization…of veterans who 
fought to prevent tyranny from spreading over the face of the earth.‖ Like this battle, 
the present fight against the Butler bill was aimed at ―the protection of our country‘s 
government from infiltrations by those who would subvert it…and also from those 
who, by design or misguided zeal, would in the name of such protection, introduce 
policies and methods suitable only to the political climate of a totalitarian state.‖ The 
group further argued that by trampling over civil liberties, the measure could generate 
another source of subversion from among those it targeted. ―We must beware lest our 
security program create enemies of state out of once loyal citizens and their children. 
Unjust repression, investigation and destruction of the right to a livelihood have 
produced that result in many another country.‖ In May 1955, the AVC‘s Mitchell 
Cooper told the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that in giving ―absolute power 
to the Executive to curtail the movements of any citizen who, for whatever reason, 
was deemed likely to commit ‗subversive acts‘‖ rendered the bill, ―as close an 
approximation to the police state envisaged in the ‗1984‘ of George Orwell as we 
have yet seen proposed.‖ Furthermore, he declared, ―We are fearful this legislation 
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Given the enormous threat of arbitrary dismissal the Butler bill posed to its 
membership, organized labor also testified against the measure using Cold War 
language. As Tom E. Harris, CIO assistant general counsel, told the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee, ―If the program this bill authorizes is ever put into effect, we 
will have taken a long step toward requiring that every worker carry a police card 
attesting to his loyalty in order to get work. And if that ever happens we will have 
exchanged the freedom of American democracy for the tyranny of a police state.‖
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Yet despite Cold War arguments, it was the combined lobbying clout of the CIO and 





 The AVC also actively intervened to defend the rights of persons subjected to 
allegations of subversive activity. In early 1956, the Hartford (CT) chapter came to 
the defense of Connecticut‘s Children‘s Services director Verne Weed, suspended 
from her job for harboring ―communist sympathies.‖ The AVC stood out as ―the only 
organization besides the local Social Service unit to urge full protection of Miss 
Weed‘s constitutional rights.‖ As the chapter‘s chairman warned the agency‘s 
trustees, ―there was a danger to civil liberties‖ if they fired Weed ―on the basis of a 
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mere allegation of communists ties.‖ In November 1950, the Massachusetts AVC 
presented State Department advisor Owen Lattimore (falsely targeted by McCarthy 
that March as ―the top Russian agent‖ over Alger Hiss), with its Bill of Rights Award 
for ―his outstanding performance in alerting our nation to the existing dangers to our 
right to freedom of conscience and expression, without which we cannot exist as a 
democracy.‖ Likewise, following atomic physicist Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer‘s loss 
of government security clearance in April 1954, after being labeled a ―security risk‖ 
by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the AVC immediately established a 
national legal defense fund on his behalf. In a letter to Oppenheimer, and in its public 
statements, the group praised him for his leadership as ―one of the scientific heroes‖ 
of the war for developing the atomic weaponry that allowed its members to survive it, 
and for the bomb‘s ongoing contribution, in the face of ―Soviet aggression,‖ to 
ensuring ―the security of the American people.‖ Additionally, the group proclaimed, 
it established the fund, ―in the hope‖ that the Security Board‘s action against ―a man 
who…has given unstintingly of himself in the service of his country‘s government, 
may awaken the American people to the fundamental injustice of our security review 
procedures and of the dangers inherent in our present day hysteria.‖
158
 In short, in the 
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AVC‘s depictions, far from being the subversives McCarthy and others claimed them 
to be, both Lattimore and Oppenheimer, as defenders of the country‘s democratic 
heritage and its national security, were key assets in America‘s Cold War struggle.  
Nevertheless, the AVC‘s actions did not shield Lattimore from a relentless 
three-year effort by the Justice Department to convict him for perjury over his alleged 
communist activities based upon McCarthy‘s original charge. Furthermore, its 
defense of Oppenheimer did nothing to stop the AEC review board from permanently 
revoking his security clearance in June 1954.
159
  
In sharp contrast to its conservative adversaries, who, in the name of 
combating ―subversion‖ tried to limit academic freedom, the AVC intervened to 
defend traditions of free inquiry and discussion in the nation‘s educational system. In 
early 1955, the group‘s Pacific Northwest Region ―strongly criticized‖ the University 
of Washington‘s Chancellor for blocking a lecture by Dr. Oppenheimer. As the unit 
declared, ―It is the function of a university…in a free land…to utilize the fruits of that 
freedom in the quest for greater scientific advancement.‖ Simultaneously, it praised 
the University of Oregon ―for fulfilling its academic responsibility‘ after it ―refused to 
cancel several scheduled appearances of Dr. Oppenheimer at Oregon state colleges.‖ 
Likewise, in early 1956, the Montgomery County, MD AVC chapter ―commended‖ 
three local board of education officials for their determined, though failed, effort to 
defeat a ban on a sociology textbook ―because it allegedly ‗advocated opinions‘.‖
160
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But the AVC‘s intervention on behalf of Oppenheimer at the University of 
Washington proved inconsequential. The ban sharply divided the campus, and 
generated two months of prolonged and acrimonious internal debate. Finally, in April 
1955, an agreement between the faculty senate and the University‘s president to 
involve faculty in future decisions impinging on academic freedom largely settled the 
controversy. The president officially ended the affair by personally inviting 
Oppenheimer to lecture at the International Congress of Theoretical Physics held on 
campus in September 1956.
161
     
 The AVC‘s civil liberties advocacy in education inevitably brought it into 
direct confrontation with conservative veterans groups. In late 1956, the AVC‘s 
Central Nassau, (NY) chapter ―lodged a protest‖ with the Levittown school board 
over its decision ―to select two representatives from local veterans organizations to 
review textbooks.‖ As the unit explained, ―AVC considers it morally wrong to set up 
a committee to examine study material since such a function properly belongs to the 
educational administration of the school.‖ Further, in June 1958, the AVC‘s national 
chairman lauded the Hanover, New Jersey school board‘s refusal to fire the teacher 
responsible for allowing the school newspaper to publish essays questioning the U.S. 
atomic bomb attack on Japan, despite pressure from the Legion and VFW to do so. 
As the group told the board, ―As American war veterans we are appalled at those who 
speak in the name of patriotism to discourage the free expression of ideas.‖ Rather 
than suppressing free thought in schools, the group stated, ―our country needs 
teachers who will stimulate critical thinking by young men and women since such 
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independent judgment is the basis of our democratic way of life.‖ Also, while the 
Legion opposed Alger Hiss‘s speaking engagement at Princeton University in early 
1956, the AVC ‗s New Jersey State Council supported the free speech principles 
underlying the students‘ invitation to Hiss. As the council declared, ―since the days of 
McCarthy‘s reign of Terror, ‗portions of the strong framework of our Constitution 
have been chipped away‘ and ‗self-appointed groups decide what should be read, 
what should be seen and what should be heard.‘‖
162
 
 Additionally, the AVC resisted the efforts of conservative veterans‘ groups to 
impose their political preferences on others through film bans and other restrictions 
on free expression among filmmakers. In February 1953, the AVC‘s Motion Picture 
chapter denounced the Legion‘s nation-wide campaign to prevent showings of 
Chaplin‘s Limelight as ―an attempt to control the nation‘s screens‖ and ―a gross 
violation of the basic democratic principle of freedom of the arts.‖ The unit‘s 
chairman also urged readers of his letter to the New York Times, to ask local theaters 
to show Limelight in order to protect ―our prerogative to see all films ― despite the 
efforts of ―authoritarian pressure groups.‖
163
  Yet, lacking a large membership base 
and adequate resources, the AVC had no effective means of countering the massive 
and highly successful Legion boycott of Limelight discussed in the previous chapter. 
Further, in early 1954, the AVC‘s New Jersey State Council, supported locally 
by the National Conference of Christians and Jews and the Presbyterian churches, 
denounced efforts by a unit of the conservative Catholic War Veterans (CWV) to ban 
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showings in Red Bank of The High Wall, an Anti-Defamation League educational 
film on confronting racial prejudice. As the AVC council declared, ―Being a veteran 
does not give anyone the right to decide the likes and dislikes of our citizens.‖
164
 At 
least one local parent-teacher group cancelled its showing of The High Wall after the 
CWV, citing reports from the New Jersey Anti-Communist League, charged that the 
film was ―pink.‖ However, local CWV officials promptly rescinded their call to ban 
the film
 
after meeting jointly with the Anti-Defamation League and other area CWV 
units, who informed them that the film focused on the ―prejudices suffered by a 
Polish Catholic family [and] had been shown extensively by Catholic youth groups 
and parochial schools.‖ and subsequently rescinded its call to ban the film
 165
 In short, 
the AVC‘s protest failed to influence the CWV to reverse its stance. 
 The AVC nonetheless persistently opposed the Legion‘s attacks on 
Hollywood filmmakers through the late 1950s. In February 1960, the AVC‘s national 
chairman, Mickey Levine, asked the League of Women Voters, the ACLU, trade 
unions and other liberal allies to support its efforts to halt the Legion‘s campaign 
against independent film director Sidney Kramer for his refusal to fire blacklisted 
screenwriter Nedrick Young. As Levine told these groups ―Liberals have been too 
complacent or too pusillanimous with respect to the bullying tactics of the Legion 
Leadership‖
166
 In his letter of support to Kramer, Levine praised the director ―for the 
patriotic, truly American position you have taken in resisting the mob pressure of the 
                                                 
164
 AVC Bulletin, April 1954, 8. 
165
 New York Times, March 12, 1954, 9. 
166








 The AVC also opposed the Legion‘s repeated calls for a federal investigation 
of the ACLU, based on its allegedly ―subversive‖ defense of the constitutional rights 
of radicals. Immediately after the Legion‘s national convention passed a resolution in 
late August 1952 demanding a probe of the ACLU by federal authorities, the group 
deplored the action as ―a reckless and dangerous blow at the American concept of 
liberty.‖ The AVC also pointed out that the ACLU, in keeping with its own 
anticommunist record, ―bars Communists from membership,‖ and that ―the darling of 
many Legionnaires,‖ General Douglas MacArthur, had consulted with the ACLU 
regarding civil liberties policies for occupied Japan. Further, declared AVC‘s then 
chairman Curtis Campaigne, the Legion‘s convention action revealed, ―not only that 
it has no clear idea of the real threat of Communism, but that its concept of 
‗Americanism‘ in truth subverts the meaning of the term.‖ When the Legion‘s 
September 1953 convention reiterated its demand for the investigation, the AVC 
extolled the ACLU‘s record and pointed out that the previous resolution ―was ignored 
by the federal government and attacked by 35 leading newspapers.‖ Indeed, for its 
part, the New York Times commended the ACLU as ―a stout defender of the 
principles upon which the nation was founded‖ and for having, ―denounced unfair 
attacks on religious, racial and political minorities here and likewise in Communists 
countries.‖ ACLU executive director Patrick Malin also immediately rebuked the 
Legion‘s 1953 resolution. While Malin noted the Legion should ―learn how…to 
oppose what a man says while defending his constitutional right to say it,‖ the ACLU, 
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he also declared, ―believes that the structure of freedom must be even more zealously 
guarded today in the face of the danger of the world-wide Soviet conspiracy.‖ As the 
AVC and its liberal allies implied, it was the Legion, not the ACLU, which was 
betraying the democratic rights being defended in the Cold War, freedoms for which 
all veterans, since the founding, had sacrificed to uphold. As the New York Times 
concluded, ―It is too bad that so many of our veterans, as represented at Legion 




The AVC also severely criticized the counter-subversive activities undertaken 
directly by the Legion and other veterans groups. In late January 1954, the role of a 
local VFW post in Norwalk, Connecticut in conducting a ―secret committee to ferret 
out ‗communistically inclined‘ members of the community‖ and report the names of 
these persons to the FBI came to light. News of the Norwalk incident quickly sparked 
a national debate among veterans groups concerning the appropriateness of such 
activities. The Iowa VFW adjutant deplored the Norwalk unit‘s behavior. ―We have 
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not asked our posts in Iowa to an action like that,‖ he declared, ―and we would not 
approve of it even if any of them did. The V.F.W. members are not spy hunters.‖ But 
reports from elsewhere indicated otherwise. New Mexico‘s VFW commander 
reported his unit operated a statewide committee to investigate ―suspected 
Communist activities‖ which reported names to the FBI. The Massachusetts VFW 
commander declared, ―We have been working hand in glove with the FBI for 
fourteen or fifteen years.‖ In response to the Norwalk case, the VFW‘s national 
Americanism chairman held that such investigative work properly belonged to the 
FBI, and declared, ―activities of this sort by individuals who have no experience; 
charging individuals with being Communists without proof is a procedure fraught 
with danger to our country.‖ The AVC‘s Massachusetts chairman declared that the 
Legion‘s activities of reporting alleged subversives to the Massachusetts Commission 
on Communism were ―alien and repugnant to the great American tradition of free 
expression,‖ and therefore served to undermine the country‘s most effective means 
for resisting subversion. The AVC‘s national chairman, Bill Mauldin, denounced the 
Norwalk incident, and similar cases of ―self-appointed‖ counter-subversive activity, 
as akin to, ―the Kremlin system of neighbor spying on neighbor, children spying on 
parents.‖ As Maudlin declared, ―We do not need vigilante tactics which violate the 
spirit of true Americanism.‖
169
  
In an attempt to prevent abuses of civil liberties as occurred in Norwalk, 
Mauldin issued a call on January 29 for all national veterans‘ organizations to meet in 
order to develop a ―genuine code of conduct‖ aimed at ―preserving individual liberty 
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in a time of national crisis.‖ As Mauldin stated, ―Veterans more than any other 
segment of the nation should set an example by their own behavior.‖ In an effort to 
claim patriotic legitimacy for this endeavor, the AVC chose February 22, 
Washington‘s Birthday, as the date for the conference.
170
  
Ahead of the proposed meeting, the Connecticut VFW, on February 12, 
ordered its affiliates to ―withhold further action or publicity on Americanism or 
subversive activities.‖ But the announcement, as the Washington Post reported, 
―immediately drew a number of protests, including some from veterans organizations 
leaders.‖ The national VFW declared that the order did not come from headquarters, 
and Legion national commander Arthur J. Connell stated, ―that the Legion is not 
made up of ‗counter spies or prosecutors‘.‖ Veterans groups also ignored Mauldin‘s 
call for a conference. In February, the Bulletin reported, ―only Amvets and the 
Blinded Veterans Association had indicated a willingness to sit down with…AVC.‖ 
The national commanders of the VFW and the Legion simply ―sent their regrets.‖ 
Months later, in May 1954, the AVC reported that Amvets replied with ―a routine 
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In late July 1954, the AVC called upon the national commanders of the 
Legion, VFW, Catholic War Veterans and Amvets ―to repudiate‖ the participation of 
their local units, as members of New York‘s Joint Committee on Communism, in 
sponsoring a testimonial dinner honoring former McCarthy Subcommittee counsel 
Roy Cohn. Their silence, however, further highlighted the AVC‘s inability to 
influence them. The AVC ‗s critique covered the whole list of charges McCarthy and 
Cohn made against the military in the Army hearings, including their attacks on 
Eisenhower‘s loyalty, along with their ―sordid‖ work on behalf of their assistant G. 
David Schine. As the AVC‘s Bill Mauldin and Andrew Rice told the veterans‘ 
groups, ―We urge you to place in balance McCarthy, Roy Cohn, and David Schine, 
and on the other side, President Eisenhower, General Marshall, Secretary Stevens, 
General MacArthur, General Zwicker and the loyal men of our armed forces, and 
then to speak out with us against this monstrous farce.‖ In September 1954, AVC was 
still waiting for the veterans‘ groups to take action on the Cohn dinner.
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Despite such treatment by the other veterans‘ groups, the AVC did 
nevertheless manage to claim some important victories on the civil liberties front. 
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Beginning in November 1949, the AVC‘s Harvard University chapter led an effort to 
defeat the Naval ROTC loyalty oath regulation forcing members to ―inform their 
naval superiors of any fellow students they see at any meeting of a subversive 
organization.‖ The chapter‘s resolution, sent to AVC members in Congress, including 
Senators Lodge and Paul Douglas, termed the measure ―a menace to American 
freedom‖ and ―a special threat to the academic freedom of the American student.‖ In 
April 1950, the AVC reported, ―Word has been quietly passed to the Naval ROTC 
officers that the informer or stool pigeon clause in the…oath has been dropped…not 
only at Harvard but at all other colleges having Naval ROTC programs.‖ In January 
1955, the AVC also claimed its protest to President Eisenhower (during an interview 
the previous spring,) lay behind the Justice Department‘s December 1954 order 
permitting the transfer of federal employees to ―non-sensitive posts pending the 
outcome of agency [loyalty] investigations.‖ In February 1955, a campaign by the 
Hartford (CT) chapter succeeded in having the Connecticut Board of Education 




Further, in October 1956, an amicus curiae brief filed by the Washington, 
D.C. AVC chapter, in early 1955, helped to overturn a decision by the District 
licensing office to deny a second-hand dealer‘s permit to a witness who had invoked 
his Fifth Amendment privileges before HUAC. As the AVC‘s brief argued, the 
original order ensured a system of security in which, ―every citizen and resident 
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would be subject to the vagaries and hostilities of a whole host of officialdom.‖ Also, 
the AVC stood alone among veterans‘ groups in advocating for full restoration of job 
and disability pension rights for James Kutcher, a paraplegic WWII veteran dismissed 
from his Veterans Administration job in 1948 due to his membership in the Socialist 
Workers Party, and for making allegedly treasonous statements. The VA reinstated 
Kutcher to his job in June 1956, after the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in his favor. As 
the AVC Bulletin editorialized on news of the reinstatement, his ―greatest ‗crime‘ 




As these examples reveal, the AVC‘s activism centered on the discourse of 
liberal Cold War Americanism netted some, although very limited, victories. Yet the 
group‘s achievements were not enough to overcome the Legion‘s domination. The 
AVC lacked the Legion‘s large membership, and those key resources that came with, 
it to effectively counter, for example, its picketing and shutdowns of Chaplin‘s films. 
The complete disregard the Legion and the VFW showed for the group‘s call for them 
to address the civil liberties abuses resulting from the red-hunting activities of their 
local units, as in the Norwalk incident, reflected their power. Despite its willingness, 
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early on, to confront McCarthy, many rank-and-file veterans, even some from within 
the AVC, identified with the Senator as a fellow veteran and anticommunist, while 
embracing him as a Cold War hero. The decision of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights, chaired by McCarthy foe Missouri Democrat Tom Hennings, 
in September 1955 to have the Legion act as the voice of the nation‘s veterans at its 
Constitution Day hearings, held to celebrate the 178
th
 anniversary of the Bill of 
Rights and to solicit ways of strengthening them, underscored its political influence 
over the Congress, and within the political culture at large. True to his organization‘s 
conservative Americanism, the Legion‘s representative Don Wilson urged the 
Subcommittee, ―To determine the extent to which we, as a people, are entitled to 
protection against those who would defy the Congress, deceive the courts, destroy the 
Government, and enslave the people while proclaiming that the Constitution prohibits 
their being unmasked.‖ In voicing its protest against the Legion‘s role in the hearings, 
the AVC petitioned the Subcommittee in absentia. While the group congratulated the 
committee for its efforts ―to bulwark our constitutional rights against the erosions of 
which Chief Justice Warren has spoken,‖ it denounced the Legion‘s appearance 
before it as ―a travesty.‖ Further, the AVC declared, ―Let the Legion speak for itself. 
But how can your subcommittee, faced with the Legion‘s record, accredit the Legion 
as spokesman, in the field of civil and other constitutional rights, for all the veterans 
who have sacrificed to nurture the Tree of Liberty?‖
175
 The compelling nature of that 
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question became all the more evident as the AVC tackled the other major component 
of its Americanism program, the pressing issue of securing full civil rights for the 
nation‘s African-American citizens. 
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Chapter 4: The AVC and the Fight for Civil Rights 
In its 1956 Memorial Day commemoration, the Springfield, Massachusetts 
AVC Chapter observed that, ―In the present days of international tension, the real 
meaning of Memorial Day becomes ever more clear to all of us. This is the time for 
dedication to the great principles of our American creed—liberty and justice for all. 
All citizens should take time to contemplate their contributions to these great goals—
for increased brotherhood and understanding at home and for the extension of liberty 
and democracy abroad.‖ Furthermore, it declared, ―Our thoughts…turn to the brave 
men and women who gave their lives so that our ideals might survive. We can best 
honor their memory by increasing the importance of the individual and his freedom. 
Our nation has become great and envied because of this emphasis and we shall 
maintain our place as long as we stress this concept. In the world-wide struggle 
against Communism and other totalitarian movements, this has been our most 
important psychological weapon.‖ Later that year, the AVC‘s national board meeting 
in Boston (MA) declared that, ―[O]n this Veterans Day of 1956 freedom and peace in 
many places are in short supply. There is no freedom in parts of our own country 
where freedom‘s mantle does not fall on all alike. As soldier-veterans we fought for a 
way of life that permitted no second-class citizenship Government, business, labor 
and the church are marching ahead in the struggle for civil rights while veterans‘ 
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These commemorations underscore the importance of cultural pluralism in 
shaping the language of liberal Americanism articulated by many veterans to address 
their concerns about racial inequality and injustice they confronted in 1950s. As Gary 
Gerstle has shown, cultural pluralism, or the notion of equality between differing 
racial and ethnic groups came to the forefront of American consciousness during and 
immediately after WWII. While government wartime propaganda emphasized the 
ideals of tolerance and brotherhood among all people to foster national unity, the 
revelations of Nazi atrocities in the death camps further increased its acceptance 
among many Americans.
177
 Also, the melding of pluralist ideals and the nation‘s Cold 
War goals evident in these two events reflected what Mary Dudziak has recently 
identified as one of the postwar civil rights movement‘s main tactical maneuvers to 
induce federal officials to respond to its demands. As Dudizak has shown, reformers 
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developed a Cold War civil rights discourse that linked the nation‘s strategic Cold 
War needs to the cause of racial justice. In using this language, civil rights advocates 
played upon the desire of United States foreign policy makers to project an unsullied 
image of American democracy in order to counter Communists‘ propaganda efforts to 
win hearts and minds abroad, especially among populations of color in Asia and 
Africa. By drawing attention to the gap between the country‘s democratic ideals and 
the harsh realities of racial inequality, reformers sought to pressure the government 
into accepting their demands for expanding civil rights at home. As Dudziak has 
noted, ―Following WWII, anything that undermined the image of American 
democracy was seen as threatening world peace and aiding the Soviet aspirations to 
dominate the world.‖
 178
 In the context of a conservative era, and confronted with 
considerable resistance to racial change, Cold War discourse gave reformers an 
ability to create political space in order to advance their agenda. 
As these commemorations suggests, by incorporating Cold War civil rights 
discourse into its Americanism program for racial reform, the AVC played an integral 
role in the construction of the 1950s civil rights movement. Also, the AVC‘s 
deployment of liberal Americanism in pursuit of racial justice, serves to further call 
into question and complicate notions of a single conservative Americanism at work in 
the 1950s. Throughout the decade, the AVC used Cold War liberal Americanism in 
an effort to advance fundamental civil rights change across a broad range of areas 
affecting American life, including private and public sector employment, housing, the 
active duty military, and the administration of federally mandated veterans‘ benefits 
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involving education and health care. Nonetheless, despite the AVC‘s vigorous 
application of liberal Americanism discourse to the cause civil rights reform, its 
notable lack of success in realizing its goals points to, and underscores, the 
dominance of the conservative Americanism wielded by its adversaries in this period.    
The AVC served as one of the nation‘s most determined and aggressive 
advocates for civil rights advancement in the 1950s. The group‘s internal 
reorganization in early 1952, re-emphasized its commitment to civil rights as one of 
the two pillars of its postwar Americanism program, and that April, it could rightly 
announce that, ―we are the only veterans‘ organization fighting for civil rights.‖
179
 As 
in its fight to protect and advance civil liberties, the AVC promoted civil rights 
reform by highlighting the contradictions between America‘s stated commitments to 
ensuring freedom and equal rights of citizenship to all, and its undemocratic tolerance 
of racial inequality. By pointing out that segregation and other manifestations of 
racial injustice fed the Soviet propaganda mill, the AVC sought to exploit the 
country‘s anxieties over the possibilities of domestic subversion and the prospects of 
winning the external Cold War. 
As the AVC pushed forward on the civil rights front, it served as a key ally 
within the larger network of liberal organizations, civil rights groups and individuals 
working on behalf of tolerance and racial justice. In 1951, the ADL provided funds 
and resources to set up the AVC‘s first annual George Norris Award, (named after the 
famed populist-progressive Nebraska Senator) to honor ―the AVC chapter, state 
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council or area council which has, during the preceding year performed the most 
outstanding service in the field of civil rights. The AVC also developed close 
collaborative ties to the National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ,) the 
annual sponsor of national ―Brotherhood Week‖ which promoted ―amity, 
understanding and cooperation‖ among Protestants, Catholics and Jews, and the 
abolition of ―inter-group prejudices‖ from American life. In 1953, the AVC‘s 
Washington D.C. chapter and NCCJ‘s Cleveland area affiliate co-sponsored an art 
exhibit on improving ―human relations,‖ featuring a speech by NCCJ‘s president. The 
AVC also regularly promoted the NCCJ‘s work and publications among its members 
and other veterans through its national newspaper, The AVC Bulletin. In late 1955, the 
New Jersey State AVC joined together with the NCCJ, Trenton‘s (NJ) Council on 
Human Relations, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP,) and the Anti-Defamation League of B‘nai B‘rth (ADL) to sponsor a 
―Brotherhood in Action‖ exhibit at the New Jersey State Fair.
180
           
Throughout the 1950s, nationally and locally, the AVC and the NAACP 
maintained close bonds and a strong working alliance. In May 1950, the NAACP‘s 
District of Columbia Branch honored the AVC‘s counsel, Phineas Indritz, for his 
considerable work in filing Supreme Court amicus curiae briefs ―involving basic civil 
rights of minorities.‖ Also, in mid-February 1952, the group conferred its first ―AVC 
Brotherhood Award,‖ on NAACP executive secretary Walter White. In October 
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1957, the AVC entered an amicus brief backing NAACP‘s U.S. Supreme Court case 
against Alabama‘s attempt to thwart its activities on the basis that it was specifically 
an inter-racial organization in violation of the state‘s laws. The May 1956 AVC 
National Planning Board (NPC) meeting in Chicago featured NAACP Chief Counsel 
Thurgood Marshall as its ―honored guest and principal speaker.‖ In 1954, the AVC 
told the NAACP national convention that, ―We are proud to be working together for 
the common goal of justice for all men.‖
181
 Early in 1956, AVC reported that its 
Cleveland Freedom Chapter filed an amicus brief supporting the NAACP school 
desegregation suit in Hillsboro, Ohio. When the AVC, in April, 1950, sought to 
reestablish its organizational presence in St. Louis (MO) following its bruising 
factional fight to oust its Communist membership, it contacted the city‘s local 
NAACP to lay out its past four years record of successful work on behalf of the group 
in Tulsa, Oklahoma. As Pakiser noted, ―In that…drive we recruited for the Tulsa 
Branch of the NAACP through our AVC contacts, in labor unions, the university, and 
women‘s groups, over 100 white members, which made the Tulsa Branch, I believe, 
the first genuinely interracial NAACP Branch in the Southwest.‖ As Pakiser assured 
Witherspoon, ―We fight Jim Crow wherever he rears his ugly head, and our 
opposition to discrimination is one of the principal tenets of our faith.‖
182
  Coming so 
recently after the group‘s fierce and publicized factional battles, and given the 
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renewal of anti-red hysteria nationally, Pakiser‘s inclusion of the Tulsa story was 
likely an attempt to convey to Witherspoon that the AVC was safe to work with. 
The AVC also worked on civil rights with a number of leading House and 
Senate advocates, such as Illinois Senator Paul H. Douglas. As one of the foremost 
Democratic Party Senate leaders behind the push in Congress for enactment of a 
national civil rights bill, Douglas not only held membership in the AVC, from at least 
1956, he also served on the group‘s National Advisory Council (NAC). Another 
important civil rights ally in the House, was WWII combat veteran and New York 
liberal Republican Jacob Javits, who joined the AVC not long after its inception. 
Also, leading civil rights advocate Congressmen Charles C. Diggs, an African-




The AVC also maintained an active presence in major civil rights conferences 
and rallies. In January 1950, AVC joined with 3,500 delegates originating from some 
60 national groups, in the National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization in 
Washington, D.C. held by participants, ― to demand…early passage of the FEPC and 
the entire Truman Civil Rights Program.‖ In early 1952, the group sent a 10-member 
delegation, led by its national chairman Michael Straight, to the Washington D.C. 
meeting of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, chaired by the NAACP‘s 
Walter White. The delegation gathered with its fellow liberal coalition members, 
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including the ADL, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA,) and the American Federation of Labor (AFL), as White 
declared, ―to voice our demand for the adoption of a majority cloture rule…the 
enactment of the civil rights program, and to make known to Congress and to political 
leaders our firm intention of holding them accountable…on these matters.‖ In early 
1956, AVC members from across the country met with 3,000 civil rights activists at a 
three-day ―assembly for Civil Rights,‖ in Washington, D.C., which it and 51 other 
―national labor, religious and civic groups‖ sponsored. In May that year, the AVC 
participated in a rally of over 14,000 at New York City‘s Madison Square Garden to 
demand progress in civil rights and ―to raise funds for carrying out other activities in 
this field.‖ The rally‘s evening program featured radio and television star John Henry 
Falk, an AVC member and WWII veteran, who served as master of ceremonies, and 
AVC honorary member Eleanor Roosevelt.
184
  
Aside from private sector meetings, the AVC also sought to ensure its 
affiliates full participation in governmental bodies set up to carry out civil rights 
mandates. For example, following and the creation of the national Civil Rights 
Commission (CRC) required by the 1957 Civil Rights Act, the AVC asked all 
members and local chapters to suggest names for service on the state level advisory 
committees that the Commission empowered as the voice of local communities on 
matters of joint concern. For its part, AVC headquarters set up a National Office of 
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As a matter of policy, the AVC practiced thorough racial integration. As 
executive director Lou Pakiser informed the NAACP‘s St. Louis branch in early 
1950, ―The AVC…is the only major veterans‘ organization that has insisted upon a 
completely democratic membership policy. We have no segregated chapters. We will 
not tolerate segregation in AVC.‖ African-American veterans also held key 
leadership positions in the AVC. In January 1954, Robert A. Thompson, a charter 
member of the Atlanta (GA) chapter, joined the National Planning Committee (NPC), 
which along with the National Administrative Committee (NAC), comprised one of 
AVC‘s ―two top governing bodies.‖  
Columbia University Law School graduate Grant Reynolds served on both the 
NPC and NAC. His background included co-chairmanship of A. Philip Randolph‘s 
Committee Against Jim Crow in the Military, established by A. Philip Randolph, in 
early 1948, to encourage President Truman to desegregate the armed forces (with the 
threat of mass civil disobedience to the draft.) Paul Cooke, a professor at Washington, 
D.C.‘s Minor Teachers College (a black college during segregation,) simultaneously 
served on the NPC and the National Executive Committee from 1953-1954; and in 
the late 1950s, he was a member of the National AVC Board and the National Affairs 
Commission chairman. In late April 1957, Chicago attorney William R. Ming‘s 
election as AVC‘s chairman, its highest post, made him ―the first Negro to head a 
national veterans organization.‖ As a top attorney with the NAACP‘s Legal Defense 
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Fund, Ming argued numerous civil rights cases, including those involving school 
desegregation, before the U.S. Supreme Court.
186
   
The notion that achieving full civil rights for African Americans was essential 
to provide the nation with the necessary strength to prevail against its Cold War 
adversaries permeated the AVC‘s rhetoric. As national chairman Curtis Campaigne 
told national convention delegates in 1953, ―An America faithful to its own 
democratic tradition: no person shall enjoy less of liberty or opportunity than any 
other person.‖ Furthermore, he stated, ―In reaching our second goal AVC is effect 
establishing itself as a committee of the whole, --a sort of American Activities 
Committee. For as our platform states, ‗Our strength as a world leader rests on our 
demonstration at home of the fact of Freedom.‘ This requires work to do away with 
all segregation and discrimination and at the same time to be alert to the danger of 
Soviet-inspired subversion.‖ Similarly, in January 1954, AVC executive director 
Andrew Rice informed the Senate‘s Subcommittee on Civil Rights that, ―The 
establishment of a permanent national commission on civil rights would shine a 
continuous spotlight on the remaining inequalities in a society which still denies some 
of the ―inalienable rights‖ with which all men are endowed.‖ Not creating the 
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commission, Rice warned, could imperil the nation in a final Armageddon-like 
showdown with the Soviets. ―As veterans of three great wars against fascist and 
communist totalitarians, we want the darker-skinned peoples of the world—the 
majority of our planet‘s population—to know we believe in equality. Else we may 




The AVC‘s executive director, Kenneth M. Birkhead, echoed this theme his 
July 1955 testimony to a House Judiciary Subcommittee in support of civil rights 
legislation. ―As veterans we have also been deeply interested in the problems of 
stopping the aggressor nations and winning the peace. We have supported measures 
to achieve physical strength for our nation and the free world. This struggle requires 
more. The conflict with the Soviet Union is not carried on alone with guns and bombs 
and planes. It is also a moral struggle for the minds and loyalty of men. We give the 
skilled Russian propagandists another weapon when we fail to protect the rights of 
our own citizens.‖ While Birkhead linked internal civil rights reform to helping 
facilitate the nation‘s national security goals, he also stressed reform‘s essential role 
in fostering a strong and vibrant American nation. ―More important even than this,‖ 
he told the committee, ―is the fact that our nation and our people need this 
legislatio0n. It is at the same time a moral problem and a social-political and 
economic problem. The passage of major civil rights legislation would be good for 
the American spirit, the American community, American education, the American 
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political structure and American business.‖
188
 By implication, Birkhead‘s insistence 
on the essential role of reform in reinvigorating the American nation meant that to 
oppose it would be an act of un-Americanism aiding the Soviets. Further, while 
framed as a national security issue, it also broadened the need for reform to include 
the need for addressing social and economic problems associated with racial 
inequality deemed essential to the nation‘s health. 
The group‘s focus on employment discrimination similarly focused on the 
destructive effects of racial inequality on the American way of life by frustrating one 
of its most precious and foundational ideals: the belief that the individual was free to 
do better by working hard in an occupation of his own choosing. Failure to end racial 
bias in employment Birkhead noted, undercut individual faith in the workings of the 
nation‘s entire economic system. ―I think it is fair to say that the fundamental concept 
of American capitalism is that an individual may better his economic status to the 
extent that his abilities and energies empower him to do so…These principles of 
freedom and equality of opportunity have made our nation great. But as so long as 
any person is denied the right to compete on the basis of abilities without the arbitrary 
barrier of racial or religious discrimination, for so long is the American ideal not 
realized.‖ What all of this also implied, although it was unstated, was that if 
individuals could not believe in the American system of capitalism, they might be 
susceptible to embracing its alien other—Soviet collectivism. This thought may have, 
at least in part, informed Birkhead‘s testimony when he told a House Judiciary panel 
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that ―every employer should abide by the American principle of equal 
opportunity.‖
189
 Further, in an era in which comparisons of the superiority of 
American and Soviet economic systems became the material for high politics 
propaganda exchanges between Cold War rivals, such as the Nixon-Khrushchev 
kitchen debate at the 1959 Moscow trade show,
190
 institutionalized economic 
inequality based on race that sullied the U.S. image, could potentially be utilized by 
the enemy.  
  Fighting job bias remained a primary focus of the AVC‘s civil rights activism. 
In late 1951, the group‘s NAC denounced the Truman Administration‘s Committee 
on Government Compliance, set up to prevent racial discrimination in Korean War 
defense contracts as ―excellent material for paving the torrid zone of the hereafter.‖ 
Unlike WWII‘s Fair Employment Practices (FEPC), Truman‘s Committee could 
review compliance procedures and recommend changes, but not enforce them. Even 
those recommendations the AVC noted were ―subject to review by the Director of 
Defense Mobilization.‖ Although the AVC applauded the President‘s ―personal 
courage‖ in setting up the agency, it criticized ―‗the highly legalistic and timid 
endeavor‘ of his staff to placate the racist minority in Congress.‖ To improve the 
situation, the AVC put its energies behind the fight for a national FEPC bill, modeled 
on the more potent WWII agency. In early 1950, it mobilized its national office 
resources and its state and local chapters to help end the Senate filibuster blocking 
passage of the bill. Battles also took place to establish state FEPC‘s. The Salt Lake 
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(UT) unit, that same year, remained the only veterans organization to join the state 
campaign. In July 1950, AVC units affiliated to the Pennsylvania Council for a State 
FEPC; and reported in January 1951 that they were ―pushing the state‘s FEPC 
organizing committee into what we hope will be a successful conclusion.‖ The group 
linked its fight for an effective FEPC to Cold War goals. As Harry Shugaar, AVC‘s 
New York Civil Rights chairman, declared in the commemoration marking FEPC‘s 
10
th
 anniversary, held at FDR‘s Hyde Park estate, on June 16, 1951: ―The waste in 
skilled manpower that results from job discrimination is seriously undermining 
America‘s defense effort.‖ When Shugaar, ―pointed out that June 25 also marks the 
first anniversary of the Korean fighting,‖ he imposed additional patriotic meaning on 
the event. Also, when the national AVC, in October, 1951, called upon Truman ―to 
quit stalling‖ on FEPC, it declared, ―the creation of an FEPC is needed to show the 
world, ‗that we mean what we say when we talk about democracy.‘‖
191
 
 The AVC also vigilantly opposed racial discrimination in public sector 
employment. In April1950, the group urged Congress to defeat a bill intended to 
block a February ruling by the Fair Employment Practices Board of the Civil Service 
Commission opening plate making apprenticeships to blacks employed at the Bureau 
of Printing and Engraving for the first time in the agency‘s history. To maintain the 
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whites-only hiring practices of the Bureau, the bill voided an apprenticeship 
examination mandated by the Commission, which many blacks, in this instance all 
WWII veterans, passed in March.  As the AVC noted, the legislation, sponsored by 
segregationists Southern Democrats in the House and Senate, effectively closed off 
―printer plate-making apprentice jobs to Negro employees…who have already earned 
the right to these jobs through competitive examination.‖
192
 Although the House 
passed the bill May 1, 1950, the Senate declined to take it u Finally, in late January 
1951, the campaign to open plate-making jobs to blacks, begun three years earlier, 
ended victoriously when the Bureau appointed 35 black veterans to apprenticeships. 
But the AVC apparently had little, if any, influence on the outcome. The Afro-
American in fact attributed the campaign‘s success to its persistent in publicizing the 
case, and the agitation of the United Public Workers, the union representing the 
veterans, ―which has spearheaded this fight.‖  Indeed, despite the ex-soldier status of 
the apprentices, the Afro-American listed the Elks, Council of Negro Churches in 
America, and the local (black) American Legion, among the organizations that 
supported the campaign, but not the AVC.
 193
 
At the state level, in some instances at least, well-positioned AVC members 
instituted fair hiring practices. In April 1955, for example, the Bulletin reported that 
Bergen County (NJ) chapter member D. Louis Tonti, as the state Highway 
Authority‘s acting executive director, ―has incorporated mandatory non-
discrimination clauses in all Authority contracts.‖
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The AVC also fought job bias at Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) facilities 
in the South. In late summer, 1951, the AVC‘s Southern Region chapters publicized 
widespread racial discrimination by contractors at AEC sites at Oak Ridge, (TN), 
Paducah, (KY) and Ellenton, (SC). In these locations, the group maintained that the 
AEC ―steadily refused‖ to mandate that a number of large northern corporations hire 
without color bars. Absent such restrictions, the Southern chapters noted, the firms 
freely, ―adapted their employment practices to local prevailing racial customs.‖ The 
AEC permitted segregated eating areas and the relegation of ―virtually all‖ black 
construction workers to jobs as ―unskilled laborers‖ at the Paducah and Ellenton 
plants. In a resolution denouncing these practices, the southern chapters drew upon 
the patriotic authority of their members‘ status as ex-soldiers and liberal Cold War 
Americanism rhetoric to depict the agency as unpatriotic and thoroughly hypocritical. 
―As veterans of World War II, joined together without regard to race, color or creed, 
we strongly protest these undemocratic practices...They are doubly reprehensible in 
federal operations which are designed to build weapons for the defense of the very 
democratic principles which are being violated.‖ The national AVC reinforced these 
protests in letters to the AEC and President Truman, as the Bulletin reported, 
―demanding that the government adhere to American principles by abolishing 
discrimination and segregation in its plants.‖
195
 
As the AVC argued, by producing atomic weapons the AEC advanced the 
country‘s Cold War defenses against potential Russian missile attacks. By permitting 
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segregation, however, the agency betrayed the nation by failing to uphold the 
principles for which the Cold War was being waged. By ending segregation, the AEC 
would both keep faith with the sacrifices made in the name of racial equality in the 
last war, and demonstrate its loyalty to the Cold War‘s democratic purpose.      
But these arguments failed to overcome Congressional conservative 
opposition to the creation of a strong FDR-style FEPC. They also did not induce 
Presidents Truman or Eisenhower to provide their respective government contract 
committees, created to police discrimination by contractors on federal projects, with 
the kind of resources and strong enforcement powers they required to make 
substantial progress against employment discrimination possible. Instead, the 
authority both administrations granted to the contract committees paid deference to 
the power of segregationists and other conservatives in Congress. As historian Hugh 
Davis Graham has noted, ―They were offered in response to a moral imperative, but 
they were designed to give minimal offense to a conservative-leaning Congress 
whose memories of Roosevelt‘s FEPC conjured up dark images of 
Reconstruction.‖
196
 Thus, despite the commitment made by AEC director Fletcher 
Waller to black civil rights advocates in September 1951 that he would ―make a 
sincere effort to ‗improve‘‖ employment practices; in October, 1953, NAACP 
officials found that major chemical firms at the agency‘s Aiken, (SC) and Paducah, 
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(KY) sites ―used and trained large numbers of white workers, ‗but consistently give 
the run around to colored [workers] seeking similar jobs.‘‖
197
  
The AVC also attacked one of the major continuing stumbling blocks to civil 
rights reform, the use of Senate Rule 22, which permitted die-hard segregationists 
among Southern Democrats to endlessly filibuster reform bills unless two-thirds of 
the full Senate, not just those Senators who happened to be in the chamber at a given 
time, voted cloture to end debate and permit a vote. While giving due respect to the 
Constitution‘s concerns for protecting minority viewpoints, the AVC‘s arguments for 
Rule 22 reform used liberal Americanism to characterize Dixiecrat filibustering as not 
only un-democratic, but also, as an unpatriotic impediment undermining Cold War 
national defense priorities. As then national chairman Michael Straight testified in 
October 1951, in support of New York Senator Herbert Lehman‘s cloture revision 
bill, ―it is desirable that any cloture rule contain a guarantee protecting the right of 
thorough debate. We don‘t want to see legislation ‗railroaded‘ through the Senate.‖ 
But he added,  ―a majority has a right to act, and after assuring the minority its ‗day in 
court,‘ to close debate and proceed to a vote…We are tired of seeing a determined 
minority repeatedly frustrate the will of the majority to expand our American 
freedoms and serve the general welfare.‖ Further, Straight declared, ―In the present 
emergency, when at any time we may be confronted with new acts of communist 
aggression, the Senate must be able to act speedily on measures essential to national 
security. Senators dedicated to the extension of equal rights to all Americans—and 
they are a majority of Senators—have long sought the enactment of President 
Truman‘s Civil Rights Program…They must think twice, however, before bringing 
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these proposals to the floor of the Senate, in the knowledge that the filibuster they 
touch off cannot, under the present rule, be stopped by cloture and that their efforts to 
make American democracy a reality for all Americans may delay or prevent the 
enactment of necessary security measures.‖
198
  
Yet the group‘s contention that Rule 22 simultaneously undermined American 
democracy and Cold War national security interests failed to generate support for 
reform. Unable to gain sufficient Senate backing to achieve their goal, the AVC and 
its liberal allies continued work for change, but reform eluded them for the remainder 
of the decade. In 1957, the AVC praised its chapters in California for conducting a 
―Letters to the Editors‖ campaign ―to arouse public understanding of the issue.‖ Also 
in November 1958, a coalition of the AVC and 16 other liberal organizations, 
including the NAACP, ADA, and the ACLU, advocated adoption of a majority 
cloture rule, and asked Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson ―not to accept any 
‗spurious compromises‘ to limit debate in the Senate.‖ But, in January 1959, 
―compromise‖ rule change Johnson engineered, allowing two-thirds of those senators 
present to vote cloture, ensured him large Southern support and, consequently, the 
defeat of the majority rule proposal liberals endorsed. As the Afro-American 
characterized the outcome, ―no substantial change has been made in Senate Rule 22, 
which throws an arm of protection around the filibuster.‖ The election of 1960 
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reinforced the status quo, since both President Kennedy and Vice-President Johnson 
refused to expose their legislative agendas to likely attacks by segregationists by 
supporting further changes to Rule 22.
199
 As the fate of the Rule 22 campaign 
demonstrates, calculations of raw power politics, rather than Cold War rhetoric, 
determined the course of domestic civil rights reform in these years. 
The AVC also worked to advance racial equality in housing. For example, in 
1953, the AVC filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court case Barrows v. Jackson, 
which confronted the issue of whether persons who had contractually agreed to the 
terms of a restrictive covenant, could be held liable for monetary damages for 
breaking its conditions by selling their property ―to persons in the proscribed classes.‖ 
If the Court ruled that the parties could be held liable for breaking the covenant 
contract, it would serve to undo its 1948 covenant decisions, which held that courts 
could not use their authority to enforce the discrimination such restrictive contracts 
required. Framing the issues at stake within liberal Americanism, the AVC declared, 
―The Court now has another opportunity to hammer home several points about 
American democracy and genuine freedoms.‖ In concluding its statement on 
Barrows, the group declared, ―We in the [AVC] are interested in this case because the 
very formation of our nation-wide organization during World War II was based on 
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the desire to continue our fight in peacetime for our finest democratic beliefs and 
institutions, while continuing our fight against the undemocratic and un-American 
attitudes that one particular race or skin pigmentation group is superior to all others.‖ 
In March 1955, AVC Bulletin termed segregated housing, ―our greatest civil rights 
challenge in America today,‖ and excoriated the discriminatory housing loan policies 
of Veterans Administration and Federal Housing Authority that resulted in 
―government-financed ‗ghettos‘.‖ It also labeled the FHA‘s home loan practices, ―the 
‗Typhoid Mary‘ of segregated housing.‖ Later in 1957, the AVC publicly 
commended Vice-President Richard Nixon, Senator Estes Kefauver and Oscar 




 The AVC‘s fair housing activism in New York was considerable. In late 
1956, AVC member James Sheuer, chairman of the Housing Advisory Council of the 
State Commission against Housing Discrimination, won the Walter White Award for 
promoting fair housing practices in New York‘s real estate industry. The AVC‘s 
efforts to obtain fair housing in New York often focused attention on Cold War 
concerns. As AVC‘s national vice-chairman Shanley N. Egeth told the New York 
City Council, in June 1957, its vote on the state bill to halt race discrimination in 
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rental apartments and homes sales entailed far-reaching repercussions on the 
country‘s Cold War image at home and abroad. ―The decision…will be followed 
carefully,‖ he noted, not only by New Yorkers, ―but...by people in other sections of 
this country [the South]… and also throughout the world.‖ To prove his point, Egeth 
held up the front page of the Burma Star, featuring the federal court reinstatement of 
African-American Authorine Lucy at the University of Alabama, Birmingham 
(previously published in the Bulletin,) ―demonstrating the enormous interests in the 
Far East of race relations in this country.‖ AVC‘s New York Regional Council 
buttressed Egeth‘s message in a resolution it passed, in mid-September 1957, asking 
New York City politicians for bi-partisan support of the bill. ―Passage of this 
legislation affords…a unique opportunity…to refute charges of hypocrisy leveled by 
the segregationists of the South and by their action demonstrate to the entire world 
that people of our city, regardless of race and color can and will live side by side as 
good neighbors.‖ The issue warranted such unity, they observed, because ―the whole 




The group also targeted its protests against segregationist homebuilders. In 
June 1958, the AVC‘s New Jersey State Council denounced William J. Levitt‘s  
―white [only] occupancy policy‖ for his new Levittown project in their state as  
―‗morally wrong‘ and as ‗part of the segregation issue which aids the Communists‘ 
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advances in the non-white areas of the world.‘‖ The Council found Levitt‘s latest 
project especially reprehensible since, ―many of the Negro families barred by him are 
headed by veterans, some of whom shed blood.‖ As the Council concluded, Levitt‘s 
discriminatory policies ―handicapped the fight against international communism.‖ 
202
 
In the AVC‘s argument, racial segregation in housing provided ready fodder 
for the enemy always seeking to exploit the gap between the ideal and the reality of 
American democracy. While the Levittown projects stood as America‘s new symbols 
of mass production abundance and economic superiority over Soviet collectivism, 
they effaced the democracy their veteran residents fought and died for by denying 
their African-American brothers in arms equal access to them. By potentially handing 
the Soviets a propaganda victory, Levittown betrayed the country‘s soldier-veterans, 
and in the process the nation at large. The ―un-American‖ racial restrictions of 
Levittown tossed aside as meaningless, the patriotic wartime sacrifices of all veterans. 
Inasmuch as the new federally subsidized suburbia projected the image of a broadly 
distributed economic national security envisioned by New Deal reformist policies, 
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Nevertheless, the New Jersey Levittown case underscores the ineffectiveness 
of liberal Cold War rhetoric in advancing non-discriminatory housing policy in this 
period. After Levitt announced his intention to sell homes at the sprawling Burlington 
County site exclusively to white buyers in June 1958, New Jersey officials moved 
quickly to block his plan by invoking a recently enacted 1957 housing law prohibiting 
racial discrimination in federally financed housing. In late July 1958 the New Jersey 
Division Against Discrimination secured an agreement with the Veterans 
Administration that it would help the state enforce its housing law by withholding VA 
mortgage funding from discriminatory home builders. Levitt filed a suit in December 
1958 to overturn the state law; but in late February 1960, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court sustained lower court rulings requiring him to make VA and FHA subsidized 
homes available to black buyers. In June 1960, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
review the case. In July 1960, as the Afro-American reported, Levitt & Sons, Inc. 
―announced that two colored families are purchasing homes in the firm‘s hitherto lily-
white 16,000 unit development.‖
 
Levitt‘s defeat in the courts, as the Afro-American 
observed in August 1959 (shortly after the state Appeals Court had ruled against 
him), resulted from New Jersey having ―one of the strongest laws against racial 
discrimination in the country.‖
 204
 In short, as the outcome of this case revealed, it 
was the presence of an effective law and its enforcement, rather than Cold War 
reform rhetoric that helped curb the discriminatory practices of one the nation‘s 
largest homebuilders. Indeed, states that lacked anti-discrimination laws, Levitt 
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followed local patterns of segregation as a matter of company policy and kept his 
developments closed to blacks. Thus, through the mid-1960s, in the absence of a 
housing law banning discrimination, Levitt refused to heed the demands of the AVC 
and a coalition of civil rights organizations led by the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE), to integrate his Belair, Maryland development.
205
 
The AVC also devoted considerable energy to the problem of Jim Crow in the 
military. Segregation among U.S. military forces remained a major issue well into the 
mid-1950s. In large measure the problem originated with Truman‘s July 26, 1948 
Executive Order 9981. The order mandated ―equality of treatment and opportunity in 
the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin,‖ but it 
lacked a clear timetable, other than ordering compliance as soon as possible 
consistent with the maintenance of ―efficiency or morale.‖ Further, many in the 
military‘s command structure did not want to desegregate.
206
 When the AVC‘s 
National Planning Committee took up the issue at its January 13, 1951 Minneapolis 
(MN) meeting, it reported that while the Air Force and Navy had desegregated, the 
Army remained recalcitrant. Frustrated and incensed by the situation, the NPC sent 
President Truman a forceful resolution that called upon him to order the Army‘s 
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immediate compliance with his September 30, 1949 directive requiring racial 
integration of the armed services, ―at home and abroad.‖ Furthermore, the group 
declared, should the Army not comply, ―we respectfully suggest that all responsible 
officers including the Chief of Staff…be court-marshaled for violation of the Articles 
of War, as have been other officers and enlisted men where their derelictions were 
neither so gross nor so damaging to the military establishment of the United States.‖ 
It justified its appeal in terms of Cold War priorities, noting, ―The actions we have 
suggested would serve effectively, we believe, to weld the national unity without 
which we cannot meet the present crisis.‖ In addition, the group pledged ―an all-out 
effort‖ to achieve the Army‘s full desegregation, which included, ―the widest possible 
publicity,‖ and its ―continued cooperation with the [NAACP] at the national and 
chapter levels.
207
   
In this same resolution, the AVC protested the re-segregation of Minnesota 
National Guard inductees by the Army, which the state‘s NAACP officers reported to 
the meeting. These officials brought proof of the practice whereby the Army‘s 
inductee stations kept separate induction lists to route previously integrated black 
guardsmen, bound for duty at the Korean battlefront and elsewhere, into segregated 
units. As the Bulletin reported, the black guardsmen, ―after reaching Fort Riley, were 
detached from their white unit mates, and were assigned to Fort Rucker, Alabama, 
where they were placed in an all-Negro battalion. This battalion did not have proper 
clothing (50% lacked field jackets and 75% lacked overcoats) while white units, 
training in a separate section of the camp, were well equipped.‖ In addition, the camp 
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provided blacks with substandard recreational and post-exchange facilities, and 
ordered them ―to long tours of duty without relief.‖
208
 
On March 1, 1951, the AVC‘s national chairman Michael Straight, Minnesota 
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and NAACP leaders met jointly with U.S. Army Chief 
of Staff General Lawton Collins, whose office wielded direct responsibility for 
implementing Truman‘s E.O. #9981, to push for complete desegregation of the Army. 
General Collins assured the group, in Straight‘s words, that the Army ―was moving 
forward as fast as possible to end segregation.‖ But in an answer to a question from 
Straight on the meaning of E.O. 9981‘s clause requiring ―equal treatment,‖ General 
Collins ―replied that he did not think the order demanded an end to segregation, but 
merely held it as an ultimate goal.‖ In subsequent months, Humphrey and other 
Senate liberals persisted in pushing reform in meetings with the Defense Department. 
Finally, on July 26, the Army agreed to desegregate the Far Eastern Command, or 8
th
 
Army units, in Japan and Korea. This breakthrough came after Senators Humphrey 
and Lehman appealed to Defense Secretary Marshall, ―asking him to strongly support 
moves toward ending Army segregation.‖ Significantly, they sent their letter on June 
25, ―the anniversary of the Korean communist aggression.‖ On July 20, Marshall 
informed the Senators of the Army‘s forthcoming desegregation order.
209
  
But the AVC‘s Cold War Americanism arguments proved to be 
inconsequential to the integration of the Far Eastern Command. Instead, military 
necessity forced de-facto integration well ahead of the Army‘s July 26 order. As the 
Baltimore Sun reported, ―The end of segregation was speeded in Korea last year by 
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the critical need at the front for every man who could fire a gun against the Chinese 
Communist.‖
210
 Reports from field commanders concerning the battlefield 
advantages of de-facto integration in Korea also propelled the change in policy. As 
Army officials in Washington, D.C. subsequently informed the press, ―Combat 
experience in Korea…has demonstrated that ‗Negro soldiers serve more efficiently in 
integrated units.‘‖
211
   
Despite such progress, segregation in the Army persisted elsewhere overseas 
and in home front units. As the Bulletin reported in late summer, 1951, ―Basic 
training camps are generally integrated now, but most organized units are still set up 
on a Jim Crow basis.‖
212
 In late September, the NPC wrote Gen. Collins to applaud 
the desegregation of the Far East Command, while calling for immediate follow-up in 
Europe and the United States. Answering for Collins, Lt. General A.C. McAuliffe, 
limited discussion to the need for further analysis of the problem. As McAuliffe 
reported, ―[S]tudy is continuing… In this regard, it is evident that integration in areas 
other than the Far East Command, particularly in the United States, will present 
problems of greater magnitude and variety than those encountered in Korea and 
Japan.‖ Straight rejected McAuliffe‘s assessment. As he declared, ―the pattern of non-
segregation over most of the United States is as deep and should be far more 
important in determining the attitudes of the military than the dying pattern of 
segregation in sixteen Southern states.‖ Straight also pointed to the desegregation 
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record of the Navy and Air Force, along with that of civilian organizations and 
institutions, including labor unions and universities, as indicators that the Army could 
follow suit in the U.S. His last point, however, struck at the un-American nature of 
the Army‘s policy. As Straight declared,  ―it is a mockery of democracy that colored 




 As David Nichols has recently revealed, President Eisenhower exceeded the 
Truman record in desegregating the armed forces. In late October 1954, Defense 
Secretary Charles E. Wilson, as Nichols notes, ―formally announced that the last 
racially segregated unit in the armed forces had been abolished.‖  But Nichols 
acknowledges that ―residual problems‖ remained. The AVC continued to press for 
reform in these areas, particularly in the southern states, and including segregation in 
the National Guard. Yet segregation also existed in northern guard units. In December 
1951, for example, the Massachusetts AVC conferred its Freedom Award on State 
Assembly representative Harold Putnam, ―for his fight to end segregation in the 
National Guard.‖ Throughout 1955, the AVC‘s Baltimore chapter pressured 
Maryland officials to put a halt to segregation in the state‘s National Guard units. 
When Maryland Governor Theodore McKeldin abolished Guard segregation in late 
November that year, Frank Inglehart, chair of the AVC‘s Veterans and Armed 
Services Commission, wrote him, ―expressing AVC‘s complete support and 
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congratulations for the action he has taken in Maryland.‖ Inglehart, and AVC 
executive director Kenneth Birkhead, also sent a statement to 12 southern governors 
calling upon them to follow McKeldin‘s lead. ―Governor McKeldin has desegregated 
the Maryland National Guard. We urge you also [to] strike a blow for democracy and 
honor those who serve their nation by taking similar action.‖ At its 9
th
 national 
convention, in November 1955, the AVC also called for an anti-segregation 
amendment to the armed forces reserve bill, an end to segregation ―in any federally 
aided National Guard units,‖ and from Congress or the Defense Department, ―a report 
regarding the efficiency of such non-segregated units.‖
214
 
As always, in lobbying for its reserve bill amendment, the group framed 
reform as a matter of national security and a rebuff to Soviet propaganda efforts. As it 
informed House Armed Services Committee chairman Carl Vinson, in late June 1955, 
―No group is more concerned about the security of this nation than AVC, whose 
members have fought in three wars against totalitarianism in all forms. But it would 
be a ‗false security‘ indeed to enact a reserve program which would weaken our 
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fighting forces and handicap our position as the leader of the free world. Why give 
the Communists another weapon in their ideological warfare? In its present form, the 
reserve bill, H.R. 7000, uncommitted to a disavowal of segregation, would be the 
most vulnerable link in our security.‖
215
 The AVC‘s national chairman Mickey 
Levine likewise denounced the refusal of Iceland and the Arab countries to, 
respectively, allow the stationing of black and Jewish servicemen. As Levine 
informed Secretary of State Herter in December 1959, ―These policies place the 
United States in the ridiculous position of posing as the defender of democracy 
throughout the world, while at the same time bowing in abject humiliation before any 
government which does not like Catholics, Jews, Negroes, or any other minority 
groups.‖ ―Frankly,‖ Levine stated, ―we wonder how we can expect the peoples of the 




The AVC‘s Cold War arguments, however, proved ineffective in bringing 
about reform of the National Guard in the South. In June 1961, the AVC‘s national 
convention reported that in ten Southern states ―not a single colored citizen serves in 
the National Guard.‖ The convention also urged President Kennedy to ―correct these 
conditions…without further delay.‖
217
 Although states exercised primary authority 
over the National Guard, the President possessed substantial leverage to press for 
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integration, since more than ninety-five percent of its funding in the early 1960s came 
from the federal government.
218
 Yet, in keeping with Eisenhower‘s policy, the 
Kennedy Administration remained unwilling to challenge Southern governors over 
segregation in the National Guard by withholding federal funds. As the Department 
of Defense Department (DOD) announced in July 1963, ―The department is seeking 
to have bars dropped voluntarily.‖ Consequently, the DOD reported, while ―Progress 
has been achieved in that practically all of the colored units have now been eliminated 
throughout the [Northern] National Guard…[t]he principal problem remaining is with 
regard to ten of the Southern states which do not yet have colored people in their 
National Guard units.‖
219
 President Johnson continued this approach. As the 
Washington Post observed in late December 1964, while the President‘s Committee 
on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces informed him ―that considerable vestiges 
of discrimination exists in branches of the National Guard…Johnson indicated that he 
would prefer to rely on voluntary means to integrate National Guard units in the 
South.‖
220
 In short, the unwillingness of successive presidential administrations to 
wield federal power to force integration of Southern Guard units neutralized the 
reform potential of Cold War discourse.  
The AVC also took up the problem of segregation and racial inequality in the 
administration of veterans‘ benefits.  In October 1953, when the group attacked  
segregation at Veterans Administration hospitals, national chairman Curtis 
Campaigne told the agency‘s administrator Harvey Higley that, ―It is hard to 
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understand why men who fought and were wounded side by side on the battlefield 
now must be separated.‖ Over time, the AVC found Higley to be a friendly ally in 
carrying out the Eisenhower Administration‘s pro-civil rights mandates. As Higley 
informed AVC, ―Please know that I am in complete accord with the policy of the 
President to eliminate segregation in federal institutions.‖ ―The Veterans 
Administration,‖ he noted, ―is taking a lead in this direction and moving toward this 
end as rapidly as practicable.‖ Higley received Eisenhower‘s praise in October 1954, 
after he reported in September that he had completed the VA‘s racial integration 
about a year after initiating the process. But when the government transferred 
authority over military hospitals to segregated states, such progress ended. This 
became clear to the AVC, in late 1959, when it sought the Army‘s intervention to 
ensure that the Army-Navy Hospital in Hot Springs Arkansas would continue to 
adhere federal mandates preventing segregation in its operations, including job 
assignments, after its transfer to state control. In September, the group‘s National 
Affairs Commission chairman Michael Cooke wrote the Army requesting the 
inclusion of a clause in the hospital‘s transfer deed prohibiting re-segregation. But the 
defeat of H.R. 6190 in Congress, which provided for a nondiscrimination rule in the 
property deed, led the Army‘s General Counsel to inform Cooke that, ―Congress itself 
has acted upon and rejected this precise proposal and the Secretary of the Army 
would not be justified in disregarding this action by Congress.‖
221
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National chairman Levine‘s early 1956 first-hand investigation of the 
administration of veterans‘ benefits in the South also dispelled Higley‘s optimistic 
1954 report to Eisenhower. In mid-March, the AVC released the results of Levine‘s 
survey it sent to Congressmen Teague‘s House Veterans Affairs Committee. ―We are 
failing miserably the hundreds of thousands of Negro veterans…mainly because of 
the attitude of those in the South who are able to contravene the purposes of the GI 
Bill of Rights and other veterans programs.‖ Levine‘s report did not paint a 
completely dire picture. For example, the survey found it, ―encouraging …that VA 
hospitals have gradually become integrated and that progress is being made. 
However, there is much to be done.‖ The survey revealed ongoing problems with 
segregation. ―In Memphis,‖ he noted, ―I was told that the hospitals there are allegedly 
non-segregated. The VA Hospital in Montgomery has also likewise begun to integrate 
but nevertheless, when there is a question of admitting a Negro veteran strong efforts 
are made to divert him to Tuskegee which is overwhelmingly Negro in 
composition.‖
222
    
Levine‘s report on veteran‘s hospitals built upon the group‘s February 1956 
report known as the ―veterans audit,‖ which buttressed his findings, and revealed, for 
example, that at the New Orleans (LS) VA hospital, ―segregation existed in the wards 
and the dining halls.‖ In the Columbia (SC) VA facility a mixed picture emerged. 
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―Segregation was found at the hospital here in several wards, although other wards 
and the cafeteria were integrated.‖ Further, in Atlanta‘s VA hospitals, the audit found, 
the medical director mandated that staff ―in all installations,‖ utilize race data in the 
delivery of health care services to patients, as his instructions stated, ―‗where it has a 
bearing on the treatment or would facilitate service to the veteran‘.‖ ―Another 
recurring and disquieting complaint,‖ the audit noted, ―is the equalization of facilities 
by their elimination. This occurs frequently in the field of recreation particularly with 
regard to the use of swimming pools. When integration is ordered in the use of these 
facilities, some excuse is often found for discontinuing them.‖ Despite official VA 
mandates, then, the AVC‘s investigations showed that for the sake of upholding 
segregation, black veterans were systematically being denied equal services and 
facilities, which by law, they had earned.
223
   
In practice, Levine‘s survey also found that blacks faced limited access to GI 
Bill of Rights education benefits, due in large part to severe restrictions segregation 
placed on available schools. ―In Montgomery, [Alabama],‖ he reported, ―where 
conditions are better than in rural areas, there is no professional school, or… 
mechanical training school for Negroes. Mississippi‘s African-American veterans 
apparently fared the worst. Likewise, he reported, ―In Mississippi, I was told by 
Negro veteran leaders that the educational rights have been utilized by those that are 
the most aggressive and the luckiest. The great mass of Negro veterans have not been 
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able to make use of the educational benefits of the GI bill.‖
224
 Pervasive racial bias in 
southern banking also meant that black veterans faced denial of their rights to GI bill 
home and farm loan programs. Growing white resistance to the civil rights upsurge 
reinforced existing discriminatory practices. As Levine noted, in Mississippi ―the 
locals bankers, many of whom are members of the White Citizens Councils, 
threatened not only those who made applications but those whose businesses are 
mortgaged with economic reprisals if they signed integration petitions.‖ Levine found 
only Atlanta (GA) stood out as a beacon of limited progress due to the creation of 
―Negro Federal Savings and Loans Associations‖ there.
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African-Americans also confronted major difficulties in utilizing their GI bill 
veterans‘ employment preference guarantees. Levine‘s reported that in Clarksdale 
(MS), because ―the privilege of being a letter carrier is reserved for Negroes so…in 
this instance, [they] could use their veterans‘ preference.‖ But, he noted, ―Those 
interviewed could not recall any other examples of veterans‘ preference in the state.‖ 
Levine discovered abysmal job conditions among veterans in Alabama as well. 
―Veterans who were trained while in the armed services as electricians or skilled 
carpenters, pointed out to me that they were not able to get on the job training or jobs 
in these professions in Alabama, but had to take menial employment while white 
veterans were receiving on the job training.‖ At the Montgomery (AL) VA facility, 
Levine reported, ―no Negroes are employed as clerks, counselors, or in any other 
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technical positions.‖ He did find blacks in jobs at the city‘s VA hospital, but ―only as 
laborers.‖ At Alabama‘s Maxwell Army Air Base, Levine found that when hired, 
unlike white veterans, black ex-servicemen ―begin in the mess hall on a job that is 
akin to K‖ Further, Levine reported, at Maxwell, ―only about a half-dozen Negroes 
employed…have what might be called ‗skilled positions.‘‖ 
226
 
In summarizing the underlying basis of Levine‘s findings, the Jewish Labor 
Committee‘s national publication, Labor Reports noted, that they, ―seem to indicate 
that in some states they read it, ―‗White GI Bill of Rights‘,‖ or ‗GI Bill of White 
Rights‘.‖ As Ira Katznelson has shown, the problem with the GI Bill began when 
arch-segregationist and Mississippi Congressman John Rankin, as chairman of the 
committee originating the Servicemen‘s Readjustment Act bill in 1944, ensured that 
its administration would be decentralized to the state level, through federalism, and 
therefore strongly protective of southern Jim Crow practices. While Katznelson 
confines his analysis of the GI Bill to the 1940s, Levine‘s investigation underscores 




When asked by the press about Levine‘s findings, Deputy VA Administrator 
John S. Patterson maintained ―we lean over backward to see that VA laws and 
policies are carried out on an equal basis to all.‖ He also, ―denied there is any 
widespread conspiracy to deny veterans rights to qualified Negroes in the South.‖ 
Levine wrote Patterson to express his ―misgivings‖ about his press statements, but 
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praised the VA for its past progress, and suggested a meeting on ―some of these 
matters.‖ Patterson agreed to meet at some ―mutually agreed date,‖ and told Levine, 
―I see no reason for any misgiving,‖ and said that in his press comments, ―My entire 
premise was that insofar as the [VA] is concerned segregation is a thing of the past.‖ 
While it is not clear whether Levine ever met with Patterson, he did request 
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell to formally ask the VA to address his survey. 
But Patterson replied to Powell‘s inquiry with information supplied by personnel in 
the agency‘s southern facilities, and by reciting, at length, the VA‘s formal complaint 
procedures. In short, the VA did no real follow-up investigation of its own. 
Nevertheless, Levine felt that the AVC‘s efforts were not without some gain. When 
he passed Patterson‘s reply to Powell on to Ken Birkhead for distribution to the 
AVC‘s list of key southern African-American contacts who provided him with 
material for his report, he noted, ―at least the VA is now on the defensive and that 
they know we have been snooping around in these particular areas.‖ When the Afro-
American asked VA officials for their response to Levine‘s report, they ―had no 
specific answer to these charges.‖ Also, despite Levine‘s urging, Congressmen 
Teague failed to hold hearings on the southern report‘s findings.
228
  
                                                 
228
 Patterson‘s comments to the United Press reporter are in, Typescript, ―[UP] Over City Wire 
Service,‖ n.d., MS 2144, AVC Records, Ser. 1 Subjects, Subser. 2, Civil Rights, box 21, folder 8: 
Black Veterans in the South, 1955-1958; Levine to John S. Patterson, Deputy Administrator, VA, 
Washington, DC, March 19, 1956, Ibid., GL;  Patterson to Levine, April 6, 1956, Ibid., GL;  Deputy 
Administrator, VA, Office of Veterans Affairs to Hon. A.C. Powell, Jr., House of Representatives, 
Washington, DC, June 8, 1956, attached to Memo, Levine to Ken Birkhead, June 27, 1956, Ibid, GL.; 
For the Afro-American’s encounter with the VA, see the news clipping, Washington Afro-American, 
March 31, 1956, in MS 2144, Ibid., GL. As the paper reported, a VA information official told the 
paper that he, ―did not know whether the central office had made any special check with the regional 
offices to determine whether colored veterans were getting equal benefits as guaranteed by law.‖ Ibid. 
On Teague‘s failure to hold hearings on Levine‘s report, see AVC Bulletin, April, 1956, 1,3; and, 
―AVC Chairman Scores House Veteran Affairs Committee on Failure to Consider Rights of Negro 
Veterans,‖ April 28, 1956,  MS 2144, AVC Records, Ser. 3, Press Releases,  box 79, folder 6: 1955-




Undeterred by these official responses, the AVC launched its ―Project 
Service‖ office to distribute VA technical benefits information to ―Negro veteran 
leaders throughout the south,‖ to help black veterans claim their rights to equal 
services. As the Bulletin reported, ―Levine found that the lack of this information was 
one of the great weaknesses faced by southern Negro veterans.‖ This effort also 
sought ―consultation and advice‖ from black leaders ―in processing claims and 
securing aid for Negro veterans.‖ As word of Levine‘s study spread in the national 
press, the AVC headquarters reported receiving numerous inquiries from black 
veterans for information. These efforts also led to ―increased AVC activity‖ in the 
South, including the chartering of a chapter in Louisiana.
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 Besides exposing discrimination in the VA, the AVC also confronted actions 
by the Eisenhower administration antithetical to civil rights progress. On July 30, 
1953, the AVC sent a ―strongly worded‖ telegram to President Eisenhower urging 
him to withdraw his nomination of South Carolina Governor James Brynes, a leading 
segregationist, as a delegate to the United Nations: ―HIS OPEN AND 
UNAMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL 
AMERICANS CAN ONLY EMBARRASS OTHERWISE STRONG 
DELEGATION. IN VIEW OF MASSIVE COMMUNIST ATTEMPT TO DISTORT 
AMERICAN AIMS WE MUST STAND FAST AS TRUE AND CLEAR 
ADVOCATE OF DEMORACTIC PRINCIPLES. GOVERNOR BRYNES BY HIS 
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 Numerous civil rights and labor groups also wired the President, arguing that that the 
Brynes appointment would damage U.S. Cold War interests. As Textile Workers 
(CIO) national president Emil Rieve informed Eisenhower, ―surely [Brynes] does not 
and cannot represent our country in the parliament of the world. Let us never forget 
that the majority of the world‘s people have skins of a different color than ours.‖ The 
Jewish Labor Committee warned the President that the Governor‘s ―blatant 
identification with the forces racial intolerance and human inequality will basically 
weaken the otherwise strong position of the United States,‖ in United Nations 
―deliberations on the settlement of the Korea issue.‖ ―His record is so bad,‖ NAACP 
head Walter White informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ―that he will 
become the immediate and exceedingly vulnerable target of the communists and other 
critics of American democracy.‖
231
 
 Some conservative newspapers supporting Brynes attempted to discredit 
liberals by reversing the terms of their Cold War arguments. ―We fail to see,‖ the 
Arkansas Gazette declared, ―what relevancy Governor Brynes‘s views on racial 
matters could possibly have in connection with his new temporary UN assignment. 
Furthermore, we doubt the Kremlin propagandist would have attempted to capitalize 
on the Byrnes appointment if the NAACP hadn‘t paved the way for them.‖ The 
Charlestown News & Courier (S.C.) denounced Walter White‘s objection to the 
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nomination as ―unpatriotic,‖ and declared that White ―has jeopardized our national 
unity by his unwarranted criticism of Brynes.‖
232
  
 Despite the flurry of liberal protests to the White House, the Senate confirmed 
Brynes as a UN delegate on July 31.
233
 Considerations of Cold War interests, 
however, had failed to influence Eisenhower. Instead, as David Nichols has recently 
shown, the President appointed Byrnes primarily to repay him for supporting his 
candidacy in the 1952 election.
234
     
Through the late 1950s, the AVC continued to press the Eisenhower 
administration to expand civil rights reform. In mid-December 1957, the group 
protested the announcement by Attorney General William Rogers that the 
administration had decided not to pursue further civil rights law reform. Since the 
announcement came only two months after the Soviet Sputnik launch, the AVC 
seized the opportunity to impress upon the President that the Attorney General‘s 
statement, unless reversed, meant another major Cold War defeat for the 
administration. As national chairman William S. Ming, Jr. informed Eisenhower, 
―You, Mr. President, are the only one who can off-set the serious damage done by the 
Attorney General, both here at home and among our friends in the free world who 
look to us for leadership in human freedom. We urge you to speak out now, before 
you go to the NATO meeting so that you do not have to carry this additional burden 
of another U.S. failure on your shoulders while you are meeting there with the other 
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nations.‖ To strengthen this appeal, Ming sought to convince the president that 
Rogers‘s statement undercut recent Cold War gains resulting from the August 
authorization of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. ―This country gained somewhat of a 
propaganda victory with the passage of the civil rights bill this year. The Attorney 
General‘s remarks have offset any victory that may have been won,‖ Ming observed. 
In reinforcing this message, Ming noted, ―We are certain that when the government 
scores its first satellite breakthrough and our moon is in space, it will not then call for 
a ‗cooling-off‘ period. The same should hold true following the breakthrough, as 
small as it was, in civil rights.‖
235
  
Despite the intensity of the AVC‘s civil rights advocacy, its efforts produced 
only limited results. In some instances, the AVC succeeded in ensuring the passage of 
important civil rights measures at the state and local levels. In 1953, the local AVC in 
Oregon served as a leading force in mobilizing a grass campaign, involving a 
coalition of liberal groups, that resulted in passage of a state law outlawing racial 
discrimination in hotels, food establishments and public amusements. In early 
August, the American Jewish Congress‘s Will Maslow, mentioned the bill‘s passage, 
along with North Carolina‘s anti-Klan law prohibiting masks and cross burnings, as 
constituting the year‘s only two positive signs of progress in state civil rights 
legislation. Maslow also cited the Supreme Court‘s favorable June 8 ruling in the 
Thompson, Co. Inc. restaurant case, which outlawed racial segregation in the District 
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of Columbia‘s public eating establishments, as a major step forward. While dozens of 
liberal groups, among them the NAACP, CIO and the ACLU, joined in coalition 
behind the Thompson campaign; the AVC assumed a prominent role in the legal 
battle by providing numerous amicus curiae briefs in the case that contributed to the 
eventual Supreme Court victory. The AVC infused its petitions with liberal Cold War 
Americanism. As the Washington Post reported, its October, 1951 brief to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals declared, ―racial discrimination in Washington serves as ‗grist for 
the propaganda mills of the Communists and Fascists all over the world and impairs 
our international regulations with many nations whose friendship we need.‘‖ Also, in 
April 1955, the group‘s legal counsel succeeded in having the U.S. Civil Service 
Commission eliminate racial identification data from all civilian personnel forms.
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 While such local legislative and legal gains were important, without the 
backing of other veterans‘ organizations, the group was unable to achieve its larger 
reform goals, such as moving civil rights policy forward in the VA. Given its 
considerable lobbying power, the Legion might have been able to bring Teague‘s 
House Veterans Affairs Committee to convene hearings on Levine‘s survey of 
southern VA facilities, and to take action to ameliorate conditions.
237
 Had the national 
Legion rallied its members more numerous voices behind the AVC‘s call for 
Eisenhower to reverse himself on the Brynes nomination, given his other pro-civil 
rights initiatives, he might have found a way to do so. Besides having his attorney 
general intervene in the Thompson case, Eisenhower took a strong leadership role in 
ending segregation in the nation‘s capital.
238
 But the AVC could not count on the 
Legion for support in the fight for civil rights. As will be seen, the Legion preserved 
segregation within its organizational ranks; and as the legal tide turned in favor of 
civil liberties and civil rights in the mid-1950s, it stiffened its resistance to liberal 
change and became a major instrument of segregation. 
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Chapter 5: The American Legion, Civil Rights, and the 
Limits of Cold War Brotherhood  
 
Writing in the May, 1950 issue of American Legion Magazine, George N. 
Craig, the first WWII veteran to serve as the American Legion‘s National 
Commander used the occasion of Memorial Day to call upon his fellow Legionnaires, 
in posts throughout the nation, to actively join in the fight against ―bigotry,‖ ―bias,‖ 
and ―intolerance.‖ Craig began this appeal by noting that on Memorial Day, ―We join 
our neighbors in a salute of gratitude to the hordes of heroes, from the Revolutionary 
War to the last great conflict, who died in order that our Republic might live. 
Mentally, we place a wreath on the grave on the Unknown Soldier in Arlington.‖ But 
Craig also underscored a sharp distinction between the remembrances of the recent 
war dead among regular civilians, and those of Legionnaires who served with them in 
battle. ―Memorial Day, for Legionnaires, has a deeper and more intimate meaning 
than for the average American.‖ Elaborating on this theme, he noted, ―[O]ur hearts 
turn to the many ‗known soldiers,‘ to specific men whom we learned to know and 
cherish in a common ordeal by fire. They are not an abstraction but comrades-in-arms 
whose names and faces are indelibly engraved on our private memory. Each of us has 
his own roster of buddies who paid the supreme price of patriotism. We crave to give 
them a sign that we have not forgotten through the piled-up years—to pay something 
on account as it were, on the staggering debt of affection that we owe them.‖ Indeed, 
Craig‘s point in making this distinction, one that undoubtedly resonated deeply 
among many of his fellow WWII veteran readers, was that since their comrades had 




America but the concepts of human liberty and dignity which the name implies,‖ it 
was the duty of veterans to begin, ―dedicating ourselves in earnest to the ideals which 
drew those men into battle…Freedom, Equality, Justice and Tolerance.‖  As Craig 
noted, such dedication required active effort. ―To the extent we that we labor to apply 
[these] basic American principles in everyday life, we are paying that debt contracted 
on the battlefields.‖ Failure to do so, he noted, brought the opposite result. ―By the 
same token,‘ he intoned, ―we insult the memory of our heroic dead, we diminish the 
significance of their supreme contribution if we permit bigotry, intolerance, [and] 
discrimination to flourish in our midst.‖ 
239
 
The larger point, however, of Craig‘s linking wartime memories of the 
sacrifices of the fallen to the need for action against postwar bigotry was to rally 
Legionnaires behind the nation‘s Cold War goals. Drawing attention to the real 
possibility of atomic Armageddon, Craig stated what by the early 1950s had become 
an all-too familiar refrain. ―Mankind is at a crossroads in its history. Through no 
choice of our own, merely because we are what we are, the fateful decision of this 
juncture—between freedom and slavery, between dignified human being and 
terrorized robot—rest upon us Americans.‖ The way forward was for Americans to 
unify in ways that both neutralized the enemy‘s appeal, and brought their would-be 
captives firmly into alliance with the free world. Obliterating bigotry at home in this 
context became essential for victory in the Cold War. As Craig noted, ―Ours is the 
responsibility of leadership But how can we hope to lead the peoples of this planet 
into the sunlight of fraternity unless we live as brothers here at home? We must bring 
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to the crisis of this period, not alone dollars and military prowess, but moral vitality. 
It is our obligation, to ourselves and the world, to show an example of a society in 
which prejudice is counted a disease and discrimination regarded as a crime.‖
240
  
This kind of unity across religious, ethnic and racial differences was idealized 
in Craig‘s representation of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.
241
 ―One of the 
primary things we do not know about the Unknown Soldier is whether he was a 
Protestant, Catholic or Jew; whether he was native born or an adopted son of our 
generous Republic. We do not know and we do not inquire. For us it suffices that he 
was an American, whatever the faith of his fathers or the color of his skin. In this 
sense he is not only a symbol of patriotic death—but a challenge for patriotic 
living.‖
242
 The national commander went on to summarize Legion‘s past convention 
actions, which, he noted, ―have taken clear-cut and out-spoken stands against hate-
mongering in any form in our land.‖ In reiterating his call for Legionnaires to uphold 
the sacrifices of the fallen, Craig re-emphasized the need for them to actively work 
against intolerance. A convention resolution among an ―array of vigorous resolutions 
on Americanism,‖ he noted, passed at the Legion‘s 1949 convention, like his 
representation of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, especially embodied the nation‘s 
obsessive Cold War emphasis on effacing signs of domestic disunity because it, 
―specifically branded as a menace to our common liberties any individual, group, or 
organization which fosters racial, religious or class strife among our people.‖  But, 




 The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington VA,  and originally 
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Craig observed, ―Resolutions on paper…are futile unless they reflect a practical 
resolve expressed in action. They will have the effect on American life which the 
conventions intended only if every Legionnaire—and that means you and me—
accepts them as directives, as orders of the day.‖ Noting that, ―A number of splendid 
voluntary organizations are conducting a year-round battle [against] injustice in inter-
group relations,‖ joined by,  ―[v]arious cities [that] have acted to outlaw bias, through 
legislation and an enlightened public opinion,‖ and, [a] good many industries that 
have set up ‗projects in intolerance,‘‖ Craig asked, ―Why should not Legion posts 
everywhere take the initiative, in line with the specific evils in their own towns and 
cities, for a tolerant America?‖
243
 Craig‘s representation of the Unknown Soldier can, 
then, be seen as a synecdoche for national Cold War ―Brotherhood.‖ As the previous 
chapter revealed, such sentiments regarding the meaning of the sacrifices of the war 
dead echoed as well in the AVC‘s commemorations of the fallen.   
For the most part, however, in practical everyday terms, the Legion‘s racial 
practices contradicted the messages Craig articulated in his eulogy to the nation‘s war 
dead. Throughout the 1950s, the Legion‘s dominant approach to matters of racial 
equality and civil rights ensured the perpetuation of practices that dishonored the 
sacrifices of the fallen as Craig understood them. The Legion largely failed to heed 
the national commander‘s warning that resolutions against racial bigotry and 
inequality were futile unless they became incorporated into daily life. On civil rights 
matters, the Legion mainly followed the dictates of its conservative Americanism. 
While the period did see some steps towards racial equality within the Legion, racial 
change remained quite minimal.  
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Nevertheless, through their participation in the country‘s emerging postwar 
civil rights movement, African American Legionnaires challenged the Legion‘s racial 
status quo, often infusing their protests with liberal Cold War Americanism discourse. 
Their efforts were supported by the AVC, the black press, and, in at least some 
instances, by white racial moderates within the Legion affronted by their 
organization‘s racial policies. While these challenges served to further disrupt and 
complicate the notion of a unitary, conservative Cold War Americanism in these 
years, they did not succeed. In the mid-1950s, the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, began to liberalize its stance concerning the rights of political dissenters, 
especially the Communist party, and assert preeminent federal jurisdiction over these 
cases. Most Legionnaires, however, called for the restoration of state authority to 
define and punish radicals. This desire for state control over civil liberties converged 
with the states‘ rights, pro-segregation positions of the Legion‘s southern units, which 
further reinforced the organization‘s racial conservatism. In the absence of stronger 
pressures for racial reform from within the Legion, the rising sentiment for change 
among African American Legionnaires accompanying the increased civil rights 
activism in the nation at large following the Court‘s landmark 1954 public school 
desegregation order in Brown, remained stifled.  
African American Legionnaires confronted a range of racial practices in the 
1950s that relegated them to second-class status stemming from the Legion‘s long-
standing policy of permitting racial segregation, but also racial exclusion among 
affiliates. Beyond requiring ―honorable‖ war service from veterans, neither the 






 As William Pencak has shown, the founding convention in 1919 
firmly entrenched a policy of states‘ rights concerning matters of race. ―Rather than 
lose Southern whites, Northern supporters of black equality allowed each state to 
reach its own racial solution.‖
245
 In the South, until after WWII, states‘ rights often 
translated into racial exclusion. But from April 1946 through August 1947, four 
Legion state departments, Alabama, Georgia, Florida and North Carolina, voted to 
permit black membership in segregated posts and other units, ending their whites only 
membership policy.
246
 Although this shift in policy remains to be studied, some 
southern state Legions feared blacks would join rival veterans‘ organizations. For 
example, in September 1946, the Afro-American reported that the ―formerly lily 
white‖ Florida Legion was establishing black posts, ―Apparently to forestall the 
organizational efforts of the American Veterans Committee and other liberal veterans 
organizations which accept all ex-servicemen on an equal basis.‖
247
  
Legion policy also meant that segregation remained widely practiced in the 
North as well. In January 1946, New York State Legion deputy adjutant Maurice 
Stember reported that the unit included, ― ‗more than a dozen Negro posts…‘although 
‗theoretically, a Negro veteran could join posts with white veterans.‘‖
248
 Moreover, 
despite demands by black Legionnaires to end segregation,
249
 the Legion upheld its 
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states‘ rights policy through the 1950s. In October 1959, the Chicago Defender 
reported, the North Carolina Legion annually convened its state convention ―in two 
sections, one for whites and one for Negroes.‖ Also, as the group‘s national body 
stated in late 1959, ―In the Legion, no national rules compel local units to accept or 
reject members from among patriotic veterans who served honorably without 




Given its record its record on segregation, why, then, did blacks join the 
Legion? First, as in previous wars, blacks joined veterans‘ organizations to gain 
recognition of their war service and to assert their claims to equal citizenship that 
service promised to confer on them.
251
 Despite its record of segregation, the Legion, a 
politically powerful and respected force as the foremost veterans‘ organization in the 
nation, offered African Americans an important institutional credential to promote 
and lay claim to federal benefits due them, and to advocate for civil rights. The 
evidence indicates that Legion posts were often centers of civil rights activism before 
and after WWII. For example, Linwood Koger, an African-American WWI veteran 
and an NAACP leader in Baltimore (MD), used his position as head of the Walter-
Green Legion post to campaign against lynching in Maryland in the 1930s.
252
  
While this chapter provides discussion of postwar civil rights activism among 
Legionnaires, other evidence suggests that the Legion offered black civil rights 
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activists a political shield to better confront red-baiting. After Red Channels and 
Counterattack magazine accused Hazel Scott, wife of New York Congressmen Adam 
Clayton Powell, of Communist front activities in late 1950, Scott publicly proclaimed 
she had recently made sizeable monetary donations to various groups ―all headed by 
anti-Communists and smaller contributions to the American Legion, Veterans of 
Foreign Wars and to scores of religious organizations.‖
253
 In short, for black veterans 
active in the NAACP, a group often targeted as a Red front by those opposing civil 
rights,
254
 Legion membership provided political respectability.  
It is also clear that blacks comprised a small percentage of the Legion‘s total 
membership in the1950s. Although precise information on the number of black 
members in the 1950s does not appear to exist, a Legion commissioned survey of 600 
members, conducted in the winter of 1954-1955, reported 585 (or 97.5 percent) were 
white, and only 7 (or 1.2 percent) were ―non-white.‖ When the percentage of non-
whites in the survey is applied to the total membership of slightly over 2.7 million in 
1954, total non-white membership comes to 32,739.
255
  This fact provides another 
reason why the Legion felt little internal pressure to alter its racial practices.  
Indeed, aside from disaffiliating its subsidiary unit, the Society of the 40 & 8, 
over its whites only membership restrictions in 1959, discussed in chapter 6, in the 
1950s, the national Legion confined its advocacy of racial equality to issuing 
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convention resolutions. In April 1952, Allen B. Willand, director of the National 
Americanism Commission, sent a high school student seeking information on 
Legion‘s civil rights policy the Legion‘s consolidated resolution adopted by the 1948 
national convention. The resolution stated the Legion‘s ―belief in the inherent 
constitutional and equal rights of all Americans, irrespective of race, creed or color‖ 
and asked the delegates to ―reaffirm its long established policy in this regard.‖ 
Specifically, it listed six prior resolutions, that began in 1936, which variously 
condemned ―mob violence,‖ ―lynching,‖ ―racial strife,‖ ―religious hatred,‖ and called 
for advancing ―tolerance,‖ and ―human decency.‖ The resolution lauded 
advancements in these areas. ―The Legion proudly states …that great progress has 
actually been made and is constantly being made… and also feels that The [sic] 
American Legion has contributed in no small measure to this progress.‖ But in 
January 1956, the national Americanism Commission reported, ―The American 
Legion has never considered a resolution on segregation.‖ Further, in 1957, Robert 
Lynch, an Assistant National Adjutant, informed Benjamin J. Bowie Post 228 (Los 
Angeles, CA) that, ―It would not be possible for the National Commander to make a 
statement on the subject of integration because the American Legion does not have a 
mandate on this subject.‖ As Lynch noted, ―It would appear from the fact that they 
have so refrained, that [t]he...Legion as an organization does not believe that the 
problem of integration is one in which our organization should become involved.‖
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The national Legion‘s publications also studiously avoided identification with 
the civil rights cause. In April, 1956 cartoonist and WWII veteran Jack Hamm, sent, 
Jack Little, the Legion‘s publicity director, samples of his ―new series of drawings,‖ 
depicting scenes of home front inequality and segregation experienced by black 
veterans. In one cartoon, entitled ―Freedom Vehicles,‖ black and white soldiers travel 
in integrated seating on military trucks and ambulances. In another drawing, mixing 
WWII and Cold War propaganda imagery, the smirking heads of Hitler, Mussolini 
and Stalin look down from on high as a white man tells his black counterpart, also in 
civilian suit-clothes, ―Sure, you‘re a full-fledged American citizen, but I decide what 
you can and cannot do.‖  
  In recommending his series to the Legion, Hamm noted, ―Most of the veterans 
with whom I have talked feel that the Negro soldier and those of his race should be 
made ‗full-fledged citizens‘ of our country. My fellow G.I.‘s seem to be of one 
accord on this.‖ In rejecting the drawings, Little informed Hamm, ―I took the matters 
up with the heads of our various Divisions…the head of the American Legion Press 
Association, which services our…publications, and even with our National Adjutant.‖  
But as Little explained, ―Unfortunately, Jack, all of us are unanimous in the opinion 
that such a controversial subject is not for us. As you probably know, our national 
Constitution prohibits our taking part in any issue not directly connected with 
programs of the American Legion.‖
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Many Legion units likewise showed little interest in advancing racial 
understanding or tolerance, let alone equality. In March 1958, for example, the 
Legion‘s Post 184 (Hudson, NY) refused to heed the Schenectady NAACP chapter‘s 
protest calling for it to cancel its annual charity fund-raising event, the ―White and 
Black Revue,‖ a  ―blackface minstrel show.‖  As the chapter noted, it deemed the 
performance, ―discriminatory in implication, especially the title.‖ In respecting the 
NAACP‘s protest, Hudson‘s Board of Education unanimously revoked the Legion‘s 
use of the high school‘s auditorium. The Legionnaires responded by moving the show 
to a local private stage in the Walter Reed, Jr. Community Center. Despite its 
inability to block its performance at the Reed Center, the NAACP chapter again 
protested the show in April 1959, for its, ―‗unfair stereotyping‘ of the Negro race.‖ 
Still, the chapter gained some ground when actor Harry Belafonte, invited by the 




Segregation in local units also meant that Black Legionnaires found 
themselves publicly humiliated by the discriminatory practices of their white 
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counterparts. For its mid-1956 General Council meeting in Omaha, Nebraska, for 
example, the Congregational Christian Churches secured overflow rooms for its 
delegates at the local Legion‘s clubhouse. The clubhouse, however, refused a room to 
Legionnaire A. Langston Gordon, an African American delegate. While church 
delegates appealed to local Legion post officials with protests, they were rebuffed. As 
Christian Century reported, ―they sustained the decision of their [clubhouse] 
employee, maintaining in spite of their public advertisement of accommodations for 
travelers that theirs was a private club for whites only.‖ After failing to get 
satisfaction from city officials, the church group brought suit against the post.
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The presence of many African Americans active in the emerging postwar civil 
rights movement within the Legion ensured that these discriminatory practices would 
not go unanswered.
260
 For example, WWII veteran Rouville M. Fisher, commander of 
both the Alabama 10
th
 district and Mobile‘s Dubose-Tatum Post 302, until his passing 
in July 1951, was active in ―other civic work, particularly the NAAC‖ Robyyn 
English, a First World War veteran, of the all-black George L. Giles Post, No.87 in 
Chicago‘s Southside district, actively participated in his Letter Carriers Union and the 
NAAC In1957, he published a novel, Citizen U.S.A, which advanced the case for full 
racial equality in the United States. African American women Legionnaires likewise 
took active roles within the nation‘s major civil rights organizations. In early August 
1954, Mrs. Minnie Banks, District of Columbia‘s Legion Auxiliary vice-president, 
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joined local civil rights activist Mary Church Terrell among the featured speakers at 
the National Association of Colored Women‘s (NACW) Washington, DC national 
convention in 1954. In the summer of 1946, NACW members picketed the White 
House to protest a wave of southern lynchings. Julia West Hamilton, the first 
president of Washington DC‘s James E. Walker Post 26 [Women‘s] Auxiliary once 
served as NACW‘s national treasurer, and was among the first women to chair the 
District NAACP‘s membership committee. Other black Legionnaires served on 
official public bodies concerned with racial matters. In early 1951, Boston (MA) 
Mayor John Hynes appointed Major Stephen Douglas, commander of the Legion‘s 
all-black William E. Carter Post, No. 16 to a committee composed of ―50 prominent 
men and women…to study racial tension…and develop a program for the 
improvement of relations among the various religious groups.
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The participation of African Americans in the Korean War provided one 
source for assertions of home front civil rights activism by black Legionnaires. In 
early September 1950 James E. Walker Post 26 forwarded its letter to the Washington 
Post entitled, ―Memo to Fighters,‖ which its membership ―unanimously endorsed and 
adopted,‖ in answer to Soviet U.N. Security Council delegate Mailk‘s comment 
about, ―Negro troops fighting in Korea under compulsion of their capitalist masters.‖ 
Addressed to the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment fighting at the front, a unit composed of 
black and white troops, but ―with a large preponderance of colored enlisted men;‖ the 
letter linked the battle there, ―a righteous cause, against a tyrannical, crafty, insincere, 
and evil enemy,‖ to the efforts to achieve civil rights at home. ―The heart of America 
is sound, the conscience of America is being revitalized and righteousness and fair 
play and the belief in the brotherhood of man are steadily gaining way. We are 
moving toward the day of the realization of the American ideal. You, out there on the 
battlefields of Korea, are playing a significant part in hastening that day.‖ The post 
also assured domestic readers that the job of advancing civil rights would be 
undertaken under American methods. ― Here in the homeland, good Americans of all 
races, creeds and colors are solving the internal problems by good straight forward 
American methods, namely dissemination of the facts, conferences, discussions, the 
courts and the ballot.‖ The letter also extolled the Cold War Americanism of home 
front and frontline efforts. ―You are fighting to maintain and preserve the best 
concept of government yet created by the mind of man. You are showing by your 
deeds your attitude to totalitarian dictators and we want you to know that we, here at 




nothing wrong with the Unites States that Red communism can cure, or that we want 
it to cure.‖
262
  In short, the realization of racial change would not mimic ―Red‖ 
revolution, but rewarded and earned through sacrifice on the battlefield and legitimate 
forms of democratic struggle at home. 
Black Legionnaires also used official Legion ceremonies and their positions in 
the organization to assert claims to expanded rights and space in the political culture 
as equal citizens. In September 1958, the all-black George Davis Post No. 116 
(Brooklyn, NY), presented Dr. Garner C. Taylor with its Americanism Award, for 
his, ―valued services in promoting the American way of life, and his unique 
contributions to the community.‖ In his acceptance speech, Taylor, a Greater New 
York Urban League vice-president and Concord Baptist Church pastor, told the some 
2,000 guests assembled in the church‘s Memorial Hall, ―any person who assumes the 
posture of defiance to the law of the land is in treason against the Republic.‖ 
Similarly, when New York City‘s ―predominantly white‖ Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. 
Post 1775, ―unanimously‖ elected black surgeon Dr. Sylvester J. Carter, post 
commander in June 1956, also using Cold War language, he stated his intentions to 
use his position to carry out civil rights work. As the Chicago Defender reported, ―the 
new commander said he will call upon the post to lead the way in the fight for civil 
rights for all Americans as it has led the battle against subversion.‖
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The prestige and authority given to civil rights reform by the May, 1954 
Brown decision ruling racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional raised the 
expectations of many African Americans for accelerated change. As it became 
apparent that resistance to the Court‘s authority endangered reform some black 
Legionnaires demanded that the Legion intervene on behalf of the new constitutional 
mandates. In July 1955, for example, John D. Silvera, Commander of the Jesse 
Palmer Post No. 1068, an all-African American Brooklyn, (NY) unit, wrote national 
commander Seaborn Collins, to mobilize the entire organization behind the Supreme 
Court‘s May 15, 1955 ―all deliberate speed‖ order, in order to help bring about local 
community compliance with Brown. Pointing to the failure of states and localities to 
comply with the Court, Silvera make the case for the group to intervene by 
interpreting the Legion‘s mission as consistent with Cold War liberal Americanism. 
As Silvera argued, ―This advocacy of lawlessness is contrary to the best interest of 
the nation and can only serve to damage the prestige of the United States in the eyes 
of the rest of the world. As a dedicated group sworn, by its constitution to uphold law 
and order and to ‗transmit to posterity the principles of Freedom, Justice and 
Democracy,‘ we are duty bound to oppose it.‖ Silvera then laid out several steps for 
action. In addition to issuing a policy fully backing the Court‘s desegregation order, 
Silvera insisted that the Legion, ―must call upon public officials at all levels to be 
calm and to cease inciting citizens to rebellion.‖ While making its position on 
obeying the Court ―known and felt through every means at its disposal, reaching 
down into every cross roads and hamlet in this great Nation,‖ Silvera also declared 
                                                                                                                                           
1956, 3. The Defender also added that Carter ―expected them [the Post] to give some help with Harlem 





that, ―The Legion must join forces with organizations such as the NAACP [my 
abbrev.] in making the Constitution a guide for day-to-day living for every single 
American.‖ Collins essentially dismissed Silvera‘s appeal by simply restating the 
Legion‘s formal procedures for submitting resolutions through the organization‘s 
state affiliate structure, ―through regular channels,‖ to the national convention. 
Despite segregation within affiliates, Collins reminded Silvera, ―It has always been 




African American Legionnaires also used national conventions to combat 
segregation they experienced both in the Legion and in their communities. At the start 
of the Legion‘s 1954 national convention held in segregated Washington D.C., two 
local black units, James Reese Europe Post 5 and the James E. Walker Post 26, issued 
―threats of a picket line‖ to protest the white imposed ―social club code‖ prohibiting 
them from use of the District of Columbia Department‘s headquarters and clubhouse 
facility. The local black posts also protested the issuance of so-called ―courtesy 
cards‖ or passes, from the DC Department, which temporarily suspended segregation 
in all convention related activities, including access to access its own office and 
clubhouse. One such event included the ―moonlight‖ boat ride to Mt. Vernon. But 
since after the convention, boat rides to this patriotic shrine and access to DC 
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headquarters would revert to the whites only policy, Post 26 members, led by their 
first WWII veteran, declined to accept the pass cards. As the Chicago Defender 
noted, ―local Negro Legionnaires say they want the ban dropped permanently.‖ 
However, as late as August 1956, whites continued to deny their African American 
counterparts access to the DC headquarters facilities.
265
  
    Photographic evidence of the Georgia Department‘s participation in the 1954 
convention parade published in the Chicago Defender give the appearance of 
integration and equality. They show black and white veterans vigorously marching 
forward, not in racially separate rows, but intermingled.
266
 Given the lengths to which 
the DC Legion went to issue the ―courtesy cards,‖ it is clear that the Legion found 
segregation, and the protests it produced, damaging to its image. From the vantage 
point of white Legionnaires adhering to segregation, this representation can be seen 
as staged, a temporary accommodation to racial equality for public relations purposes, 
in the same way the boat ride to George Washington‘s birthplace, a symbolic site of 
national patriotic founding and democracy, was only momentarily an egalitarian 
event. However, from the perspective of the black marchers, their participation can be 
interpreted as a protest against the un-photographed segregation and other 
discriminatory practices they sought to abolish. Legion national conventions then, as 
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revealed in the Georgia contingent‘s photograph, in part, became performances of 
contested Cold War Americanism.  
To be sure, the Legion was not all together devoid of some positive instances 
of racial change and reform interest in this period. Several affiliates displayed their 
capacity for increasing fairness and equality. In early September 1954, the Wisconsin 
Legion included an African American in its state delegation to the national 
convention in Washington, DC.
267
 In October 1956, Memphis born Charles Simmons, 
Jr. became the first black commander of Colorado‘s District 6, which gave him 
supervision of five posts, including Denver Post 1, then the largest such unit within 
the Legion. At its 1952 convention, the Michigan Legion elected an African 
American as its state chaplain. Further, in January 1951, the Pennsylvania Legion 
supported the state assembly‘s Fair Employment Practices bill. In July 1956, the 
District of Columbia Legion called for the Justice Department to investigate the 
White Citizens Councils, but it turned down a competing resolution stipulating that 
the Councils be declared, ―‗subversive‘‖ and…placed on the Attorney General‘s list 
of subversive organizations.‖  Other reforms gave blacks some recognition, but 
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preserved segregation. For example, in August 1956, the Texas Legion authorized 
equal voting representation to its segregated black units at conventions.
 268
    
As these examples indicate, racial change in the Legion remained quite 
limited. The unwillingness of the District of Columbia Department to attack the 
White Citizens Councils as ―subversive,‖ however, points to a major factor that 
served to reinforce the racial status-quo and limit the prospects for racial progress in 
the Legion. By the late 1950s, as southerners increasingly mobilized around the 
strategy of ―massive resistance‖ to the emerging civil rights movement, the Supreme 
Court, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, increasingly liberalized its interpretation of 
laws governing the civil liberties of radicals. The Court also established exclusive 
federal jurisdiction and control over sedition legislation, therefore rendering state 
laws in this area unconstitutional. Within the Legion, members concerns about 
preserving strong state enacted anti-radical legislation converged with southern 
Legionnaires‘ interest in using states‘ rights arguments to forestall racial integration. 
The overlapping of these two interests reinforced the group‘s conservatism, and, in 
turn, foreclosed upon chances for further racial reform.
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The U.S. Supreme Court‘s ruling in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, in April 1956, 
established exclusive federal authority to prevent the violent overthrow of the 
government and nullified Pennsylvania‘s 1919 sedition law that convicted 
Communist Party leader Steve Nelson. The Nelson decision helped to place the 
Legion squarely behind a staunch defense of state‘s rights. In May 1956, the Legion‘s 
National Executive Committee (NEC) issued a resolution declaring its strong 
disapproval of the Nelson decision. It urged the Congress to ― ‗preserve the powers ‗ 
of the states to enact and enforce anti-subversion laws.‖ Legionnaires also passed 
various national conventions resolutions that called for the restoration of state 
authority over anti-radical legislation, and denounced the Court for weakening those 
laws. At the 1956 convention, members approved a resolution that demanded, 
―Remedial action to permit each state to enact anti-sedition legislation within its own 
limits.‖ They passed another resolution which declared that the expansion of federal 
control, to the detriment of states‘ rights, ―will eventually result in a socialistic or 
dictatorial form of government.‖ Three southern state departments sponsored the 
latter resolution, joined by Nevada.
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The 1958 convention adopted a combined resolution that denounced Nelson, 
and called for ―strong action to prevent further usurpation of states rights...through 
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judicial legislation by the United States Supreme Court.‖ It also praised the 
Pennsylvania Department‘s role in winning the state assembly‘s passage of a public 
school curriculum stressing the Constitutional limit on federal power, since it ―is a 
crucial base of our democracy and represents our most powerful weapon in the fight 
against the Communist conspiracy.‖ This invocation of conservative Cold War 
Americanism in opposition to Supreme Court authority continued through the decade. 
In his attack on a spate of 1957 U.S. Supreme Court rulings overturning the 
convictions of well known Communists, in particular Yates v. U.S., (which involved 
14 California Communist Party members), the Legion‘s national commander Preston 
Moore declared, ―The fact of the matter is that a combination of irresolution and poor 




When Legion units in the South went on record for state‘s rights to oppose 
federal desegregation efforts, they tied the loss of state sovereignty to radical 
subversion. The Mississippi Legion‘s 1957 convention, for example, protesting 
federally imposed integration of veterans‘ hospitals in the state maintained that, since 
it prevented social discord, ―the practice of segregation…will make this state and 
nation invulnerable from attacks from within and without.‖ Further, the resolution 
declared, ―We…assert, that the safety and security of this nation…on the other hand 
will be weakened and ultimately destroyed by integration to the delight of those who 
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would destroy our form of government.‖ The unit‘s conflation of radicalism with 
racial reform also led it to call for the state legislature to investigate the NAACP as a 
subversive organization, since it maintained, the group ―has been found in other states 
to be controlled and intermingled with various subversives…and has had a tendency 
to support various causes and legislation that…disrupt, and in many cases, threaten 
our traditionary [sic] American way of life.‖ The national Legion gave its blessing to 
this line of reasoning at its 1956 convention, when it approved a Texas Department 
resolution for it to investigate the NAACP ―to ascertain the truth or falsity of the 




 The alliance being forged in the Legion around anti-radicalism and states‘ 
rights also surfaced in national commander W.C. ―Dan‖ Daniel‘s remarks before 
Georgia‘s state legislature in late January 1957. Daniel ―commended the body for 
their advocacy of states‘ rights,‖ to the extent he also stated that the Legion shared 
Georgia‘s adherence to those principles, and that he ―would be willing to fight to 
uphold Georgia‘s traditional policy of states‘ rights.‖ In explicating his position, 
Daniel used conservative Cold War Americanism language. ―Arrogation of power by 
a central government was fast reducing the states to municipal dependencies,‖ he 
observed. Further he declared, ―An all powerful central government is the vehicle that 
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the Kremlin hopes to ride in conquering our free land, as was the case in so many of 
the countries in eastern and central Europe.‖
273
 
The Cold War language of states‘ rights segregationists to promote their racial 
agendas helped to ensure that critics of Daniel‘s speech would interpret it as pro-
segregationist. This remained the case despite the Legion‘s official press release 
declaring that the International News Service had retracted its initial report that 
Daniel said he would fight not just to protect Georgia‘s states‘ rights, but also its 
policies of segregation.
274
 To some units, the official explanation for what Daniel said 
was insufficient. As the Ohio State Legion‘s top officers informed Daniel in March, 
1957, ―We have received much criticism as respects [sic] this incident, and none of 
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the explanations to date have clarified or controverted the accusation that you stated 
that the position of the American Legion is similar to that of Georgia.‖ Other 
Legionnaires protested Daniel‘s comments using liberal Americanism. Mrs. Betty 
Green Young, a founder of the Oberlin, Kansas first women‘s post, declared: ―by his 
stand Commander Daniel has made the Legion principle of freedom, justice and 
democracy ridiculous or is the Legion going to uphold these principles only for those 
citizens who happen to have white skins?‖ Given her husband‘s and daughter‘s 
Legion membership, she noted, ―I had considered my family a Legion family.‖ But 
she made it clear, ―if the Legion is taking a pro-segregation stand, we‘ll have to 
severe all connection.‖ In early February, the African-American William L. Carter 
Post 16 (Boston, MA) told Daniel, ―The members of...Post 16…request to be 
informed, when the American Legion voted not to uphold the Constitution and to 




Also, in early February, in ―An Open letter to the National Commander of the 
American Legion,‖ E.B. Weaver, commander of the all-black Grady Mabry Post, 506 
(Rome, GA,) told Daniel, ―Now Sir, at this particular time and especially during the 
session of the Georgia Legislative bodies, there is quite a bit of controversy over 
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questions pertaining to civil rights, state‘s rights, school rights, integration, 
segregation and etc. Unfortunately, it seems that things are not enough to set brother 
against brother and, buddy against buddy [i.e. veterans]; yet in the name of peace, it is 
the prayer full hope of the Unit that these things will be resolved for the best interests 
of all the people, of all races contained on this continent.‖ While appealing for racial 
unity in this way, Weaver informed Daniel that he, and his post comrades, considered 
Daniel‘s remarks a betrayal of their understanding of Americanism. ―We, (supposedly 
your buddies, Sir.), may be a bit naive, but, we are also a little confused at your 
spirited and encouraging statements given to one side in this controversy, same 
statements being particularly encouraging to any person or groups…who may wish to 
set themselves up in defiance of…the Constitution of our Country.‖ To members of 
Post 506, Daniel‘s comments undermined their interpretation of the Legion‘s 
commitment to the ―one hundred percent Americanism‖ as stated in its preamble: 
defense of the Constitution, fostering of ―law and order,‖ and the ideals of ―Justice, 
Freedom and Democracy.‖ Weaver concluded by expressing his members‘ hope that 
the Legion‘s would act in accordance with their understanding of its purpose. ―We are 
a small Post, but we have been proud to believe in the Ideals of our Legion 




 The AVC entered the Daniel controversy in early January, when national 
chairman Mickey Levine characterized Daniel speech as un-American for following 
the path of segregationists, which he argued, also undercut the nation‘s Cold War 
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interests. As Levine declared, ―We would urge, in the name of law and order, as 
citizens and as veterans, that in behalf of human rights as against states rights you 
would declare that the American Legion is not going to become a part of a plot to 
keep millions of our people, of which no small number are veterans who fought so 
gallantly alongside us in the armed services, in the role of second class citizens.‖ 
Further, Levine added, ―Not only will your reported statement have deep 
repercussions in our nation…it cannot fail to weaken America‘s position in the free 
world…Endorsement of segregationists by our largest veterans organization could 
provide a valuable tool for our enemies in their struggle for the minds of men.‖ This 
point was not unfounded. As Mary Dudziak notes, the Soviets used ―the race issue 
prominently in anti-American propaganda.‖ The AVC also rejected the Legion‘s 
claim that the INS had actually retracted its report that Daniel stated he would defend 
segregation in Georgia. As the AVC Bulletin reported, ―No such apology has been 
made public by the wire services according to the best evidence available at AVC 
headquarters.‖ The black press denounced Daniel in similar terms. As a Chicago 
Defender February 14 editorial entitled, ―The Un-American Legion,‖ observed, ―If 
democracy is not the ultimate objective of the American Legion, and we take it that 
the Commander‘s statement resolves that question, then it goes without saying that 
the brand of Americanism that the Legion advocates is in reality a prototype of the 
Master-race doctrine which both Kaiser Wilhem and Adolph Hitler attempted to push 
through in their mad dash for world hegemony. If this estimate be correct, the 
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Whether Daniel actually used the word segregation in his defense of 
Georgia‘s state‘s rights or not, in the context of southern resistance to the emerging 
civil rights movement, his statement could only serve to strengthen the strong states‘ 
rights agenda within the Legion being forged by the backlash to Warren Court‘s  
approach to matters of civil liberties and civil rights. The fact that protests over 
Daniel‘s remarks predominantly came from African-American posts and only 
scattered white units, reveals the dominance of conservative anti-radical and 
segregationists forces within the organization. Protests by the AVC and the black 
press, invoking liberal Americanism, could not effectively counter the Legion‘s racial 
conservatism. A look at the role of southern Legionnaires in their region‘s massive 
resistance to the civil rights movement further underscores the hegemony of racial 
conservatism within the organization.  
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Chapter 6:  ―May the Spirit of Our Boys Who Fell in Battle Live 
Forever‖: The American Legion and Massive Resistance. 
 
In June 1951, the police in Natchez, Mississippi took part in, ―the forceful 
halting, for the second consecutive year of the annual Negro Memorial Day parade,‖ 
organized by the Frederick Patterson Legion Post, an African-American unit. 
Although the Post obtained permission for the parade‘s route, the issue, nonetheless, 
seems to have been its passage through ―the heart of the business district.‖ Delayed 
for almost an hour, police released the parade, which eventually made its way ―to the 
national cemetery,‖ to carry out remembrance services. Incensed by the incident, the 
state-wide African-American Elks Club convention meeting in Biloxi a couple weeks 
later, issued a resolution against police violence directed at blacks, and urged its 
members to ―take steps to see that assaults, blackjackings, and other forms of 
violence against Negroes in Mississippi be discontinued.‖
278
 In the context of the 
emerging civil rights movement, such incidents reflected the growing unease of 
southern whites over the physical presence of organized African Americans. But the 
use of the police to interfere with a Memorial Day procession also highlights the fact 
that black veterans were among the most ardent activists in the postwar struggle for 
civil rights.  
Many black war veterans placed themselves in harm‘s way again by fighting 
on the home front for the rights of citizenship they believed they had earned through 
their war service, but which were, nonetheless, being denied to them. As the civil 
rights movement intensified in the South during the 1950s, whites developed the 
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strategy of ―massive resistance,‖ in opposing racial change. These efforts included the 
creation of new organizations, such as the White Citizens Councils, and the use of 
violence to prevent racial integration. White resistance expressed itself in the revival 
of southern nationalism, built around a conservative Americanism stressing an 
extreme defense of state‘s rights, white racial dominance, and anti-radicalism. In 
defending their states against the intrusions of federal authorities and liberal 
organizations seeking racial reforms, southern nationalists regarded themselves as 
performing their patriotic duty to uphold their region and nation against what they 
perceived as unwarranted centralized control by the state and communist-inspired 
subversion of the social order.
279
 Among the South‘s most loyal patriots and 
nationalists, many white Legionnaires were in the forefront of their region‘s 
opposition to African Americans‘ fight for freedom. The response of white southern 
Legionnaires to the struggle of William Walker Post 214, a Jackson, Mississippi 
black Legion unit in the forefront of the civil rights movement, and President 
Eisenhower‘s military intervention in the Little Rock crisis, in particular reveal the 
strength of anti-radical and states‘ rights interests underlying the national Legion‘s 
policies regarding segregation. Drawing upon Cold War liberal Americanism 
discourse in their civil rights activism, black Legionnaires and their allies, primarily 
the AVC and the black press, challenged the white backlash among southern 
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Legionnaires, as well as the national Legion‘s policies. These efforts, however, 
proved to be ineffective.     
Post 214‘s involvement in civil rights was a part of the growing activism in 
Mississippi among other African-American posts and black civic associations. During 
the 1956 Christmas holiday season, black Legionnaires and Auxiliary members from 
posts in Clarksdale and Mound Bayou joined their counterparts in VFW posts, the 
United Order of Friendship and the Knights and Daughters of Tabor in a relief drive 
to aid black farm laborers in their struggle to obtain fair wages from white plantation 
owners. Unable to get a settlement, workers and their families received this local 
assistance, along with a railcar of coal and two vans of ―clothing, food and toys,‖ sent 
in by California contributors and those in other northern locales, but still ―hundreds 
had to be turned away.‖ Dr. T.R.M. Howard, directing the Mississippi Regional 
Council of Negro Leadership, coordinated the relief effort against the combined 
forces of the landowners and the state‘s White Citizens Council. For its part, Post 214 
served as a unit in the front lines of the fight against segregation. As the Afro-
American reported, the Post‘s commander, Albert Powell, ―has been very outspoken 
against segregation. He has been equally active in the NAAC‖ Further, Medgar 
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Beginning in May 1957, the civil rights activism of Post 214 soon embroiled it 
in a major confrontation with the Mississippi Legion. After learning of joint meetings 
between local White Councils and two white Legion posts in Jackson, Mississippi, in 
early May, Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. ―called for investigation of the 
growing trend for white American Legion posts to meet with citizens‘ councils.‖  He 
also learned of a higher level of political activity between the councils and the state 
Legion, noting that, ―Mississippi‘s white citizens‘ councils and veterans organizations 
have criticized Gov. James Coleman and his ‗state sovereignty commission‘ for 
approving construction of a racially integrated veterans‘ hospital in the state; they 
point out that the commission ‗is paid to defend segregation.‘‖ On May 10 Diggs sent 
a telegram to the Legion‘s national commander Dan Daniel about the joint meetings. 
As Diggs asked, ―How can an organization which professes Americanism as its 
foundation act in public concert, on an official basis, with such a hate organization as 
the White Citizens‘ Council? If the National American Legion does not reject this 
kind of Association, it will certainly indicate that it has rejected its fundamental 
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purpose, the promotion of Americanism.‖ In a letter to Diggs, Daniel said he could 
not comment since he had no knowledge of these events. Diggs wired Daniel again 
on May 21, and included a detailed reference to the joint meeting notice for May 6 
that appeared in the May 5 Jackson Clarion Ledger. Diggs also noted, ―Your 
response…is an incredible insult to my intelligence.‖ On May 24, the unit‘s state 
commander Jack Pace, in a public issued announcement, which conflated civil rights 
with subversion, ordered all ―Negro‖ posts to ―rid their membership of radical 
agitators or face expulsion from the organization.‖ This directive came on the heels of 
Albert Powell‘s accusation against the Jackson police for corruption, (in the form of 
―liquor payoffs,‖) and for ―brutalities against Negroes.‖ When Jack Pace issued his 
―radical agitators‖ directive, he also declared that Congressman Diggs ―had no 
business‖ investigating Legion activities with the Citizens Councils, and observed, 
―with respect to the Citizens Councils part in the meeting [with local posts], we are 
delighted to see other organizations are waking up to the dangers of communism.‖   
281
    
 On December 18, Fred Metcalfe, the Mississippi Legion‘s new commander, 
and a large Leflore County plantation owner, issued a directive canceling Post 214‘s 
charter. In early March, Post 214 officers and members appeared before a committee 
appointed by the state body‘s executive committee to defend themselves against 
charges that the post‘s officers violated the constitution by, ―using their official 
positions…to promote the ideals and purposes of the N.A.A.C.‖ The examining 
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committee‘s report denounced the officers for using the post ―to further their zeal for 
the left wing dominated NAAC‖ Further, it recommended permanent revocation of 
the charter, not removal of its officers, because, ―We find it would do no good…as 
the members of the post have assented in or acquiesced in the action of its officers in 
reelecting them and in refusing to do anything to prevent their using the officers in 
the Legion to disseminate partisan principles.‖ With the committee‘s recommendation 
in hand, the executive committee permanently revoked Post 214‘s charter. In a word, 
the state body intended to eliminate the threat Post 214 presented to the existing racial 
and economic order. The report did not mention the joint activity between white 
Legion units and the White Citizens Councils. Such coordinated action apparently did 
not qualify as prohibited activity because it held the line against ―radical‖ racial 
integration and equality, the state Legion deemed to be a threat to the region. As Pace 
maintained earlier, the state Legion welcomed the Citizens Councils‘ participation in 
the fight against Communist subversion it attributed to the work of the NAAC
282
 
 Reports in the black press actually substantiated the charges that Post 214 
advanced the mission of NAAC In July 1957, the Chicago Defender noted, 
―Mississippi Negroes of voting age have just been urged to go ‗to your circuit clerk‘s 
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office in your respective county and district and present yourselves for registration.‘ 
This was the command of William Walker Post, No. 214, of the American Legion 
Department of Mississippi issued in an open memorandum to Mississippi Negroes.‖ 
This report, with its military-like wording urging blacks to report for duty and register 
to vote is what likely so disturbed the Mississippi Legion, and the entire local white 
power structure. From their vantage point, veterans were recruiting and mobilizing 
the black citizenry, as  readying them for a great offensive. Worse still, in a ceremony 
held in Laurel in late September 1957, Robert Hearn, president of the Laurel Youth 
Chapter of the NAACP received the group‘s initial charter from the ―guest speaker,‖ 
Post 214‘s commander Albert Powell. In yet another sign of their role in a mass 
mobilization, black Legionnaires were now involved in recruiting the young as 
well.
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 Post 214 officials and their allies immediately mobilized to fight the charter 
revocation. Medgar Evers utilized a rhetorical strategy to neutralize the opposition‘s 
effort to characterize the Post as ―radical.‖ As Evers told The Afro-American, ―I 
understand the Post is said to be dabbling in partisan politics, but anyone who‘s 
contrary to Mississippi beliefs is considered a ‗radical agitator.‘‖ He also drew from 
the Legion‘s national preamble, (as had Post 506‘s commander Weaver in the Daniel 
affair,) with its talk of defending the U. S. Constitution and democracy, to depict state 
Legion officials as usurpers of the organization‘s ideals, and claimed that the Post 
remained guiltless in supposedly having violated the group‘s constitutional 
provisions. While Albert Powell announced he would appeal the case to the Legion‘s 
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national body, John Silvera, commander of the black Jesse Palmer Post 1068 
(Brooklyn, NY), called upon national commander Gleason to ―explain‖ the charter 
revocation for ―racial agitation,‖ and to, ―order Legionnaires to refuse post halls as 
meetings places for White Citizens and subversive groups.‖ He also asked Gleason to, 
―create a commission to plan for Legion activity in civil rights.‖ Gleason dismissed 
Silvera‘s suggestion, ensuring that the states‘ rights policy of the national Legion 
remained unchanged.  As Gleason told Silvera the Legion ―would not interest itself in 
race, color or creed.‖ Silvera subsequently told the Afro-American, ―Mr. Gleason‘s 
reply means that Legion halls will continue to be used for meetings admittedly called 
for the purpose of attacking the U.S. Supreme Court.‖
284
  
Clarence Mitchell, then director of the NAACP‘s Washington D.C. Bureau, 
used his column in the Afro American regarding Silvera‘s protest, to further extol the 
patriotic contributions of Post 214, by casting its members as law abiding, staunch 
defenders of the nation‘s highest legal principles. As he noted, while ―some white 
Legion posts in the South have put that organization on the side of those who are 
preaching defiance of the U.S. Constitution,‖ Post 214‘s members, ―publicly advocate 
compliance with the Supreme Court.‖ As Mitchell declared, ―the Legion must not 
allow local officials to use Klu Klux Klan definitions in the name of a great national 
organization of veterans. Up to this time, the national officials have been able to 
escape some share of responsibility on the ground that if they had no official notice of 
what is happening. Now they have it.‖ The Afro-American’s editorial, ―The Legion of 
Reaction,‖ and its accompanying cartoon targeted the Mississippi Legion directly. It 
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gave notice of the state Legion‘s success in having ―persuaded the state legislature to 
investigate the NAAC‖ While lambasting the state Legion‘s working relationship 
with the White Citizens Council and for having ―tagged such patriotic organizations 
as the ACLU and ADA [my abbreviations] as ―‗subversive,‘‖ it placed much of the 
group‘s behavior on older veterans. ―Steeped in reaction, the American Legion is 
controlled by aging veterans of WWI who fought in a jim crow [sic] army, retained a 
segregated organizational setup and still pay allegiance to an outmoded concept of 
‗separate but equal.‘‖ While the reference to WWI undoubtedly rang true, the point 
elided the fact that state commander Metcalfe was himself a WWII Navy veteran, a 
status he undoubtedly shared with many of his pro-segregation Legion peers, who 
likewise fought in a racially segregated military.
285
  
These discrepancies, however were surely were not unknown to the editors, 
whose purpose seems more to have been to portray the events surrounding Post 214 
as occurrences best relegated to the interwar past, as contrasted with the promise of 
genuine postwar equality. This point comes out in the editorial‘s cartoon titled, 
―Americanism—Mississippi Version.‖ It depicts a large, somewhat rotund, thick-
necked white Legionnaire, in full Legion military uniform, who stands with his left 
arm angled authoritatively against his substantial coat belt, bearing an arm ban 
labeled, ―American Legion.‖ His left hand also clutches a slightly rolled up 
document, reading, ―Alliance With Miss. White Citizens Councils.‖ In his right hand, 
held close to his mid section, he dangles a set of handcuffs with one manacle opened, 
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at the ready. He looks backward over his left shoulder with a scowl, head tilted chin-u 
The entire pose suggests the image of a strutting Nazi or Brown Shirt. The caption 
reads: ―It‘s our patriotic duty to teach that the NAACP demanding equal citizenship is 
subversive.‖ In this capacity, the Legionnaire in uniform, a symbol of past patriotic 
duty to God and Country against authoritarian dictatorship, is placed in the service of 
domestic reactionary elements whose activities efface its meaning. The once well-
regarded war hero is now but a willing mercenary of hate.
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 The Afro-American’s subsequent editorial further reinforced these messages. 
In addressing the state Legion‘s charges that Post 214‘s association with the NAACP 
violated the Legion‘s constitutional rules, it asked, ―The ideals and purposes of the 
NAACP are to advance the cause of colored citizens, secure their rights guaranteed 
under the constitution and promote the blessings of democracy for all people. Most of 
us have taken for granted that the American Legion stood for the same things. If they 
don‘t, just WHAT DO THEY STAND FOR?‖ The editors then raised the issue of the 
Legion‘s potential as an Un-American threat to the nation. ―If their purposes and 
ideals are counter to this and they are dedicated to some ulterior and sinister program 
cleverly hidden beneath their pretensions of super-patriotism, both the public and 
veterans contemplating joining their ranks need to know just what their program is. 
We have seen what the Black Shirts did for Italy, what the Brown Shirts did for 
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Immediately following the state Legion‘s initial suspension of Post 214, the 
AVC joined the fray in late December 1957, by offering the beleaguered post a 
charter. In keeping with its non-segregation policy, the AVC‘s offer stipulated that 
the new unit would need to be opened to whites. In the group‘s public statement on 
the charter, national chairman William Ming excoriated the Legion for its segregation 
practices, and declared, ―It is a monstrous thing what the Legion is doing to 
honorably discharged veterans who served the American armed forces, fighting for 
freedom, and now they find themselves thrown bodily out of a so-called patriotic 
American veterans organization.‖ In early January 1958, Albert Powell thanked the 
AVC for its action, and noted, ―of course we are more than interested,‖ but he also 
stated that for the moment, the post remained set on its present course of appealing to 
the Legion‘s national office. As Powell declared, ―we are going to fight this thing 
here to the finish and we mean just that, for we have contributed much to the 
organization and we are not going to take INJUSTICES sitting down.‖ Shortly 
afterwards, Powell informed the AVC‘s executive director Kenneth Birkhead that, 
―we are still interested in the offer…and as soon as we receive the necessary 
information from you we will go about setting up an organization of the AVC here.‖ 
Birkhead reinforced the AVC‘s determination to provide its fullest support to Post 
214. As he told Powell, ―We appreciate your desire not to bow down to the dictates of 
the Legion leaders there,‖ and, he added, ―Possibly, there may be some legal work or 
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other similar activities which we may be able to carry on for you.‖ He also told 
Powell that other veterans stood behind him: ―keep up the good fight and rest assured 
that there are many thousands in our organization and, we are equally sure, in the 
Legion itself, who abhor the kind of thing that was done to you and your fellow 
members of the Jackson post.‖
288
   
 Post 214‘s internal battle with the Legion hierarchy in one sense proved 
fruitless. As Powell explained to Birkhead in late October 1958, ―We appealed the 
State Dept. decision to the National Dept. But even until now nothing clear has been 
handed down by the National Body—the State Dept. with the aid of race traitors have 
set up a puppet group bearing our name and number.‖ As Powell noted, the state 
Legion had re-chartered Post 214 and staffed it with blacks they had handpicked to 
serve as its new officers. In early November, the Afro-American also reported that the 
NAACP recently voiced its ―disapproval of colored veterans who joined Mississippi 
Department...posts in the face of the continuing insults to colored veterans,‖ and that, 
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―posts have been ordered to stay out of NAACP activities.‖ Despite the defeat of their 
appeal to the national Legion to intervene on their behalf, Post 214‘s members 
succeeded in another sense. As Powell‘s report to Birkhead continued, ―Frankly we 
have won a moral victory for almost daily we are getting calls from all over our State 
in relation to AVC units. Here in Jackson on November 15
th
 we hope to have (11) 
eleven veterans ready to form a group under the AVC Banner.‖  Powell‘s organizing 
effort did not stop there. He noted his strategy included getting AVC materials ―into 
the hands of responsible men whose interests are now in the AVC and when we get 
organized in Jackson we plan a mass exodus of veterans from other groups all over 
the state.‖ Powell also included a copy of his group‘s press release announcing the 
organizing plan, which they sent to the Associated Press and United Press 
International. Framed in the language of liberal Americanism, it expressed their 
deeply felt sense of patriotic outrage over the Legion‘s repressive policies. Pointing 
especially to the Mississippi Legion‘s use of ―race traitors to perpetrate treacherous 
practices against other Negro veterans within this state who dare to exercise their 
individual right of freedom of speech,‖ it further noted that,  ―such actions have 
motivated freedom loving veterans to ally themselves with an organization that does 
not engage in such…o[b]vious practices of race hate and bigotry, and to invite all 
freedom loving veterans who fought and bled for such right[s], to join them 
regardless of color, creed or religion.‖ With Powell‘s communication in hand, the 
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The AVC‘s role as an ally within of 1950s civil rights movement in 
Mississippi actually began in early 1955, when it contributed $5,000 to the Tri-State 
Bank, which the NAACP set up to provide funds to blacks financially penalized by 
whites for their civil rights activities. The group also called upon its ―chapters and 
members [to] deposit savings in the Memphis Bank.‖ At its 9
th
 annual convention 
1955, the AVC conferred its first Citizenship Award on T.R.M. Howard, leader of the 
Mississippi Regional Council of Negro Leadership for his civil rights activism in the 
state. In February, the group focused attention on the need to prevent the arch-
segregationist Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland from assuming, by seniority 
rules, an open seat on the Senate Judiciary Committee. The group‘s petition to the 
Senate protesting the matter contributed to its effort to cast Mississippi 
segregationists as operating thoroughly outside the boundaries of America‘s 
democratic legal order. ―As veterans who fought against lawlessness of Nazi 
tyranny...and Communists aggression in Korea, we cannot stand idly by while there is 
a possibility that one who has impeded the work of the Senate and flouted the 
constitutional power of the nation‘s highest court is in line to be elevated to the 
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chairmanship of the committee most concerned with the legal structure of the United 
States.‖ The AVC‘s strategy aimed at having the Senate invoke Rule 24, which it 
reminded the chamber‘s members, ―allows the full Senate to have a voice in the 
choosing of members and chairmen of standing committees.‖ The group also argued 
Eastland‘s seating would harm America‘s image ―in the eye‘s of the world,‖ and its 
―leadership in the struggle against the evils of communism, if we hand the 




The AVC‘s efforts to portray Mississippi as un-American place, outside of the 
country‘s mainstream democratic political culture, is especially evident in 
characterizations accompanying its plan, announced in January 1956, to ―take drastic 
action against the growing lawlessness,‖ there. The plan, laid out by national 
chairman Mickey Levine, called for immediate intervention by federal law 
enforcement officials, ―to uphold the laws of the national government,‖ along with, ―a 
voluntary boycott against the products of Mississippi.‖  Its last two measures, ― a 
committee for political refugees from Mississippi terror and a ‗Radio Free 
Mississippi‘ to break through the ‗Magnolia Curtain,‘‖ unambiguously depicted the 
state as akin to a Soviet bloc nation. The radio program was needed, as Levine stated, 
―so that the people of that State ‗may discover what the civilized people of America 
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think‘.‖ Levine initially outlined the plan to Look Magazine writers and in a national 
ABC news interview, immediately after Look published details of Emmett Till‘s 1955 
murder as related by two Mississippi whites, subsequently acquitted for the crime. In 
his appeal for ―veterans of this nation‖ to focus on problems in the state Levine 




 There is no evidence the specifics of the plan went further than the 
announcement of these proposals. As much as anything it reflected the AVC‘s intense 
frustration and moral outrage over Mississippi‘s escalating anti-civil rights violence. 
But at least one of the group‘s key allies and even some AVC‘ers gave the plan a cool 
reception. Congressman Diggs for one told Executive Director Birkhead, ―Although 
no one feels more strongly about initiating corrective action, I feel that some of the 
proposals are impractical and intemperate.‖ Diggs worried especially about the 
impact it would impose on the state‘s black citizens. ―I would particularly oppose any 
movement which would result in a mass evacuation of Negroes from Mississippi. My 
experience from visits there convinces me that such a proposal plays right into the 
hands of the White Citizens Councils, who recognize the potentiality of the high 
percentage of Negroes in Mississippi and are attempting to drive at least 500,000 of 
them into other states.‖ In opposing Levine‘s proposals, the AVC‘s Lou Pakiser fell 
back on his faith that Americans‘ beliefs in freedom and democracy would largely 
―eliminate these weak spots,‖ such as Mississippi, ―without rash and ill-conceived 
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statements and actions.‖ Pakiser further argued that the state‘s whites, ―are not 
inherently lawless and that they wish to behave as loyal American citizens.‖ Under 
this assumption, Pakiser noted that while some measures would be required to bring 
about the South‘s compliance with Supreme Court mandates, ―a declaration of war is 
not in order.‖ Pakiser viewed the plan, in essence, as having strayed from what he 
regarded as one key aspect of the nation‘s Americanism. As he noted, ―It is a basic 
tenet of our religious faiths and of American democracy that all men have within 
them the possibility of redemption. This is no less true of racist Mississippians than, 
say the Communists fellow-travelers of the ‗30s. We do not banish Mississippi from 
the Union to bring about the redemption of Mississippians.‖ Charles Hubbell agreed 
with Pakiser, noting that, ―I‘m sure that our national officers have their hearts in the 
right place,‖ but, he argued, ― We need to work…in a way that has the majority of 
Southerners accepting and supporting the end result. May be that seems impossible, 
dark as things look now. But if we don‘t think it can be done, we don‘t have much 
faith in our fellow man.‖
292
 These opinions served to further elaborate the AVC‘s 
liberal Americanism.  
The crisis precipitated by the attempt to desegregate Little Rock, Arkansas‘s 
Central High School in the early fall of 1957 belied Pakiser‘s faith that something like 
―a declaration of war‖ was unnecessary to foster meaningful racial change in the 
South. The unprecedented intervention by the Eisenhower administration into Little 
Rock‘s desegregation controversy especially sharpened the debates between the AVC 
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and the Legion concerning the legitimate use of federal authority and the meaning of 
American democracy. Confronted by Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus‘s ongoing 
refusal to comply with court-ordered desegregation mandates and the escalation of 
mob violence by local whites over the presence of a small group of black students 
entering Central High on the morning of September 23, President Eisenhower did 
what he had previously hoped to avoid. On September 24, in order to restore law and 
order and end the violent resistance to integration of the school, the president 
deployed elements of the U.S. Army‘s 101
st
 Airborne Division to Little Rock, while 




This action sent southern Legion units into a frenzy of denunciations over 
what they deemed as an unwarranted intrusion of federal power. In its resolution 
attacking the President‘s actions, Alabama‘s 5th District American Legion, 
representing 5, 000 members in four counties, invoked a multiplicity of meanings 
about the Cold War, wartime sacrifices, and even Southern womanhood. The group 
sent their protest directly to the President ―by registered mail‖. One portion of their 
resolution turned the federal government‘s Cold War civil rights propaganda on its 
head. ―The only justification we have ever heard for the enforced integration is to 
combat communist propaganda. We in the South have never nor shall we ever attempt 
to live in such a way as to please the communists—the United States Army 
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notwithstanding.‖ Further, they held the use of the Army to be, ―obnoxious to every 
principle for which we fought and [an act which] threatens the people of this Republic 
with a future existence similar to that of the unfortunate Hungarians.‖ Legionnaires 
drew upon gender and patriotism in a way that called into question the manhood of 
both the President and the 101
st 
Airborne Division, through an assertion of their own 
manliness. ―We would suffer the consequences of refusing to obey our commanding 
officer rather than prod defenseless girls into an integrated school with bare 
bayonets.‖
294
 The potential for mutiny and rebellion against the commander-in-chief, 
and the nation‘s laws, in this instance, is justified in the name of the manly protection 
of southern womanhood. Defiance of both the President and the Supreme Court were 
reworked as a patriotic defense of the nation against a communist-style subjugation of 
the American people that Khruschev himself would find pleasing. 
 An Alabama Legion report, forwarded to national commander John Gleason 
in early October 1957, summarizing resolutions ―unanimously‖ adopted by affiliated 
posts to express their ―outraged feelings‖ over Eisenhower‘s intervention in Little 
Rock, struck similar themes. Post members mixed representations of their wartime 
sacrifices and presidential denigration of the democratic system, to justify their 
massive resistance to federal authority. They rested much of the presumed legitimacy 
of their case upon their previous war duty. ―The posts…are composed solely of men 
who have served honorably with pride in the armed forces of the United States, 
having offered their lives on the altar of sacrifice in time of war, and so are well 
qualified to speak‖. From their vantage point, the President‘s actions undermined the 
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very system they, and their fellow soldiers, fought and died for under his wartime 
command of them. ―The President has now arbitrarily perverted the ordinary mission 
of the armed forces of these United States by using them against their fellow citizens 
in one of the Sovereign States.‖ In this sense they were not wrong. The President‘s 
actions did assault the old system of states‘ rights and the racial order it upheld, and 
from their perspective, this was the society that they went to war to protect. In this 
representation, they also depicted themselves, and Little Rock‘s citizens opposing 
desegregation, as the president‘s victims, eliding the lawlessness of the white mobs, 
whose rioting openly defied the Supreme Court‘s authority. While the posts did not 
call outright for a boycott on military service, they certainly hinted at it. ―The 
spectacle of men in American uniforms using gun-butt and bayonet against their 
fellow American citizens so shocks the sensibilities of those who have served in the 
these same armed forces that a further willingness to serve therein is seriously 
compromised.‖ The emphasis they placed on ―men in American uniforms,‖ and the 
images of force in repressing resistance, suggested that the troops acted in a manner 
not consistent with American democratic ideals, but more like a brutal, and alien, Iron 
Curtain army. For all these reasons, the post declared, ―the present use of the armed 
forces should be discontinued forthwith, and…no such future use should ever be 
made again except upon the direct request of the Chief Executive or Legislature of the 
affected Sovereign State.‖
295
 As the administration demonstrated its commitment to 
enforcing Supreme Court desegregation mandates, Legionnaires mobilized 
                                                 
295
 John H. Wienand, Jr. Department Commander, American Legion, Department of Alabama to John 
Gleason, National Commander, October 4, 1957, AL Records, M-Film, 89-2036, Reel 22E11, Subject 
Files, file: Americanism—Tolerance, Segregation,  ALLA; Gleason replied with only, ―I am in receipt 
of your letter dated October 4, and I have duly noted the sentiments expressed, Gleason to Wienand, 




conservative Americanism discourse to resist them. In short, their conservative 
Americanism authorized their argument for the continuance of racial inequality under 
the status-quo regime of states‘ rights.  
 A number of Legion posts kept the focus on states‘ rights while decrying the 
use of force as facilitating an un-American system of governance. Veterans of 
Williston, South Carolina Legion Post 75 labeled the federal use of troops, 
―unnecessary, uncalled for, and a gross violation to the sovereignty of any state.‖ The 
intervention disrupted the otherwise well-ordered social system based on states‘ rights 
and segregation. Post 20 of Plain, Dealing, Louisiana, for example, in a resolution it 
sent to Eisenhower, maintained, ―this highhanded enforcement method is productive 
of the most chaotic condition ever known in our Republic, which condition is vividly 
characterized by the bayonet-pointed ruthlessness of the soldiers under your 
command.‖ The post blamed Eisenhower for the social turmoil in Little Rock, not the 
defiance of the mobs and the system they defended, in its demand that he, 
―immediately countermand the orders which brought about this disruption and 
disharmony and withdraw all federal troops from the city of Little Rock…de-
federalize the National Guard…and return the Guard to the State of Arkansas.‖ In 
stipulating their demands for the restoration of states‘ rights, ―as members of this post 
and as Citizens [sic] of these United States,‖ they underscored the reality that, within 
the terms of their Americanism, only they as whites were true citizens, and that 
federal intervention disrupted that entire social construct. In this sense, integration 
itself constituted an un-American act for attempting to undermine a governing system 




telegram it sent national commander Dan Daniel on the morning troops surrounded 
Central High, protested the Army‘s presence, and the federalizing of the National 
Guard, ―as constituting an illegal and unconstitutional interference with and invasion 
of the sovereign rights of the state of Arkansas.‖ Further, it warned, these actions 
―must ultimately lead to the establishment of a dictatorship in this country.‖ Posts 525 
and 97 (Danville, VA), the later Dan Daniel‘s ―home post,‖ focused on, ―The 
unwarranted and brutal use of force…resulting in bodily injury to unarmed American 
citizens.‖ Adding further to the image of Iron Curtain-style repression, they decried, 
―The invasion of private property, the unlawful detention of citizens held 
incommunicado without charges, the use of massed bayonets against innocent 
children, the arrogation of civilian school authority by the military commander.‖ To 
Americans familiar with ―Day Under Communism‖ events, such as the one organized 
by the Legion in Mosinee (WS) in early 1950 to show townspeople what life would 
be like under Soviet rule,
296
 (let alone the real Soviet suppression of  the Hungarian 
revolt in 1956) this representation recalled its scariest elements.   
 The resolution passed by Legion Post 1 in Jackson, Mississippi to protest the 
Little Rock intervention, asserted the legitimacy of its conservative Americanism 
protest by invoking memories of sacrificing citizen-warriors, while also hinting at a 
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boycott of the military‘s recruitment efforts. While noting the Legion‘s patriotic 
support of a ―strong military force for the defense of our Country,‖ the resolution 
warned, ―unless the Federal Government desists in its present action…it is the feeling 
of this post consisting of approximately 2,000 veterans who prided themselves on 
being a part of the Citizen Army of World War I, World War II, and the Korean 
Conflict, that future enlistments in the military forces will decrease with far reaching 
and dangerous results to our military efficiency needed in defense of our Country.‖ 
While such an act in any circumstances, but especially in Cold War times, could be 
seen as traitorous, from their perspective, ―an act which endangers the sovereign 
rights of all States to govern…and control their own internal affairs,‖ meant that it 
was not rebellion, but the necessary defense of ―the United States Constitution.‖
297
  
 In October 1957 the Mississippi Legion issued a racially inflammatory 
editorial directed at Eisenhower that also accused the President‘s Little Rock 
intervention of fostering the Soviet cause. ―You have once again played right into 
Red hands, Ike, by stirring up a mess of racial hatred, using Federal force to cram a 
minority opinion down the throats of a majority. The people of Hungary must wonder 
now if this isn‘t the reason why they didn‘t get any help from us—that you were 
planning all the time to do the same thing to the South that Russia did to them.‖ It 
also turned the administration‘s Cold War civil rights propaganda against his actions. 
―Ike gets on TV, after being instructed by Brownell as to what to say, and after being 
instructed by Robert Montgomery as to how to stand, look, and how to say it, then Ike 
says, in effect, ‗This situation in Little Rock is giving much comfort to Moscow.‘ 
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Yep, Ike, it sure is but who is giving the most comfort to Moscow—Faubus by calling 
out the Guard to prevent violence or you by sending in Federal troops who started 
violent action by beating people over the head, sticking them with bayonets and 
locking up people without charges?‖ This satiric representation of Eisenhower as 
being in need of prepping by others to make his speech, received further comment in 
the editorial‘s attack on African Americans who supported his intervention. ―[A]s he 
sits at the bar on the 19
th
 hole and reads the congratulatory messages from such Red-
tinged morons as Loose-Lipped [Lena] Horne, Liver-Lipped [Louis] Armstrong, and 
Has-Been Robinson, we can‘t help but wonder if he really knows what‘s going on.‖ It 
also presented Little Rock as but the latest episode in a long string of incompetent 
sell-outs to the enemy. ―Ole Ike has done it again. Once again he has played into the 
hands of the Reds, just like he played right into the hands of the Germans at the 
‗Blunder of the Bulge,‘ and just like he played right into the hands of the Reds when 
he held us up at the Elbe river and let them take Berlin, and just like he let the Red-
ridden N.A.A.C. talk him into pushing a so-called Civil Rights bill through Congress, 
and just like he played into Red hands when he appointed Warren to the Supreme 
Court, and just like he played right into Red hands when he condemned Senator Joe 
McCarthy.‖
298
 The bumbling chief executive appears as unfit to command in peace, 
as he allegedly was in war.  
Anger among Birmingham, Alabama‘s veterans over the Little Rock 
intervention spilled over into the city‘s 1957 Veterans‘ Day festivities. While the 
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Veterans Day committee coordinating the ceremonies invited Army Chief of Staff 
General Maxwell Taylor to speak at the ―world peace‖ luncheon, they suddenly 
cancelled his appearance at the event. In early November, 1957, directly quoting a 
report from the Birmingham News, the Washington Post & Times Herald reported 
that the committee, ―in view of the procedure at Little Rock and related subsequent 
developments elsewhere—found it advisable to alter…its original plans for the 
celebration.‖ Also, this report stated, ―it was decided by the committee not to invite 
the Regular Army units to participate.‖ This outcome points to both the desire of the 
segregationist veterans to affront Eisenhower by proxy, and at the same time, by 




Another issue concerned ongoing dissatisfaction, ―at the use of integrated 
regular Army units, and a mixed WAC band which had appeared in the parade here in 
past years.‖ The committee also secured American Legion national commander John 
Gleason as General Taylor‘s replacement.
 300
 As this episode reveals, Little Rock 
implied desegregation everywhere in the civilian world, just as it occurred within the 
military community under Eisenhower. In short, by banishing the administration from 
Birmingham‘s Veterans Day, Alabama‘s veterans signaled their sense that Little 
Rock and desegregation of the military betrayed and dishonored what their 
Americanism stood for, the perpetuation of white racial dominance under state 
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sovereignty. In substituting for General Taylor, Gleason once again signaled the 
Legion‘s endorsement of states‘ rights.  
African-American Legionnaires challenged the meanings white veterans 
ascribed to Little Rock when white New Orleans Legionnaires invited Governor 
Faubus to speak at their 1
st
 District 1957 Veterans‘ Day ceremonies. For his role as a 
staunch defender of states‘ rights and racial segregation, Faubus emerged in the South 
as a role model for politicians in other states and jurisdictions resisting federal 
integration mandates. The day before the ceremony, Leon S. Edwards, commander of 
the Nelson Harper Post 554 Algiers, (LS), a black unit, wired national commander 
Gleason, stating that, ―the members…object to Governor Orval Faubus appearing as 
guest speaker of the American Legion.‖ As Edwards explained, ―Because it is 
nationally, and internationally known that his conduct in defiance to the order of the 
court and law of the land in the Central High School…matter. We do not believe that 
his conduct has been in conformity with our basic democratic system of government 
nor the constitution of the of the American Legion.‖
301
 
Another black unit, Albert Dalcour Post 555, in New Orleans, wrote Gleason 
shortly after the event to ―protest very strongly against the sponsorship of …Faubus.‖ 
As the unit‘s commander Esau Rollins stated, ―Governor Faubus is a controversial 
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figure. One who defied the Chief-Executive Dwight D. Eisenhower, president of 
these great United States.‖ Rollins emphasized that the members did not want Faubus 
to appear at another Legion function. ―We urge you to take positive steps in the right 
direction so there would not be any recurrence o[f] similar incidents.‖ Faubus, as the 
Chicago Defender reported, spoke on Veterans Day, ―from a platform in front of New 
Orleans brand new City Hall.‖ The paper lamented the presence of two African-
American members of Post 555‘s auxiliary (to meet their unit‘s service quota,) but 
noted, ―absent were Negro members of the American Legion and particularly the 
heads of the two posts in New Orleans.‖ Rollins‘s objection to Faubus cited specific 
provisions in the Legion constitution against ―purely political‖ activity by units in 
identifying its infraction,
302
 while Edwards‘s more general comment in this regard 
may have been more about its democratic ideals. In highlighting the power prestige of 
presidential authority in the Little Rock crisis, the greatness of the nation, and the 
harm Faubus inflicted on American democracy in defying the Court, black 
Legionnaires were asserting their claims to equal citizenship rights within a new 
liberal postwar order they had sacrificed for in battle. Further, by having Faubus 
speak at the new city hall, one still firmly in occupied segregationist territory, white 
Legionnaires asserted their segregationist notion of the postwar social order based on 
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racial hierarchy and subordinate citizenship for non-whites. To the black membership, 
Faubus represented the antithesis of the world they desired. His presence on the 
platform insulted a day devoted to the memory of their past and present sacrifices for 
freedom.  Through their boycott of the event, black veterans asserted their belief in a 
new day of racial equality—their liberal Americanism.   
The AVC reinforced these aspirations from the very start of the Little Rock 
crisis. On September 4, Faubus used the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the 
black high school students from entering Central High while white mobs 
simultaneously perpetrated acts of physical and verbal terror. The AVC wired 
Eisenhower, ―within hours,‖ urging him to withdraw federal support from the Guard 
units as long as Faubus used them as instruments of defiance. The group also 
suggested the President a rationale for the proposed action, noting that the AVC 
―realizes that National Guard units are under the direction and control of the 
Governors of the various states, yet at the same time, the Federal Government 
contributes to the housing, equipment, and finances of these units.‖ Earlier in January, 
the AVC called upon the President to act against increased anti-civil rights violence 
in the South. Americans across the country listened to CBS radio discussing the 
AVC‘s message. The group‘s September 4 message to Eisenhower also deployed 
Cold War civil rights discourse. ―Our friends in the free world and the non-
communists behind the Iron Curtain who look to us for leadership must be completely 
disillusioned when they hear of federally supported troops being used as they are in 
Arkansas.‖ Also noting upcoming meetings (―within 5 days‖) at the United Nations, 




attempting to secure a greater measure of freedom,‖ the group declared, ―It would be 
tragic if the world was reading of the continued suppression of civil rights in 
Arkansas by federally supported troops.‖ In what was apparently a different message 
to Eisenhower, the AVC called upon him to end his golfing trip and resume command 
of the situation at the White House, since ―the pictures of the President playing golf 
while the mobs were active in Little Rock provided, ‗devastating‘ weapons in the 
hands of enemy propagandists.‖
303
  
In calling for an end to federal aid to the Guard, the AVC focused attention on 
its actions under Faubus. The group argued that the Guard, and other units like it, 
undercut government progress, ―in doing away with segregation and in increasing 
civil rights in the nation.‖ Pointing to the recent passage of the Civil Rights bill as 
―the will of the people on civil rights,‖ the group argued that the presence of troops 
acting to suppress these goals frustrated that will, and their belief in the legitimacy of 
federal authority. ―Our people will lose faith in a government, which on the one hand, 
seems to support civil rights, while on the other hand, it continues to recognize troops 
who are being used to deny civil rights.‖ The solution in part, entailed retraining the 
Arkansas National Guard because, ―The Governor...by his actions has negated all of 
the training the Guard may have received by giving official blessing in the minds of 
the members of the Guard that defiance of the law of the land is moral and correct.‖ 
The training AVC envisioned, which it termed ―a vital phase…of proper mental 
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conditioning and orientation,‖ would provide an, ―understanding of American 
philosophy and tradition.‖ In making these proposals, the group also pointed out that, 
―The National Guard is trained by Army officers as an integral part of our military 
forces so that it can instantly be ready for action to serve any place in the world in 
case of a national emergency.‖
304
 
The AVC also roundly denounced the June 21, 1958 ruling by Arkansas 
federal Judge Harry J. Lemley (a Faubus ally) authorizing a halt to federal 
desegregation orders in Little Rock Central High School for 2 ½ years. The AVC 
termed the ruling, ―a judicial kneeling to hoodlumism.‖ But the group pointed to 
another reason why the decision fit this definition. It also viewed the Lemley ruling as 
a betrayal of ―the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.‖ As the 
Bulletin explained, ―just as the 1896 Plessy decision gave lip service to the 
constitutional command of equality, but destroyed it under the guise of ‗but separate,‘ 
so the Lemley order acknowledges the Supreme Court‘s order but subverts it by 
asserting that ‗the time for the enjoyment of that right has not yet come.‖ To the 
AVC, Lemley merely facilitated massive resistance since, ―Judge Lemley‘s order is 
clearly cut from the same cloak that the southern-diehards have woven to smother the 
constitution in the fog of dawdling, delay, and defiance.‖ Hoping for a just outcome 
in Little Rock, the group angrily denounced Lemley‘s ruling, ―In this great struggle 
between constitutional morality and law, on the one hand, and blind prejudice and 
civil disorder on the other, AVC must not falter from its historic and traditional 
insistence that the Constitution means what it says and means it now. We reject the 
slogan of gradualism. We are not against orderly progress, but we shall not condone 
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or acquiesce in the distortion of ‗deliberate speed‘ into a program of neverism. AVC 
will continue in the vanguard of those who work for full enjoyment of constitutional 
rights for all, now and in the future.‖
305
 This representation rejected attacks on 
Eisenhower, the civil rights movement and the troops as forces of subversion. Instead 
Eisenhower and the forces for racial change stood on the side of ―morality and law‖ 
the opposition upheld immorality and illegality. While the segregationists created 
―civil disorder‖, Lemley‘s ruling abetted their efforts to subvert the Constitution and 
facilitated a government of states‘ rights reliant on mob rule.  
 The contest to control the symbolism of Little Rock took another turn at the 
start of 1958. On January 25 the Arkansas Legion presented Governor Faubus with its 
Americanism Award in Little Rock. The top Legionnaires attending the ceremony 
included National Legion vice-commander Harry Miller of Fayetteville, West, 
Virginia, Dr. Garland Murphy of Little Rock, and former national commander Erle 
Cocke, Jr. Cocke, born in Dawson, Georgia, also served on the states‘s slate of 
Democratic National Committee delegates committed to the 1952 presidential 
candidacy of Senator Richard B. Russell, Georgia‘s powerful segregationist.  Cocke‘s 
father, Erle Sr., president of Fulton National Bank in Atlanta, served as Russell‘s 
national campaign treasurer that year. When Eisenhower sent the 101
st
 Airborne to 
Little Rock, Russell had dubbed them, ―Hitler‘s storm troopers.‖ Erle Cocke Jr. 
personally handed Faubus his Americanism plaque during the ceremony. The next 
day, however, the AVC conferred its Americanism Award on the group of children 
who braved the mobs to enter Central High, known as the ―Little Rock Nine.‖ The 
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AVC initially announced its award in late October 1957. In reporting the ceremony, 
also held in Little Rock, the January Bulletin noted that, ―Some observers here 
reported that actually the Legion action was a last minute effort to offset the favorable 
publicity that was being given to the AVC Award to the students.‖ Each student 
received a citation, stating the basis for the award, which the national board 
unanimously approved at its fall meeting, which read, ―For helping to make 
democracy work by resisting the un-American and undemocratic violence in Little 
Rock and by continuing attendance at school in face of such violence and at great 
personal sacrifice.‖ The inscription bore the language of a battlefield citation for 
heroic, meritorious service. AVC National Chairman, William Ming, Jr. and Chat 
Peterson, Americanism Committee chairman, presented the awards to the Little Rock 
Nine, while one of them, Terrence Roberts spoke for his classmates. Mrs. Lois Patillo 
spoke for the children‘s parents. Other important figures at the ceremony included, 
Mrs. Daisy Bates, ―leader of the Arkansas NAACP,‖ cited by the Bulletin for her 
―major contribution in arranging and preparing the meeting.‖ During the event she 
received ―a bouquet of roses‖ from Harvey C. Ray, one of the children‘s fathers. The 
Reverend Dunbar Ogden, of the Ministerial Alliance also attended. In all, ―More than 
1,400 jammed into the Methodist Church where the ceremonies were held.‖
306
  
 The AVC purposivefully selected January 26 for the ceremony because that 
also marked its 15
th
 anniversary. In early September 1958, William Ming spoke to the 
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AVC‘s Springfield (MA) Chapter on the topic, ―The Desegregation Decision Four 
Years Later.‖ During a press conference he lambasted the Arkansas Legion for 
recognizing Faubus with its Americanism Award. In his speech to the chapter, Ming 
noted, ―This action...was an insult to the millions of Americans who seek equality of 
educational opportunity after too long a period of denial.‖
307
 For the AVC then, the 
ceremony served to highlight the actions of the Little Rock Nine as a representation 
of its core mission with respect to race and civil rights.  
  Outside the Deep South, local American Legion units continued to support 
efforts to undermine school desegregation. In late September 1959, Virginia‘s Warren 
County Educational Foundation, which established a parallel system of private 
classrooms so that parents could avoid sending their children to the newly 
desegregated public schools, began its second school year. While students in grades 
nine through twelve convened class at the Virginia Gentlemen‘s Club and Restaurant, 
eight graders met ―at the American Legion Hall.‖ At its late summer 1957 
convention, the Illinois Department defeated a resolution the Chicago Defender 
characterized as, ―a simple civil rights resolution condemning racial segregation in 
schools and other areas of cultural contacts.‖ As the paper reported, even after past 
department commander Irving Breakstone asked delegates to ―stand up and be 
counted as Americans‖ and approve his, ―much watered down version of the original 
resolution, it too, ran into a thunderous ‗no‘ vote.‖ The paper denounced the Legion 
for this action. ―This is the flag-waving, drum beating ‗super-patriotic‘ organization 
which avails itself of every opportunity to deny democracy to the American Negro.‖ 
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It also attacked the Legion for having abandoned the values of previous generations 
of America‘s soldiers. ―Have they forgotten ‗Over There‘ in Flanders field where 
many of their buddies still lie buried and where poppies no longer grow to adorn their 
graves? Have they forgotten the doughboys, as they were then called, who died to 




The Legion‘s September 1958 national convention approved an Americanism 
Committee resolution committing the organization to ―vigorously oppose all 
legislation‖ in Congress that would take away state and local control of the public 
schools. A clear stand for states‘ rights in public education matters, the resolution also 
pledged the Legion to oppose federal financial ties to the schools except in ―certain 
operational programs of federal agencies,‖ and ―specialized or restricted programs of 
a temporary duration, or during time of war or grave national emergency.‖ One clause 
was a lurid expression of conservative Cold War Americanism language. ―Such 
federal domination and intervention would make possible centralized thought control, 
propagandized and collectivized captives of our children, and the ultimate destruction 
of our constitutional form of government.‖ At this same convention, the Americanism 
Committee turned down resolution 409, which the Chicago Defender noted, ―would 
have put the powerful veterans‘ organization on record as advocating a stronger civil 
rights law.‖ The Americanism Committee kept the resolution from a floor vote 
because in calling for Congress to ―implement‖ the Supreme Court‘s desegregation 
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rulings, ―it was not procedurally correct‖ and ―not germane to the programs and 
purposes of The [sic] American Legion.‖
309
 In the late 1950s, while Legion facilities 
in pro-segregation states had become platforms for massive resistance to school 
integration, the national convention, by accommodating states‘ rights interests 
sanctioned these activities. 
During his early 1956 tour of the South to investigate conditions confronting 
the region‘s black veterans, Mickey Levine photographed two images from 
Mississippi, which were later published side-by-side in the AVC Bulletin. The image 
on the left was a photograph of the railroad station at Mound Bayou, ―an all-Negro 
town,‖ which nevertheless lacked a waiting facility for blacks. The other photograph 
featured a portion of Greenville‘s ―Tribute to War Veterans,‖ a memorial consisting, 
in part, of a bill board-like panel which, in large letters, displayed the message: ―May 
the spirit of our boys who fell in battle live forever.‖ The Bulletin’s caption regarding 
the memorial observed, ―Its wording takes on a strange hue in light of the failure of 
the South to treat Negro veterans with equality.‖
310
 While this observation reflected 
the AVC‘s allegiance to the goal of racial equality, both the railway station and the 
memorial stood as symbols of the inability of the forces of liberal Americanism to 
defeat the Legion‘s southern nationalists. Although the efforts of the AVC, black 
Legionnaires and their allies to put forth their reform program further disrupts the 
                                                 
309
 For the resolution, No.567, submitted by the Texas Department, Proceedings, 40
th
 National 





 Session, 61-62. As it stated, ―Under our Constitution each state is, and should 
be, vested with complete, sole and final power, authority, direction, supervision and control of every 
facet of public education within its borders, with the largest possible measure of home rule and 
autonomy delegated to the local communities.‖ Ibid. For Resolution No. 409, introduced by Illinois in 
an apparent turnaround from the previous convention ,see, Proceedings, 40
th
 National Convention, 
Ibid., 66; and, Chicago Defender (Daily Edition), September 4, 1958, 2A. 
310




notion of an unchallenged conservative patriotic culture in this period, the 
conjunction of anti-radical, states‘ rights and segregationist interests among southern 
white Legionnaires and their allies elsewhere in the national organization proved to 
be too powerful to overcome. The Mound Bayou railway station effaced the notion of 
blacks as full citizens. For southern white Legionnaires, the Greenville memorial was, 
undoubtedly, never meant to give recognition to the sacrifices of fallen African 
American soldiers. To have actually done so, would have given authority to their 
living comrades‘ claims for citizenship rights that were being denied to them, and 
their fellow civilians, at the railway station, and throughout the South. As the 1950s 
ended, the national Legion took an important step forward on race matters within its 
structure, but change remained limited in the years ahead, even as the civil rights 






Chapter 7:  ―All good Legionnaires know that a bullet has no 
racial or religious discrimination.‖ The Society of the 40 & 8 
Controversy and the Limits of Racial Reform in the American 
Legion  
 
Despite the power of segregationist forces within the Legion, the close of the 
1950s nevertheless did witness one important shift in the organization‘s policy 
regarding race. In 1959, following several years of growing controversy and debate, 
the national Legion officially severed its organizational ties to its long-established 
affiliate, the Society of the 40 & 8, over the unit‘s refusal to eliminate its rule 
restricting membership to white veterans. The black press and other important 
national voices of liberal Americanism seeking to advance civil rights applauded the 
Legion‘s policy change. But the AVC excoriated the group for its failure to end its 
toleration of racial inequality by abolishing segregation in the 40 & 8, and within its 
own organizational structure. The limited extent of racial reform that occurred within 
the nation‘s largest veterans‘ organization at the end of the decade, further highlights 
the inability of liberal Cold War Americanism to engender more far-reaching change 
in a conservative era.   
Officially named La Societe des Quarante Hommes et Huit Chevaux, the unit 
formed in 1921 as an ―elite‖ unit of veterans existing within the national body. The 
designations ―40 & 8‖ referred to a type of French railroad car used during WWI 
which had the capacity to transport either forty men or eight horses. The whites only 
membership clause in the group‘s constitution existed from its inception. In the 
interwar years the 40 & 8 centered its activities on widow and orphan relief, and 




600 chapters in all but three states. In 1925 the group moved its offices from Seattle 
Washington to the Legion‘s headquarters in Indianapolis. In the interwar years the 40 
& 8 centered its activities on providing relief to widows and orphans of deceased 
servicemen, and recruiting members for the national Legion. Previously existing as an 
independent unit, in 1937 the group became ―a subsidiary‖ organization of the 
Legion, that, as discussed earlier, did not itself bar membership on the basis of race. 
During WWII it shipped thousands of cases of playing cards to troops overseas. To 
help alleviate the shortage of nurses after the war, in 1946 it established a Nurses‘ 
Training Program that became a national program in the mid-1950s. The group also 
functioned as the Legion‘s ―fun-making‖ group for the pranks and other acts of 
merriment its members performed at national conventions, especially during parades, 
such as ―romping around the streets in diapers.‖ In 1954, the 40 & 8 had a national 
membership of some 70, 000, which included WWII and Korean War veterans.
311
  
In the early 1950s the 40 & 8 came under increasing criticism by a number of 
Legionnaires, especially African Americans, who wanted the racial restriction 
repealed. In July 1951, the Samuel Dowd Post in Yonkers (NY), an all-black unit, 
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succeeded in winning the Westchester County Legion convention‘s approval to repeal 
the ban. Of the 200 delegates voting, ―only two or three responded with shouted 
‗nays‘.‖ Delegates also approved a resolution ―advocating immediate internment of 
all Communists and Communist supporters in this country.‖ The Dowd unit‘s 
resolution interpreted the Legion‘s conservative Americanism as consistent with the 
idea of racial equality. ―One of the purposes of the American Legion is its 
uncompromising fight for 100% Americanism and an unqualified condemnation of 
any force in the national life that advocates the doctrine of racial or religious 
superiority…There are many members who are not Caucasians but who work 




 Internal opposition to 40 & 8‘s racial restriction opened up elsewhere. The 
Legion‘s Illinois Department convention in July 1951, with its 12,000 plus delegates 
attending, approved a resolution, which drew upon Cold War discourse, calling for 
the race bar‘s ―elimination.‖ As the Chicago Defender reported, ―the 
resolution…condemns the use of restrictive clauses as lending assistance to the 
spread of communism.‖ The group also resolved to forward the resolution ―to the 
national body.‖ Likewise, in mid-1953 the Ohio Department‘s convention voted, ― to 
urge the national Legion to erase [the] color line that keeps Negroes from 
membership in the 40 & 8.‖
313
  
Opposition among other Legion affiliates intensified in the mid-1950s. In July 
1954, the New York State Legion convention approved a ―strongly worded‖ 
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resolution calling for the national Legion to ―abolish‖ the 48 & 8, ―unless it 
prohibited ‗discrimination of any race, creed or color.‘‖ This action followed passage 
of a resolution by the New York state 40 & 8‘s meeting, consisting of some 600 
members, against ―Legion control.‖ At their August 1955 convention, New York 
State Legion delegates voted down a resolution calling for the placement of 40 & 8 
under the control of the Legion‘s National Executive Committee, while ―[t]he 
resolutions committee tabled a motion calling for an official Legion policy of 
obedience to the Supreme Court order on school desegregation.‖ But at its 1956 
convention, in ―an overwhelming voice vote,‖ the group ―demanded‖ that 40 & 8 
remove its race bar. New York State Attorney General Jacob Javits, a member of 
AVC and the Legion, informed this same meeting that, ―the national veterans 
organizations themselves can render a great service by being absolutely sure that in 
their own organization and structure there is no vestige of discrimination or 
segregation anywhere in the country.‖  Meanwhile, 500 Hawaii Department delegates 
meeting at their July 1955 convention ―voted to disown the local Forty-and-Eight 
Society because of its racial policies.‖ In a state in which only 15 percent of its 
residents were white, the 40 & 8 unit consisted of only 60 members. Following the 
Hawaii Department‘s action, the unit reported its intentions to ―possibly petition the 
national [40 & 8] group to eliminate its race clause.‖ Its state president even told the 
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As the example of the all-black Samuel Dowd Post reveals, these various 
convention actions, in part, represented the determined efforts of the Legion‘s 
African-American membership to keep 40& 8‘s membership restriction squarely 
before their fellow white veterans. In May 1951, the Chicago Defender reported on 
the work of the Johnny Baker Post, an African-American unit, ―which has sent a letter 
to every Negro post on its mailing list, urging attack on the Forty and Eight ban‖. The 
paper also noted that, ―[f]or years this last stand of those who in earlier days of [the] 
America Legion organization sought to bar Negro membership entirely, has been 
under constant though unorganized attack by Negro Legion groups throughout the 
nation.‖ As the language of the Illinois Department‘s 1951 resolution reveals, the 
influence of Cold War discourse and concerns helps to explain the growing interests 
of whites in ending the racial ban and the increasing leverage which they, black 
Legionnaires and their liberal allies exerted in making the case for reform. Cold War 
discourse also came directly to the Legion‘s convention floor by way of some of its 
most notable guests and officials within its leadership In a speech epitomizing liberal 
Americanism‘s call for national Cold War unity, presidential candidate Dwight 
Eisenhower told delegates at the Legion‘s 1952 convention, ―[L]et us once and for all 
resolve that henceforth we shall be guided in our relations with our fellows by the 
American creed that all men are created equal—and remain equal. All of us who 
salute the flag, whatever our color or creed or place of birth, are Americans entitled to 
the full rights and privileges of our citizenship In a time when America needs all the 
skills, all the spiritual strength and dedicated services of its 155 million people, 




did not hear Eisenhower speak (whom they termed, ―their old comrade at arms,‖) 
because of the president‘s recent heart attack. Instead, they ―stood in silence for one 
minute of prayer for [his] ‗speedy recovery‘.‖ But delegates did hear ―a plea,‖ from 
staunch anti-communist and AFL-CIO president George Meany, who asked ―that 
they work hard to eliminate race and labor discrimination as ‗flaws‘ in our national 
defense.‘‖ Also, in an April, 1954 address before the New York State Legion‘s annual 
national commanders‘ dinner, national commander Arthur J. Connell, ―Asserting that 
the communists seek to sow suspicion and manufacture differences…condemned 
racial and religious prejudice as ‗serving the enemy‘s cause as surely as the soldier in 
the Red Army.‘‖
315
    
Yet in spite of these messages, many Legionnaires remained unwilling to 
vanquish the 40 & 8 race ban, as their ―old comrade at arms‖ would have them do. In 
1953, the Legion‘s national convention in St. Louis tabled a reform resolution 
targeting 40 & 8‘s racial bar. At the 1954 convention, the Internal Affairs Committee 
―unanimously‖ passed a resolution to end the membership restriction, but it mandated 
that it be done by allowing  ―individual units‖ of [40 & 8] to pass on membership‖ In 
short, a process that left the pace of change firmly in the hands of 40 & 8 affiliates. 
While no such reform measure made it to the convention floor in the previous ten 
years, it nevertheless constituted ―a compromise‖ that defeated a much stronger 
resolution requiring the complete elimination of discrimination and ―the immediate 
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admission of Negro members‖ in the 40 & 8. Following ―an hour-long bitter debate,‖ 
the compromise resolution lost on the floor by ―a shouted voice vote.‖ During 40 & 
8‘s convention in 1955, its Massachusetts delegation proposed a motion to take 
―white‖ out of the membership clause, but failed by a 20-1 vote; while in the Legion‘s 
1955 national convention, a Colorado Department resolution before the Constitutional 
Committee, to insert protections against discrimination of members based on race was 
rejected, thereby preventing it from reaching the floor.
316
  
Throughout the 1950s, the black press remained critical of the 40 & 8‘s racial 
policies. For example, in September 1952, the Chicago Defender in an editorial 
criticizing 40 & 8 and the Legion‘s national convention on racial matters, highlighted 
how each organization stood in contradiction to developments in the military, whose 
former members they represented.― The 40 et 8 …is still a lily-white organization 
which turns its back on Negro Legionnaires wishing to affiliate and most of the 
[Legion‘s] posts are organized along racial lines, even though the armed forces have 
or are in the process of abolishing racial segregation.‖ In September 1954, the AVC 
also protested the Legion‘s failure to resolve the 40 & 8 issue. As the group‘s 
executive director Andrew Rice wrote national commander Arthur Connell, then 
presiding over the Legion‘s national convention in Washington, D.C., ―It is a 
shocking travesty on the freedom which the American Legion is pledged to defend 
that it should refuse to require that …the 40 & 8, eliminate its ban against admitting 
Negro and Oriental Americans. Convening in the capitol of the entire free world, the 
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Legion, by its action, will make good propaganda for the enemies of freedom 
everywhere.‖ In October 1955, following the Legion‘s national convention, Kenneth 
Birkhead wired the Urban League‘s, executive director Lester Granger, NAACP‘s 
executive secretary Roy Wilkins, and Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porter‘s union 
president, A. Philip Randolph, calling upon them to join the AVC and others ―in 
lodging the most vigorous protest with the Legion, and in seeking a drastic change in 
the un-American and anti-democratic practices of that veterans group‖
317
  
  The situation became more difficult for the national Legion and 40 & 8 in 
September 1958, when 40 & 8 revoked the charter of its San Jose chapter for 
admitting Gerald Lee, a Chinese American who served as an Army second lieutenant 
during WWII. Not only did join the local 40 & 8, he also served as commander of the 
Legion‘s 13
th
 District and Post 89. In response to the charter revocation, the Santa 
Clara County 40 & 8‘s judge advocate, Louis Leve, brought the matter to Superior 
Court Judge Raymond J. Callahan, who subsequently ordered the parent organization 
to justify why its charter revocation should stand, and to cease its efforts to charter a 
new ―all-white‖ unit. As Leve told the Afro-American, ―Somebody here called 
somebody in national headquarters in Indianapolis and the next thing we knew they 
sent a man here to demand that Lee be expelled or we forfeit our charter. Jerry 
offered to quit, but we wouldn‘t let him. So now they‘ve picked up our charter and 
they‘re trying to organize an ‗all white‘ 40 & 8 Society here.‖ On October 1, Judge 
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Callahan issued a second restraining order to halt the attempted re-chartering move 
until trial, and informed the two local 40 & 8 officials behind it, ―I suggest to you 
people that you read the Constitution of the United States…You‘ll find it quite 
refreshing.‖ In mid-October, Judge Callahan ―summoned national officers...of 40 & 
8,‖ to appear before him to answer for their charter revocation order, and to provide a 
copy of it to the California secretary of state‘s office for review, which the group 
previously refused to make available to Louis Leve. Finally, in July 1959, California 
Attorney General Stanley Mosk announced the creation of a ―constitutional rights 
section‖. As the New York Times reported, its purpose is to investigate ―infringements 
of civil rights‖ and ―its first action…will be to join in a law suit against the American 
Legion‘s ―40 & 8 affiliates for alleged racial discrimination.‖ Franklin H. Williams, 
West Coast NAACP Counsel was appointed to direct the section. Using liberal Cold 
War Americanism language, AVC‘s executive director Irving Lechliter, in September 
1958, denounced the charter revocation action, calling for 40 & 8 to ―get in step with 
a vast majority of the truly democratic organizations in America.‖ As Lechliter 
declared, ―This is not the action of a responsible veterans group The prestige of the 
United States in the eyes of the world has already been substantially damaged by the 
intransigency of some people and groups of this country who are trying to perpetuate 
a system of second class citizenship based on color or race. The 40 et 8 Society 
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About a month after the California attorney general‘s announcement, 
delegates at the Legion‘s August 1959 national convention in Minneapolis, after 
debating various resolutions, voted 1, 650 to 1, 338 to permit 40 & 8 to continue its 
racial ban. While, the departments of California, Alaska, and Minnesota led the forces 
for repeal of the restriction, Hawaii‘s resolution called for negotiations on the matter 
between the Legion and the 40 & 8. The convention‘s vote defeated Alaska‘s 
delegation‘s call for repeal, which maintained the ban violated the Legion‘s 
constitution. But, then, by voice vote, the convention approved the Hawaii 
department‘s resolution. With their lawsuit still in Santa Clara Superior Court, 
delegates from Santa Clara distributed to Legionnaires a pamphlet stating, ―it is our 
shame that while other organizations are eliminating discrimination…the 40 & 8, tries 
to retain it. All good Legionnaires know that a bullet has no racial or religious 
discrimination.‖ At one point in the debate, using Cold War rhetoric, Hawaii 
Department Chaplain Edwin Goodwin told convention delegates that, ―the Legion 
was being ‗infiltrated by bigotry.‘‖
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Following the convention, outside forces for liberal Americanism again 
entered the debate. The New York Times held up the 1,338 delegates who fought for 
racial reform as having taken, ―the truly American way.‖ The paper also quoted a 
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passage from the recent inauguration speech of Hawaii‘s first governor, William 
Quinn: ―For the first time, our America has enfolded its people of Polynesian and 
Asian ancestry in a its warm embrace. A banner of man‘s equality in a free world has 
been lifted high for the free world to see and enslaved worlds to see.‖ To this, the 
Times added, ―We hope our friends all over the world, East and West, will understand 
that it was the Legion minority of 1, 338 and Governor Quinn who truly spoke for 
this nation‘s hope and faith.‖ The Chicago Defender took a more critical position, 
portraying the Legion as a group existing on the far right fringes of the democratic 
American mainstream. ―There is no longer any need to brood over the fact that the 
American Legion is an un-American aggregation made up, for the most part, of men 
of little mind and narrow vision; men whose psychological urge for recognition and 
power makes them extremely dangerous. In sum, the Legion is the biggest organized 
nucleus of fascist potential in American today.‖ Further, it observed, ―If the Legion 
wishes to be consistent with its own conscience and outlook, it should drop 
‗American‘ from it name.‖ The NAACP held to Cold War rhetoric in its protest. In a 
message it sent to the Legion‘s national commander, Preston Moore, the group‘s 
executive secretary, Roy Wilkins, pointedly charged that keeping the racial bar 
provided ―ammunition to America‘s Communists enemies.‖
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Immediately after the 40 & 8 vote, under its national chairman Mickey 
Levine, the AVC went all-out against the Legion. On August 27, the group wired 
Congressman Olin Teague, chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Committee to 
investigate the Legion‘s tax-exempt status, arguing that it ―has forfeited its 
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government privileges by its policy of racial discrimination.‖ The AVC also sent 
letters of protests, attached with its telegram to Teague, to Vice-President Nixon and 
a number of liberal senators, including Paul Douglas, Jacob Javits and Hubert 
Humphrey. Announcements of the investigation call also immediately went out to the 
Associated Press and United Press International. At its September 1959 National 
Board meeting ―devoted to civil rights matters,‖ the group considered both the 40 & 8 
situation and ―the futile efforts of A. Philip Randolph and others to end discrimination 
in the trade union movement.‖ In these deliberations, ―board members concluded that 
a concerted drive should be launched at once to eliminate racial discrimination and 
segregation in veterans‘ organizations and labor unions.‖ The board also unanimously 
endorsed a plan calling for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to create an Ad 
Hoc Committee to End Segregation in Veterans Organizations and Labor Unions.‖
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In late September, Levine informed Roy Wilkins, chairman of the NAACP‘s 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, of the board‘s Ad Hoc Committee plan. As 
Levine noted, ―The AVC proposal does not mean a diminution of joint efforts in 
other civil rights activities, but rather a branching out into a new field (as far as 
collective action is concerned) in breaking down segregation and discrimination in 
non-governmental but none the less public organizations.‖ For the moment, Wilkins 
urged an ―informal approach,‖ given what he knew about recent difficulties 
concerning internal organizational politics in the unions, and in the civil rights groups 
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contending with discrimination and segregation problems. In December 1959, AVC 
reported on the steps it had taken organizationally on its own, to assert its version of 
Americanism against that of the Legion‘s. Outraged by Nelson Rockefeller‘s recent 
comments, which as AVC noted, ―praised the Legion‘s defense of freedom and 
democratic principles in America‖, the group announced the formation of its 
―Legionism Unit,‖ under direction of national board member Martin Keen of New 
Jersey, ―to present to the public the true facts on the role of the American Legion in 
the United States.‖  As the Bulletin reported, the unit‘s ―Task No. 1…will be to 
inform Governor Rockefeller of the role of the Legion in such undemocratic practices 
as ‗Jim Crow‘ Posts.‖
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Levine also wrote a scathing editorial in the September 1959 Bulletin, 
emphasizing the Legion‘s unsavory side. Recalling an early encounter with the 
Legion, he reported, ―The very first time I saw an American Legion uniform was 
thirty years ago in Wayne County, Pennsylvania. These townspeople I recognized. 
They were drunk and boisterous—returning from a Ku Klux Klan demonstration in 
Honesdale. A year or so later, I saw the local Legion post decked in full regalia, 
carrying clubs and rubber hoses, drive off to act as volunteer strike-breakers in a labor 
dispute. Two years ago in Mississippi, I learned about Legion beer halls used as 
meeting places for the degenerate White Citizens Council and Legion leaders inciting 
defiance and lawlessness. They haven‘t changed very much! Although senility may 
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have dulled their sting, they are still venomous.‖ Levine‘s editorial also called upon 
labor leaders George Meany and Walter Reuther, and NAACP leaders Roy Wilkins 
and Thurgood Marshall, ― to repudiate publicly at long last this truly subversive group 
and to look into their souls to see if they really think, along with some of our 
Senatorial friends, that the Legion is one of the ‗three most distinguished and highly 
respected nation-wide organizations.‘‖  The references to organized group violence 
and beer halls, perhaps meant to remind readers of Hitler‘s Munich, added to the 
Chicago Defender’s depiction of the Legion as fascistic.
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A number of ordinary and prominent African American Legionnaires 
protested the convention‘s vote by resigning from the Legion. Mizell M. Merrill, a 
rank-and-file member, informed the Chicago Defender in early September 1959 that 
he was ―fed up to the neck‖ with the Legion‘s racial policy. Invoking Cold War 
language, Mizell observed, while the Legion is ―supposedly dedicated to the 
principles of justice, freedom and democracy…This infamous decision must have our 
enemies abroad laughing up their sleeves for when the Un-American Legion, 
comprised of those of us who have laid their lives on the line for the aforementioned 
principles will not recognize the dignity of the individual nor the integrity of his soul, 
these so-called principles of democracy become a hollow mockery, devoid of all 
truth.‖ In declaring his resignation, Mizell told the Defender’s readers, ―I stand ready 
to join with any person or group who wishes to organize a truly democratic veterans 
organization.‖ Harlem‘s state senator, James B. Watson, likewise withdrew from the 
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Congressmen Charles Diggs Jr. only ―a few hours‖ after the vote, wired the 
Legion‘s national commander, Preston Moore, to protest the convention‘s action and 
submit his resignation. As Diggs, an Army lieutenant in WWII, declared, ―I 
cannot...remain a member of the Un-American Legion as long as discrimination is the 
official policy of the organization.‖ Diggs also emphasized to Moore that the vote 
represented an affront to his war service and that of his fellow veterans. ―That you in 
effect, would condone the practices of your 40 and 8 subsidiary in excluding such 
whole groups of honorably discharged veterans, who have served with sacrifice in 
defense of our way of life, is indefensible.‖ Diggs also took the opportunity to 
underscore how the convention‘s decision contradicted Moore‘s, and the Legion‘s, 
supposedly hard-line commitments to winning the Cold War. ―Your action also 
throws the shadow of a question across your resolution against the Khruschev visit. Is 
the Legion so afraid that Khruschev will see first-hand, despite our progress in the 
field of race relations, ample evidence that there is still a wide gap between the theory 
and practice of democracy, with your negative action on the anti-discrimination 
proposal as a shining example?‖ Additionally, Diggs expressed his anguish over 
northern support delegates for 40 & 8‘s discriminatory policy. ―The vote of your 
Southern delegates against the integration proposal was not surprising, but to see a 
majority of Northern delegates, including those from my own state of Michigan, 
associate themselves with this anti-democratic viewpoint gives validity to the oft-
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repeated Southern charge that all racial discrimination is not below the Mason-Dixon 
Line.‖ In fact, the Afro-American, in September 1959, reported that South Carolina 
Senator Olin D. Johnston, himself a Legionnaire, presented the details of the Legion‘s 
northern delegates‘ votes on the Senate floor, in order to help bolster his arguments 
against desegregation in the nation‘s schools. In late October, the Chicago Defender 
gave further expression to African American veterans‘ outrage over events, by 
publishing an editorial from The Carolina Times urging all blacks to quit the Legion. 
―Every Negro member of the American Legion with an ounce of respectability left in 
his soul and body should follow the lead of …Congressman Diggs and State Senator 
James L. Watson and quit the organization.‖
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 Other black Legionnaires choose to continue the fight for reform by making 
their stand from within. Specifically addressing African-Americans who ―can‘t 
understand why Negroes stay in the Legion,‖ a Legion post ―Adjutant,‖ told the 
Chicago Defender, ―One cannot win a battle by quitting or running away. The people 
of Montgomery, Clifton, and Little Rock did not leave. They stayed and fought until 
the battle was won. That is exactly what we intend to do.‖ 
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While segregationists, like Senator Olin D. Johnston, seized upon the 40 & 8 
vote to shore up their arguments for the racial status-quo, integrationists, such as 
liberal Republican and civil rights advocate Senator Jacob Javits, of New York, both 
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a Legionnaire and AVC member, used the incident to strengthen the case for racial 
reform. 
Like many of his fellow Legionnaires, Javits also decided to fight the 
Legion‘s discriminatory policies from within. On August 28, Javits sent a telegram to 
the Legion‘s new national commander, Martin B. McKneally, stating his intention to 
stay in the Legion and ―do everything in my power to bring about a reversal of this 
action.‖  In his initial August 27 statement on the Senate floor, concerning the 
convention‘s vote, Javits‘ also hit the Legionnaires hard by suggesting they had acted 
like cowards. While he and his Senate colleagues were ―bringing into play every 
legitimate means at their command to bring about floor action on a civil rights bill in 
Congress,‖ he found it ―positively deplorable‖ that ―the Legion should at its annual 
convention vote this kind of retreat before the forces of intolerance.‖ Further he 
noted, ―to permit‖ 40 & 8 to continue the race ban, ―the American Legion staged a 
retreat, an action which would have been inconceivable to these same men were they 
on a battlefield.‖ Javits also strongly implied that the Legion‘s action hurt America‘s 
current world struggle, by undermining the nation‘s advancements in liberal racial 
and economic reform. ―In the ‗cold war‘ as it is being waged globally today, the 
common enemy is many things. It most certainly is communism, as the Legion has 
emphasized so often. It is also abysmally low living standards and the very type of 
inequality of opportunity that directly stems from intolerance and discrimination. As 
we fight this common enemy overseas, through our foreign information, military and 
economic aid and trade programs, so we must fight it at home—never being afraid to 




belong.‖ Javits ended his message to his fellow WWII veteran with a liberal 
Americanism call to arms, noting, ―Our patriotic duty and devotion to free institutions 
and ideals are not fully discharged by honorable conduct on the battlefield. We must 
be equally fervent in continuing to fight in peace against what we opposed in war—
the forces of intolerance everywhere. The fight must be waged in Congress, in 
convention halls and in our own communities.‖
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Some 40 & 8ers, however, also choose to resign. For example, Wilbur 
Lindholm, Minnesota‘s Commissioner of Veterans Affairs, resigned from 40 & 8, 
noting, he could, ―no longer tolerate membership in any organization allowing such 
discrimination‖. Lindholm did not suddenly arrive as this decision. ―In the last four 
years,‖ he explained, ―I‘ve tried to get a grass roots movement started to remove the 
word ‗white‘ from the constitution.‖ In spite of these efforts, he noted, ―it looks like 
bigotry will prevail.‖ Given his experiences, Lindholm concluded, ―I don‘t foresee 
any change from within the 40 & 8 unless the Legion kicks them out.‖
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In keeping with the convention‘s mandate, the Legion‘s newly elected 
national commander, Martin B. McKneally, initially attempted to settle the race ban 
issue through talks with the national 40 & 8. On August 31, four days after the 
convention ended, McKneally ―assured Senator Kenneth B. Keating…that he would 
do everything possible,‖ as the New York Times reported, ―to eliminate [the] 
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restriction barring Negroes and Orientals from the 40 & 8.‖ Negotiations with 40 & 8, 
however, proved to be, as McKneally termed them, ―fruitless.‖ McKneally next 
brought the issue before the October 1959 meeting of the Legion‘s National 
Executive Committee (NEC,) in a ―special report‖ which detailed the group‘s 
intransigence. He also offered a resolution for the NEC ‗s approval, authorizing him 
to force compliance. As McKneally informed NEC members, ―It is my considered 
opinion…that they do not intend to take any action to meet the issue, [and] that it is 
incumbent upon us to take every available step at our command to require the Forty 
and Eight to eliminate the white provision from its Constitution.‖ In making this case 
to the NEC, McKneally presented his ―special report.‖ Much of the report contained 
the text of his previously released press statement, of August 31, 1959, in which he 
laid out ―his own personal position on this matter.‖ The ban, he noted, violated the 
Legion‘s membership requirements, which, ―are simple: honorable service by United 
States citizens in times of war—and none other.‖ His other key point invoked the 
language of liberal Americanism. ―I believe that The American Legion, composed as 
it is of veterans of three wars which were fought for the preservation of freedom and 
human dignity, should be in the forefront in promoting brotherhood and should be the 
leader in allaying prejudice.‖ Following its deliberations, the NEC provided 
McKneally with ―special powers,‖ and authorized him to use ―any and all measures‖ 
he needed to prevail. If the group failed to comply by November 26, the NEC also 
made it clear that it would be expelled from the national body.
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The NEC based its decision on several key factors, two of which focused on 
organizational rules and the potential legal consequences the racial restriction posed. 
The committee easily sustained McKneally‘s point that the group, as a subsidiary unit 
of the Legion, violated the Legion‘s constitution, which did not preclude membership 
according to race. It also held that such racial restrictions on membership were not 
approved in the Legion‘s charter granted by Congress, and that they also violated the 
U.S. Constitution‘s 14
th
 amendment prohibitions against race discrimination. Beyond 
these points, the NEC also considered the advice of Ralph Gregg, the Legion‘s 
national judge advocate, concerning the potential for legal harm to the national body 
if the ban continued. Citing in particular the litigation regarding the San Jose 40 & 8 
charter revocation case, Gregg, stated that the ban meant both the Legion and 40 & 8 
could face similar legal difficulties especially from ―state attorneys general.‖ Gregg 
also noted that, ―Funds to serve disabled war veterans, granted to the Legion by some 
of the states, are in jeopardy so long as the 40 & 8 illegality exist.‖  Pennsylvania‘s 
Walter E. Allesandroni strongly reinforced these various legal points, especially 
regarding the Congressional charter. As he stated, ―We are, as a legal entity…only 
what the Congress said we are…it is crystal clear and there can be no disagreement 
about this. I emphasize: there can be no disagreement, and I have heard none, that 
The American Legion cannot limit its membership by defining certain classes…as to 
race, creed, or color.‖ Appealing to his fellow NEC members‘ conservative attitudes 
towards the law, and stressing the potential for ―grave legal consequences‖ coming 
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from ―individuals, attorneys general…and the United States Government,‖ 
Allesandroni declared, ―I say to you that this is not a personal decision of the national 
commander not founded on fact and law…[a] vote in favor of this resolution is 
nothing more than a vote for law and order, and I urge that you support it.‖
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Another key consideration weighed by the NEC involved the negative 
publicity the controversy produced. The NEC‘s deliberations emphasized that, ―since 
1954 at least the Legion had received bad press and a bad reputation for the 40 & 8‘s 
blanket discrimination against non-white Legionnaire war veterans.‖ Also, the 1959 
convention vote to maintain the racial restriction,― resulted in…bad nationwide 
publicity…that smothered reports of the great work of the Legion.‖ In speaking to 
this point during deliberations, one NEC member, Thomas W. Miller, Nevada 
Department commander, noted that even, ―Our great Legionnaire from the 
Department of Colorado, E. Palmer Hoyt, the editor of the Denver Post, comes out 
and gives us a good raking over.‖ Likewise, speaking in support of repealing the 
racial ban, H. Armand de Masi, identifying himself as ―the only major city executive 
editor of a newspaper of this committee,‖ observed, ―I tell you we are going to get 
continual adverse publicity and we are losing good will.‖
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In response to those advocating against 40 & 8‘s racial ban, southern NEC 
representatives voiced their considerable displeasure over the pressures for civil rights 
reform occurring in Dixie, and maintained that forcing 40& 8 to change would only 
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serve to alienate their members against the Legion. George T. Lewis, of Memphis, 
Tennessee, told his fellow committeemen of the, ―growing resentment against such 
organizations as the NAACP and other organizations which provide the Negro the 
chance of forcing them into an integrated school or into a white section, on a public 
bus, or [sic] many of the other things that they are doing. We are now having trouble 
with golf courses and other things.‖ Having apprised NEC members of the ―problem‖ 
of an especially high concentration of blacks, ―in Shelby County where I live,‖ and in 
other counties in the region, Lewis warned of that ending the racial ban would 
undercut the Legion‘s southern membership base. ―The loss of membership,‖ he 
argued, ―is going to come from the White [sic] Legionnaires who resent the fact that 
the national organization is attempting to dictate to the Forty and Eight a step which 
they regard as the colored man getting his foot a little farther in the door and I think it 
will make it very difficult for our membership there in my department of about 
55,000 members. We have between three and four thousand colored members. The 
majority of our membership comes from white people.‖  Certain of the impending 
trouble among his white membership, Lewis declared, ―I personally think if we are 
going to throw the Forty and Eight out, I would rather a lot [sic] rather throw them 
out for ungentlemanly conduct than to make it a racial issue.‖ The Mississippi 
Department‘s representative, Ralph Godwin, concurred with Lewis. ―I ask that you 
not question my love for The [sic] American Legion,‖ Godwin said, ―but I most 
heartily second the remarks of my good lawyer friend from Tennessee. The problem 
is serious and when it comes to a vote Mississippi must be recorded as voting no.‖ 




Godwin blurted out his objection, ―May the record indicate that Mississippi voted 
‗No‘.‖
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NEC members Armand de Masi and North Dakota‘s William Stern dismissed 
these notions of member defections. As de Masi noted, ―We are not going to lose 
members because of this. We are losing members already and we have lost members 
by people who have dropped out of Forty and Eight because of this thing.‖ Stern, also 
commenting that he was ―proud‖ as a Republican that Miller had mentioned Senator 
Joe McCarthy‘s name in his presentation on adverse publicity, likewise voiced the 
opinion that, ―we have lost membership over the years and this never entered into the 
situation whatsoever. Therefore I don‘t believe we are going to lose any membership 
because of this controversy in any way…We have other reasons for gaining 
membership besides this discussion.‖
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 Thomas Miller advanced a positive reform-minded position on race. ―[The 
national commander]…has presented his report to you...Now in this committee 
room…have been …representatives of all of the races of the Mediterranean, the 
Greeks, the Italians, the Spanish, the French, and going into the Pacific we have 
sitting right here as members of this NEC [my abbrev.] two splendid representatives 
of the Chinese race, our committeeman from Hawaii, Wally Young, and the 
alternate…Arizona, Soleng Tom. Would you deny them membership in this fun-
loving, hot footing, fanny-pinching, town wrecking branch of The American Legion? 
Certainly you would not.‖ Further he noted, ―If the 50
th
 state of the Union sees fit to 
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send a full-blooded member of the Chinese race to the United States Senate, a 
Republican, or a full-blooded member of the Japanese race to the Lower House of 
Congress, Mr. Inouye, …it certainly is high time that The American Legion took the 
steps recommended to us by our national commander.‖ 
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Confronted by 40 & 8‘s continued defiance of the NEC‘s decision, in late 
October 1959 McKneally threatened ―court action.‖ On November 30, he ordered the 
Legion‘s judge advocate to proceed ―‗immediately with legal proceedings testing the 
validity of the racial restriction.‘‖ Subsequently, on December 4, McKneally formally 
barred 40 & 8 from using the Legion‘s emblem and participating in its events. Later, 
in July 1960 the Legion persuaded Miami Beach‘s city manager to deny the 40 & 
8‘ers a permit to join its scheduled national convention parade there in October. As 
McKneally stated the case, their presence in the parade ―would have been ‗offensive‘ 
to the Legion.‖ The Afro- American reported that the Legion, in fact, ―threatened to 
move its convention from Miami Beach if the 40 and 8 Society is to be given a parade 
permit.‖ At the October convention, some delegations, ―spearheaded‖ by the southern 
departments, moved to restore 40 & 8‘s standing in the national body. While some 
southern delegates ―said the issue was not primarily racial,‖ Mississippi NEC member 
Ralph Goodwin told reporters that the 40 & 8 might opt for an independent status to 
avoid compliance, and that, ―pins for a separate outfit had already been printed and 
would carry the slogan ‗white all the way.‘‖ The Legion‘s Internal Affairs 
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Committee, however, upheld the NEC‘s actions, and the full convention voted 2, 344 
to 693, sustaining that decision.
335
  
From the time McKneally initially acted in October 1959 to force 40 & 8 into 
account for its membership ban, the black press and other liberal outlets praised the 
Legion‘s new approach. In late October, the Afro-American declared, ―because of its 
backward stand on so many issues in which we are interested, …we have consistently 
regarded the Legion with the same lack of affection we hold for the Daughters of the 
American Revolution. But no more.‖ As the editorial noted, ―Happily we find we 
must revise our appraisal of the Legion and gladly we doff our hats to its executive 
committee for the forthright stand it has adopted against discrimination.‖ As the paper 
concluded, ―This is indeed a move forward that merits the applause of all freedom- 
loving Americans, veterans and non-veterans alike.‖ In November 1959, the Chicago 
Defender reprinted a story from the Cleveland Call-Post noting, ―if the ultimatum 
moves the Forty and Eight to get out the Legion, everybody concerned should 
rejoice.‖ The story also recognized the work of two Cleveland Legionnaires, 
Lawrence Schumake and Jimmy Johnson. ―Both men,‖ it noted, ―played outstanding 
parts in bringing this un-American policy of one of the nation‘s ultra-patriotic groups 
to public attention, and despite rebuffs, both fought ceaselessly to bring about official 
censure of its blatant discrimination against Negro war veterans.‖ Later, in mid-
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December, the Chicago Defender observed, ―By removing this fun-making, prejudice 
inspired unit from its membership the Legion has removed dead rats from under the 
house.‖ In early December, the New York Times stated, ―As a newspaper critical of 
the American Legion‘s views on many matters of public policy, ranging from 
veterans‘ legislation to civil liberties we are encouraged to see the Legion take this 
strong position against discrimination and in favor of decent race relations.‖
336
  
For his part, Congressman Diggs embraced news of the change by rescinding 
his resignation from Detroit‘s Charles Young Post 77. Senator Javits sent McKneally 
a congratulatory telegram emphasizing ―the personal attention you have given this 
matter commencing with your election as national commander...last August.‖ Javits 
again took the opportunity to highlight the importance of the policy change to the 
Cold War. ―This action by you…is powerful proof to the citizens of the free world 
and the communist bloc that the fight to secure equal rights for all Americans under 
the law is being pressed with vigor and purpose by our national leaders. I cannot 
emphasize to you too strongly how important this fact is in fortifying the prestige of 
the U. S. peace leadership‖
337
 
Representing the AVC, Mickey Levine rebutted the favorable New York 
Times  editorial, and by implication, the positive views expressed by other liberal 
critics as well. While agreeing with the ―sentiments expressed,‖ by the Times, Levine 
wrote, ―This is the important point to consider. The Legion is still a segregated 
organization with Jim Crow posts in every state in the Union.‖ Levine also attributed 
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the Legion‘s policy shift, not to idealism, but to organizational self-interest. ―The 
only reason it took action against the 40 & 8 was because, while the 40 & 8 remained 
a Legion affiliate, the Legion itself was open to grave legal consequences, including 
subjecting itself to tax payers‘ suits.‖ Citing, verbatim, from the December 1959 
American Legion Magazine, Levine stated that the NEC‘s ruling ―would not compel 
any [40 & 8 chapter] to accept redheads, blondes, brunettes, Navy chiefs, Negroes, 
Chinese, whites, major generals, or any other special class, race, occupation, religion 
or other subcategory of the human species.‖  Levine also announced the AVC‘s 
intention to maintain its ―taxpayers‘ suit against the 40 & 8,‖ and ―to fight against all 
veterans organizations, including the American Legion, that operate as segregated 
institutions, rather than as honorable veterans organizations.‖
338
 
The points Levine emphasized were apparent in the Legion‘s internal 
deliberations. The NEC did consider the legal ramifications of 40 & 8‘s continued 
affiliation, and despite Thomas Miller‘s expressions of racial inclusion, it made no 
constitutional moves towards prohibiting the practice of racial segregation among its 
own units. Although Levine‘s letter to the New York Times did not mention the 
negative publicity stemming from 40 & 8‘s Legion affiliation, the NEC clearly did 
view it an important issue. The NEC‘s authorization for McKneally to act against 40 
& 8‘s whites only membership restriction, as Levine‘s critique pointed out, did reflect 
matters of organizational self-interest, distinct from concerns for promoting racial 
equality, especially as regards the group‘s desire to avoid further damage to its public 
image. But the NEC‘s actions, and the full convention‘s endorsement of them, also 
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reflected larger changes in the culture concerning race. As Gary Gerstle‘s recent 
study of race and nationalism has shown, many Americans in the 1950s were 
embracing more inclusive notions of nationality that welcomed Jews, Italians, and 
Catholics, as well as African-Americans, into the country‘s ―imagined community‖ of 
acceptable citizens.
339
 As the 40 & 8 episode reveals, in this period of transition, these 
changing attitudes probably began to move at least a certain number of Legionnaires 
to the conclusion that blatantly restrictive membership rules based on race, carried 
over from the interwar years, were no longer acceptable. Yet, while these new values 
seemed to have resonated with white Legionnaires to some extent, they did not, as 
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
 
As the study has shown, after World War Two, the American Legion emerged 
as an important force of conservative opposition to the New Deal. As did other 
conservative individuals and organizations, the Legion viewed the liberal centralized 
welfare state as an unwarranted encroachment upon the American way of life, defined 
as individual liberty, the system of laissez faire free enterprise and states‘ rights. In 
keeping with dominant conservative viewpoints, the Legion regarded New Deal 
liberalism as an alien and un-American development. In the 1950s, through its 
Americanism program, it brought its considerable organizational resources to bear in 
support of the broader efforts of conservatives to stop the advance of the New 
Deal/Fair Deal state. Through its national magazine, the Legion warned its nearly 
three million members that liberalism had placed the nation on a dangerous path 
towards becoming a collectivist dictatorship that is, the very type of society the 
United States was waging a Cold War to defeat. Its anti-subversives activities, an 
integral part of its Americanism program, facilitated its efforts to discredit liberalism 
as alien and radical.  
The postwar Legion also opposed the efforts of the liberal state to use its 
power to extend social benefits and political rights to groups previously denied access 
to them, especially African Americans. It worked with conservative business 
organizations to defeat public housing programs. Also, through its alliance with the 
American Medical Association, the Legion helped to defeat the expansion of health 
care to millions of Americans. In the South, Legionnaires joined the movement to 




Cold War discourse, it denounced efforts of the federal government to enforce racial 
integration as akin to the actions of Soviet totalitarians. Since the national Legion 
refused to alter its long-standing policy permitting racial segregation among its 
affiliates, and failed to confront the anti-civil rights activities of its southern branches, 
it facilitated its solidification into a major instrument of racial segregation in the 
1950s. Its opposition to U.S. Supreme Court rulings giving federal authorities 
exclusive jurisdiction in enforcing laws against sedition converged with the interests 
of segregationist Legionnaires aligned against growing federal encroachments on 
individual state authority over civil rights matters. In short, through its opposition to 
the role of the interventionist state in the economy and in civil rights policy, in 
important ways, the Legion helped establish the conservative political culture of the 
1950s. 
Yet as this study has also shown, conservative dominance did not remain 
unchallenged. Despite the hegemonic power of conservative Cold War Americanism, 
a small, but persistent, portion of the organized veterans‘ community, the American 
Veterans Committee, dissented, and attempted to counter the Legion. Using a liberal 
Americanism, the AVC promoted the New Deal legacy both as regards its promise of 
expanded economic security and equal access to its social provisions irrespective of 
race by extending full civil rights to all citizens. The example of the AVC sheds 
further light on how anti-Communist rhetoric served multiple political agendas in the 
1950s.  Its Cold War discourse opposed the efforts of conservatives to conflate 
liberalism with subversion through its representations of New Deal economic 




implemented its Americanism program activities on behalf of civil liberties and civil 
rights. Its attempt to challenge anti-New Deal forces disrupts the notion that an 
untramelled conservative consensus defined the political culture of the 1950s. The 
Cold War opened a very narrow space for the AVC to promote its reform program. 
The AVC‘s failure to achieve its goals, however, highlights the limits of Cold War 
discourse as a language of reform in this period. Yet, its presence in the 1950s, 
though muted, ensured that the conservative Legion was not, as then AVC national 
chairman Mickey Levine put it in 1955, ―the ONLY VETERANS voice heard.‖
340
  
Yet even as the civil rights movement intensified in the 1960s, the Legion 
remained a force for segregation and massive resistance to racial change. In 
December 1960, the all-white Legion post in Jackson (TN) demanded that Legion 
national commander Martin A. McKneally and HUAC investigate Lane College, a 
local black institution, after its marching band ―during the half-time ceremony‖ of a 
football game, ―played the Russian national anthem while standing in a hammer and 
sickle formation.‖  But as Lane College President Chester A, Kirkendall explained to 
the Afro-American, the band had played ―the anthems of all of the ‗Big Four‘ nations, 
Russia, France, England, and the United States…in that order.‖ Kirkendall also 
connected the white Legionnaires‘ protest to civil rights. ―They are just angry about 
the sit-downs that started here last month.‖ Indeed, as the Afro-American reported, 11 
Lane students had recently been arrested ―while staging a sit-down at Woolworth‘s 
and McCellan‘s five and dime.‖ While local units of the VFW and the Disabled 
American Veterans supported the Legion‘s protest, the all-black Lake Cisco Legion 
Post 485 ―countered‖ it with ―telegrams endorsing the college to both the House 
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Committee and…to McKneally.‖ Student protests were in fact increasing in the 
Jackson area. As the Afro-American reported, ―Nineteen students who participated in 
an Election Day parade Saturday were fined $50 on a charge of parading without a 
permit. The convictions brought to 58 the number of students who have been tried. A 
total of 144 were arrested. The fines are being appealed.‖
341
  
Also, when asked on ―Meet the Press‖ in early October 1963 to state the 
Legion‘s policy on civil rights, then national commander Daniel F. Foley told 
reporters ―the Legion had adopted the House Un-American Activities Committee 
definition of Americanism calling for ‗class, religious and racial tolerance,‘‖ and ―has 
taken no position on rights legislation.‖
342
 The Legion‘s stance on civil rights 
continued to generate protests from liberal critics. In September 1966, the AVC asked 
President Johnson not to address national Legion convention then meeting 
Washington, DC, because, as the group declared, ―the Legion is ‗still overwhelmingly 
a segregated organization.‘‖ After Johnson spoke at the convention, the Americans 
for Democratic Action publicly criticized his action, and informed the President that 




Despite these protests, the Legion continued to permit segregation in local 
affiliates in the early 1970s. In January 1972, Mrs. Madeline W. Murphy wrote the 
Afro-American, ―It is quite predictable that a racist organization such as the American 
Legion can raise its thunderous 200 percent American voice while flouting all true 
Americanism with separate Legion posts for black and white. Doing this in spite of 
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the fact that the black man has fought in every dirty war in the dirtiest jobs and in 
numbers (particularly in Vietnam) way out of proportion to his ratio to the total 
population.‖ Murphy began her letter recalling her mother‘s participation in a 
political rally ―some thirty five years ago‖ for Republican U.S. Senator John 
Williams, who told his all-black audience, ―I know how you all have always been 
loyal to the white man‘s flag.‖ Incensed by the remark, her mother ―interrupted him,‖ 
and proclaimed, ―How many wars must the Negroes fight before the U.S. flag 
becomes the black man‘s flag?‖
344
 With the persistence of segregation in the Legion 
in the early 1970s, its conservative Americanism still offered no definitive answer to 
that question. But as this study suggests, given its prominence in the conservative 
backlash against liberalism in the 1950s, its role in helping to create the postwar 
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